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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the research questions that will be addressed in the chapters to 
follow. Why do people contribute to collective goods? From a sociological and 
psychological perspective, different answers to this question are described. 
 
 
1.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In one of the episodes of Monty Python, the famous BBC-series, John Cleese 
plays a merchant banker, who receives a Mr Ford in his office. Mr Ford, played by 
Terry Jones, is holding a tin. This is what happens next. 
 
Mr Ford: Oh. I wondered whether you’d like to contribute to the orphan’s home. (he rattles 
the tin) […..] 
Banker: Yes, but you see I don’t know what it’s for.  
Mr Ford: It’s for the orphans.  
Banker: Yes?  
Mr Ford: It’s a gift.  
Banker: A what?  
Mr Ford: A gift.  
Banker: Oh a gift!  
Mr Ford: Yes.  
Banker: A tax dodge.  
Mr Ford: No, no, no, no. [………] 
Banker: No? Well, I’m awfully sorry I don’t understand. Can you just explain exactly what 
you want.  
Mr Ford: Well, I want you to give me a pound, and then I go away and give it to the 
orphans.  
Banker: Yes?  
Mr Ford: Well, that’s it.  
Banker: No, no, no, I don’t follow this at all, I mean, I don’t want to seem stupid but it looks 
to me as though I’m a pound down on the whole deal.  
Mr Ford: Well, yes you are.  
Banker: I am! Well, what is my incentive to give you the pound?  
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Mr Ford: Well the incentive is to make the orphans happy.  
Banker: (genuinely puzzled) Happy? You quite sure you’ve got this right?  
Mr Ford: Yes, lots of people give me money.  
Banker: What, just like that?  
Mr Ford: Yes.  
Banker: Must be sick! 
 
Merchant bankers and free riders? 
The merchant banker in this sketch pretends not to know what giving to charity 
is all about, because there is no personal gain in giving money to charity. He behaves 
exactly as a rational choice theory of human behavior, based on a self-interested model 
of man, would predict. In many cases, orthodox assumptions on self-interest provide 
an adequate explanation for the things that people do. But for prosocial behavior, the 
model obviously has drawbacks. Not many people react as the merchant banker do. A 
completely self-interested homo economicus does not contribute to charity, does not 
hold memberships of voluntary organizations that promote collective interests, and 
does not volunteer (Archer & Tritter, 2002; Elster, 1989, 1990; Halfpenny, 1999; 
Heath, 1976). But many people in real life do. The contrast between the self interested 
model of man in rational choice theory and the apparently non-self interested behavior 
of real individuals in society has been brought to the fore by Mancur Olson almost 40 
years ago (Olson, 1965). This problem has puzzled many social scientists and became 
known as the ‘collective good problem’ or the ‘participation paradox’ (Udéhn, 1993). 
When people have a choice to contribute to a collective good, their best option usually 
is not to contribute. In most cases, one extra contribution does not make a noticeable 
difference for the collective outcome. The personal gain from a contribution does not 
outweigh the costs involved. The rational actor is a ‘free rider’. Whatever the other 
potential contributors do, he is better off if he does not contribute to the collective 
good.  
However, there are numerous examples of prosocial behavior in real life, which 
violate this prediction. A good example is blood donation. The blood supply in the 
Netherlands depends completely on donations from volunteers, who are not paid. 
Blood collection is organized on a not-for-profit basis by Sanquin, which operates the 
regional blood banks. In 2002, some 532,000 persons donated blood at least once a    
year (Sanquin, 2003). Another example is charitable giving. In 2001, more than 80% 
of Dutch households donated money to charitable causes and nonprofit organizations. 
Annual donations totaled an estimated € 1,753 million in 2001, which is about 1.7% 
of GDP (Schuyt, 2003). The bulk of this money is contributed through direct mail 
solicitations, which are anonymous in the sense that they are difficult to observe 
directly by others. They are voluntary in the sense that there is no direct social pressure 
by a solicitor asking face-to-face for a contribution. Moreover, a considerable portion 
of philanthropic donations is received by organizations that do not provide services 
that can be used by the donors. International relief charities and organizations 
defending human or animal rights are specific examples. These donations are far from 
trivial. In 2001, € 370 million was donated to international solidarity and € 130 
million to environmental organizations, almost 30% of all donations by Dutch 
households (Gouwenberg, Wiepking, Schuyt, Bekkers & Smit, 2003, p. 39). A third 
example is membership of voluntary associations. Excluding church membership, 
which is not voluntary in the sense that many people are born as a church member, 
more than 60% of the population is a member of at least one voluntary associations 
supporting some type of collective good, while the average Dutch citizen holds more 
than 2 memberships (De Hart, 1999). A fourth example is unpaid work for voluntary 
associations. In 2002, more than 30% of the Dutch population was active as an unpaid 
volunteer working for a nonprofit organization (Dekker & De Hart, 2003). 
 
Selective incentives and ‘other things’ 
Clearly, many people do not behave as the merchant banker in the Monty 
Python-sketch. How can these apparently irrational behaviors be explained? The 
classical explanation offered by Olson (1965) is that voluntary associations provide 
incentives that make it worthwhile to become a member. Consumer interest groups 
(“Consumentenbond”), for instance, provide access to test reports of new products to 
members; the Automobile Association (ANWB) provides on demand repair services at 
below market prices to members; and many worker unions provide legal assistance and 
offer insurances at below market prices to members. However, in many cases it is 
questionable whether the value of these services actually outweighs the membership 
dues. Furthermore, not all types of voluntary associations offer such services. Many 
organizations only send magazines to their members, filled with reports on the progress 
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made in achieving the goals of the organization and requests for (additional) donations. 
It is hard to imagine how such ‘incentives’ could convince self-interested free riders to 
become members. Similar arguments hold for volunteering, donation of money and 
blood donation: they are not rewarded with money or goods of equal value, reciprocity 
is impossible, and the act of giving is usually anonymous. But if it is not for personal 
gain, then why do people contribute to collective goods? This question becomes even 
more pressing when we consider contributions to organizations working for some 
abstract ideal such as world peace, human rights, biodiversity, or charities seeking to 
relieve the needs of others in distant parts of the world. Selective incentives provided by 
the voluntary association itself generally do not outweigh the costs of contributing to 
the collective good for an individual actor. There must be other things that people take 
into account when deciding to contribute time, money, or blood. 
What are these ‘other things’ that people take into account when they decide to 
contribute to some collective good or not? The chapters in this dissertation consider 
two types of ‘other things’ that can make it worth while for an individual to contribute 
to collective goods: social incentives and psychological characteristics of decision 
makers. It is definitely possible to model these two ‘other things’ as additional utility 
arguments in a rational choice framework (see, e.g., Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Becker, 
1974; Duncan, 2004; Soetevent, 2003; Van de Ven, 2003; Weesie, 1994). These 
models have not addressed the issue how strong the effects of various sources of utility 
are, whether they interact, and if so, how. This dissertation explores the effects of 
social conditions generating social incentives, and psychological characteristics 
generating intrinsic rewards for prosocial behavior. In addition, interactions of 
psychological characteristics with social and material conditions are investigated, in 
order to facilitate decisions for model builders which types of utility arguments to focus 
on in future research and how to model them. There is no good reason to invest a lot 
of time in formal analyses and mathematical models of the effects of psychological 
incentives and intrinsic rewards on prosocial behavior when these effects are negligible, 
or only become apparent in specific conditions.  
 
Social conditions and psychological motives for prosocial behavior 
The social environment in which people live determines the social incentives 
they have for making contributions to collective goods. Many social groups evaluate    
such contributions positively, and integration in these groups creates obligations, which 
have to be realized in order to avoid disapproval. In addition, it should be taken into 
account that actual prosocial behavior is not only an outcome of a decision making 
process, but also a function of the exposure to requests for contributions. Some persons 
are more likely to be asked to become a member of a voluntary association, to donate 
money or blood, or to volunteer. Before social incentives can come into play, people 
have to be asked. Therefore, I investigate the effects of social conditions in which 
people live on their contributions to collective goods in chapters three to seven.  
However, differences in the opportunities and social incentives may not fully 
explain contributions to collective goods. Even when prosocial behavior is anonymous, 
and approval can hardly be earned, there are still people who contribute. The examples 
of monetary donations to charitable causes illustrate this. In addition, experimental 
evidence reviewed below also shows that there must be ‘still other things’ that make 
people give besides social rewards. People do not only differ in the exposure to requests 
for contributions and the social incentives for contributions to collective goods. People 
also differ in the individual preferences they have for the well being of others. Some 
types of persons are simply more likely to contribute to collective goods, whatever the 
circumstances. But who are these Mr Nice guys, the do-gooders? Which psychological 
characteristics make people have an altruistic personality? And where do these 
prosocial motives come from? Sociologists and psychologists have given different 
answers to this question. Sociologists have emphasized the role of parents in setting the 
right example. Personality and social psychologists have emphasized the role of 
personality characteristics that people acquire early in life and carry with them from 
one situation to the next (Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & 
Freifeld, 1995). In addition to social conditions, all chapters consider the effects of 
personality characteristics on contributions to collective goods. I investigate whether 
contributions to collective goods can be explained more fully by taking these individual 
differences into account. In the final two chapters (chapter six and seven) I also 
investigate the effects of socialization by parents. Putting the arguments together, the 
research question guiding chapters three to seven is:  
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P1.  To what extent can giving and volunteering behavior be explained by prosocial 
motives and other psychological characteristics of people and the social 
conditions in which they live? 
 
Below (see section 1.2) I will present a selective and very brief review of the 
overwhelming amount of studies on prosocial behavior in sociology and social and 
personality psychology, in order to make a reasonable choice of which social 
conditions and psychological characteristics are most likely to be related to 
contributions to collective goods. 
The second research question behind the chapters concerns the interaction 
between the effects of material and social incentives and psychological characteristics. 
It would be naïve to assume that there is a class of people called ‘saints’ and that these 
‘saints’ always display saint-like behavior. ‘Good intentions’ do not manifest 
themselves in every situation. When do people act upon their good intentions? A 
rational choice theorist would say: especially if it does not cost them too much. When 
people are asked for a small donation for a charity, they can afford themselves to be 
altruistic. This idea is called the ‘low cost-hypothesis’ (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 
1998, 2003; Mensch, 2000). Another idea in this regard originated in personality 
psychology, and predicts that people act upon their individual preferences when the 
expectations of others about their behavior are rather unclear. Only when there is no 
strict social norm that may guide our behavior, we base our decisions upon our own 
peculiar preferences. This idea is called the ‘weak situation-hypothesis’ (Mischel, 1977, 
1993; Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Both the low cost-hypothesis as well as the weak 
situation-hypothesis will be discussed more extensively below (see section 1.3). Testing 
these hypotheses can give an answer to the second research question: 
 
P2.  In which conditions are prosocial motives and other psychological 
characteristics more strongly related to giving and volunteering? 
    
1.2. SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
1.2.1. Sociology  
A sociological answer to the question why people contribute to collective goods 
is found in the classical theory of Emile Durkheim on norm conformity (Durkheim, 
1897). Durkheim was not very clear on the mechanisms that explain the effect of group 
cohesion on individual norm conformity. His theory has been interpreted in at least 
two ways, depending on the place where the effect of norms is assumed to become 
visible. In the first interpretation, social norms reside outside the individual, and 
become visible through the actions of other persons in the intermediary groups and 
social networks that the individual is a part of. In the second interpretation, social 
norms reside inside the individual, in his beliefs and internalized value system. 
According to the first interpretation, individuals are more likely to obey social norms 
when they are more strongly integrated in intermediary social groups such as the 
church, the family, or the village. This interpretation is sometimes labeled as a 
‘structural’ interpretation, because it emphasizes the role of group structure, assuming 
that there are no differences in the strength of these norms between social groups. 
According to the second interpretation, individuals are more likely to obey social 
norms when they have internalized these norms through socialization in intermediary 
social groups, also when they are no longer part of these groups (Ultee, Arts & Flap, 
2003). This interpretation is sometimes labeled the ‘cultural’ interpretation, because it 
assumes that individuals carry the beliefs and values that they have acquired through 
socialization with them throughout their life. ‘Culture’ and ‘structure’ are often used 
terms for competing paradigms in the social sciences (De Graaf, 2002). Although the 
two interpretations lead to different predictions on the conditions in which social 
norms affect behavior, they are complementary. The ‘cultural’ interpretation is an 
addition to the ‘structural’ interpretation, claiming that social norms affect behavior in 
a larger class of situations. The work of social scientists such as George Homans, Peter 
Blau, Robert Axelrod, and James Coleman can be seen as reinventions and 
specifications of the ‘structural’ interpretation of Durkheims theory of norm 
conformity. The ‘cultural’ interpretation has been advocated by Talcott Parsons (Ultee, 
1976). I will discuss the mechanisms that are related to norm conformity identified by 
various social scientists according to the ‘method of decreasing abstraction’ 
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(Lindenberg, 1992), starting with the model of man as a strictly rational actor caring 
only about his own material well being, and adding more complex assumptions later. 
Group size - The assumption of purely self-interested actors, caring only for 
their own monetary pay-offs in a social dilemma situation, predicts that the likelihood 
of contributions to collective goods increases as groups become smaller (Olson, 1965, 
p. 35): the more people with whom the contribution has to be shared, the smaller the 
private benefit. Experiments with social dilemmas have confirmed that the higher the 
number of actors benefiting from cooperation, the lower the rate of cooperation 
(Komorita & Parks, 1994; Stroebe & Frey, 1982; Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick & 
Wilke, 1992, p. 18). But the effect of group size is more than this. In small groups, 
individuals are more likely to encounter the same partners in future social dilemmas.  
Direct reciprocity - The work of Robert Axelrod (1984) on cooperation in 
prisoner’s dilemmas (PDs) suggests that even completely egoistic rational actors may 
achieve collectively optimal outcomes when the probability of repeated interaction in 
the future is high enough. Cooperation may require (even substantial) investments in 
the short run, but it may be beneficial in the long run, when it evokes cooperative 
responses from other players in the game. Unconditional defection elicits uncooperative 
counter-strategies. The converse strategy, unconditional cooperation, however, is too 
naive: it will give the other player the opportunity to exploit the cooperator. The most 
successful strategy in repeated PD-games is a simple rule of reciprocity, also known as 
‘tit for tat’ (Axelrod, 1984). As long as people can be sure that they will deal with the 
same partner(s) in future interactions, they have a stake in maintaining good relations 
with these partners, and they will be careful not to ‘lock themselves in’ a series of 
mutual defections. The work of Axelrod and later sociologists and game theorists 
studying social dilemmas shows how self-interest leads to norm conformity in the kind 
of groups that Durkheim studied. The ‘shadow of the future’, the expectation of 
repeated interaction, can account for prosocial behavior towards family members, 
neighbors, friends and even business partners. If there is the possibility of a repeated 
interaction or a series of repeated interactions with the recipient, helping behavior may 
pay off in the long run. In this case, the puzzle why people help each other is not very 
difficult: helping may be motivated by the expectation of future rewards. Coleman 
(1990) has explained this kind of prosocial behavior as the distribution of ‘credit slips’, 
a new metaphor in the study of the well known mechanism of social exchange    
(Homans, 1958, 1974; Blau, 1964). When you help your neighbor or colleague, she 
will feel obliged to return your favor sometime in the future. Research on trust has 
shown that the expectation of interaction in the future is positively related to 
trustworthy behavior both among students as well as business partners when it is 
profitable for them to abuse trust (Buskens, 1999; Gautschi, 2002). 
Generalized reciprocity - In many social dilemma situations in the real world in 
which we observe prosocial behavior there is no mechanism of direct reciprocity. Very 
often, the beneficiaries do not give something back to the donors. For instance, the 
people who make use of the services of a voluntary association usually do not 
compensate the volunteers who are working for the association, either with money or 
with services. Charitable giving, blood donation and post mortem organ donation are 
even stronger examples. Beneficiaries of charities in distant countries often cannot 
compensate the donors because they lack the resources to do so. Patients who receive 
blood do not know the donors because blood donation is anonymous. Post mortem 
organ donors cannot know the beneficiaries because the gift is made when they have 
died. In these examples, repeated interaction with the beneficiary is not possible. 
However, there are other forms of reciprocity that may give an adequate explanation 
for some types of prosocial behavior. Some of these examples of prosocial behavior 
may be explained by the principle of generalized reciprocity, which relaxes the 
assumption that the beneficiary compensates the donor (Gouldner, 1960). Generalized 
reciprocity occurs when help provided to someone in the community is compensated by 
another member of the community, even if this person did not receive help directly 
from the original helper. Person A helps B, B helps C, and C helps A. Generalized 
exchange emerges more easily in more cohesive groups because denser networks 
contain more connections between the individuals. Experimental research has 
corroborated that past help received from a third party increases the amount of help 
given (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1968). The principle of generalized reciprocity may 
explain some examples of volunteering: if person A volunteers for association X, and 
person B makes use of the services of X, person B may reciprocate by volunteering for 
association Y, which provides services that person C uses; person C in turn volunteers 
for association Z, which provides services for person A. This example seems to be far-
fetched. However, if the assumption that the service returned to person A must be of 
the same type as the service rendered by person A is relaxed, this example becomes 
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more realistic. Person C may not volunteer for Z, but may donate money, which 
enables Z to perform the service for A by hiring paid workers. Or person C may 
reward person A directly, with a form of practical support (e.g., by borrowing tools or 
money).  
Social incentives – In the social dilemma paradigm, decision makers can only 
punish defection by other players by defecting themselves in the next round of the 
game. Sociologists have stressed that in the real world, sanctioning often takes on more 
subtle forms. People do not only care for their own monetary pay-offs in future games, 
they also care about their reputation and social status in the group. When prosocial 
behavior is visible to others, it may produce social approval. Not only is interpersonal 
helping often in line with the (long term) material interests of the helper, it is also a 
way to build up a good reputation, to gain social approval or to avoid a bad reputation 
and avoid disapproval (Becker, 1974; Soetevent, 2003; Van de Ven, 2003).  
The effects of visibility and social approval are in line with both common sense 
intuition and classical ideas about maintenance of norms in social networks: when 
others can see whether you contribute or not, you may be subject to sanctioning 
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Sometimes, social norms lead the individual in the same 
direction as self-interest. For instance, providing help to others who are able to 
reciprocate is not only in the long term interests of the helper, but is also prescribed by 
the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). In interpersonal helping and gift-giving, the 
norm of reciprocity creates a ‘Matthew-effect’ (Komter, 2003): those who have more 
financial resources can afford to give away more, and will receive more in return. In 
these cases, ‘helping others’ is another way of ‘helping yourself’. However, it should be 
noted that visibility also increases helping behavior that is not in line with some (long 
term) material self-interest. This is the case, for instance, when the recipient is a third 
person, and not the person giving approval (Deutsch & Lamberti, 1986). The effect of 
fear of disapproval by third parties has also been found in laboratory experiments on 
cooperation (Fox & Guyer, 1978), charitable donations (Satow, 1975), and 
participating equally in group tasks (Williams, Harkins & Latané, 1981). Recent 
experiments with have shown that the visibility of prosocial behavior for third parties 
increases altruistic behavior. These experiments used a very specific type of social 
dilemma: the dictator game. The dictator game is a ‘give some’-dilemma that is not 
repeated and involves only one player (Camerer, 2003). The player decides about the    
division of an amount of money between him/herself and ‘another person’. This ‘other 
person’ is not involved in the game and has no power to refuse the amount allocated by 
the dictator. The player does not know the other person and will not meet this person 
after the experiment. The design of the dictator game resembles the situation in which 
people decide about donations to charitable causes. Surprisingly, the empirical results 
of these games reject the prediction based on a completely self-interested model of man 
that dictators keep all money for themselves (Eckel & Grossman, 1996). The amount 
allocated to the ‘other’ decreases as the decisions of the dictator become more 
anonymous for third parties such as the experimenters (Eichenberger & Oberholzer-
Gee, 1998), which indicates that fear of disapproval motivates a fair division of 
resources in a dictator game. 
How do social incentives influence actual prosocial behavior? In voluntary 
associations, motivation to continue participation is largely embedded in social 
networks even when the recruitment phase is passed (Pearce, 1993). Participants 
receive social approval from fellow participants, the people they help, and possibly also 
non-participants. Involvement in political protest has also been related to such social 
incentives (Opp, 1996; Visser & Klandermans, 1993). Even economists recognize the 
strong effects of social incentives on volunteering (Freeman, 1997). Finally, a field 
study of donations to charitable causes (Long, 1976) has shown that fear of 
disapproval also motivates actual giving. 
Exposure to requests - Furthermore, social networks are the main channels 
through which individuals get acquainted with the existence of prosocial goals and 
activities in the first place. Personal networks of family and friends are crucial for 
recruitment of volunteers (Pearce, 1993; Brady, Schlozman & Verba, 1999) and new 
members of social movements (Snow, Zurcher & Ekland-Olson, 1980). Social 
networks appear to have been crucial even for hazardous acts of helping such as the 
rescue of Jews in World War II (Varese & Yaish, 2000), which are commonly 
considered to be prime examples of altruistic behavior (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).  
Internalized values – The arguments made above implied that self-interest alone 
can explain prosocial behavior in specific conditions (in small groups where the 
likelihood of repeated interaction in the future is high enough), and that this set of 
conditions may be expanded by including a concern for social approval in the 
explanation. When people are asked for a contribution directly, norm conformity can 
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be observed and can be rewarded with social approval. However, the game-theoretic 
interpretation of Durkheim’s theory on norm-conformity, focusing on the 
opportunities for social control, cannot explain norm-conform behavior in anonymous 
situations. Theories relying on social norms have a hard time explaining anonymous 
giving. If people would only obey norms if their behavior can be observed, they would 
not give money to charitable causes through bank transfers or give blood. Thus, social 
norms seem to operate not only when they are supported by sanctions from others, but 
also as ‘internal forces’ (Elster, 1989; Lindenberg, 2000). Psychologists agree with 
sociologists on the point that people seem to punish themselves with feelings of guilt 
for a failure to help others (Batson, 1998; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio & Piliavin, 
1995). Norms of fairness for example influence choice behavior in ‘one shot’ resource 
dilemmas even when participants do not know each other, cannot observe the other’s 
choice, and do not expect repeated interaction in the future (De Vries, 1991). In 
dictator games with a double blind procedure, in which the experimenter has 
absolutely no way to infer the decisions of dictators, still 12% gives away more than 
30% of a $10 endowment (Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996). A replication revealed 
similar results when the recipient of the money is a randomly chosen person from the 
population instead of a student participating in the experiment (Johanneson & Persson, 
2000). When the decision is to split the amount between oneself and a charity, 40% 
gives away more than 30% of the money (Eckel & Grossman, 1996). Because 
reciprocity or social approval cannot motivate this type of giving, it is likely that 
altruistic preferences are the explanation. Other experiments with dictator games have 
given rise to another interesting conclusion: reciprocity is often generalized to 
strangers. In these experiments, people are playing several dictator games, each time 
with different players. The results indicated that generosity of player A towards player 
B in a first game leads player B to be generous to player C in a next game, ‘even if this 
player is and will remain unknown’ to player B, when there is no prospect of ongoing 
exchange, and when the interaction is zero-sum in nature (Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong 
& Magan, 2004; Cason & Mui, 1998). In this case, prosocial behavior occurs despite 
the fact that there are no immediate social incentives. These results suggest that 
generalized reciprocity does not only occur within a specific community, but may also 
be a norm that leads to contributions to collective goods outside the community. 
Survey research on the exceptional generosity of orthodox Calvinists to secular causes    
shows that it cannot be explained by mechanisms of social control, but are rooted in 
internalized altruistic values (Bekkers, 2003a). The mechanism for charitable donations 
is different than for volunteering, probably because charitable giving is less observable 
to others. 
Socialization – Anonymous giving can be explained by internalized values. The 
introduction of values in explanations of prosocial behavior have worried rational 
choice scholars for various reasons, one of them being that it is unclear where values 
come from (Hechter, 1992). The classical answer to this question in sociology is that 
social values are socialized early in life (Parsons, 1956; Inglehart, 1997). In the 
socialization period people internalize societal norms: thus, the moral system that exists 
on a macro-level enters the individual. Once internalized, people take these social 
values with them from one situation to another. Sociologists assume that conditions in 
youth and adolescence affect the internalization of norms. Of course, this is not a real 
solution to the problem of the origin of social norms because it merely shifts the 
problem to the generation before the present generation, ultimately regressing to the 
question how prehistoric man developed a conscience. Furthermore, one might wonder 
why parents want their children to internalize social norms. These questions are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. For our research problem, focusing on the 
backgrounds of giving and volunteering behaviors of a specific group of individuals, it 
suffices to assume that a set of social norms prescribing prosocial behavior exists, 
which parents want to instill in their children. 
Studies of the effects of childhood conditions on the internalization of prosocial 
values are scarce. Most of the research in this area is focused on negative behavioral 
outcomes (problem behavior, aggression, conflicts with peers, and maladjustment) and 
found negative effects of parental disharmony and conflict - which often precede and 
follow divorce (Grusec & Lytton, 1998, p. 200), poverty in childhood (Hao & 
Matsueda, 2000) and a lack of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Parcel & Menaghan, 
1993, 1994). A few studies of socialization antecedents of prosocial behavior have been 
conducted. Persons who rescued Jews from the Nazis recall their parents as more 
strongly emphasizing generosity than non-rescuers (Oliner & Oliner, 1988, p. 164). 
Others have found that parental volunteerism (Janoski & Wilson, 1995) and generosity 
(Independent Sector, 2002) increase children’s volunteerism and generosity. It is 
unclear to what extent the parental example of prosocial behavior actually instills 
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prosocial values in children. The effect of volunteering activities by parents on 
children’s volunteering is partly due to the transmission of resources (Janoski & 
Wilson, 1995). Developmental psychologists have shown with experiments and 
observations that prosocial behavior among children can be promoted by modeling: 
showing the ‘right example’ (Eisenberg & Fabes 1994). However, most of the 
experiments and field studies in this area are solely concerned with young children. But 
what happens when children grow up? Is there still a positive effect of the modeling 
that parents displayed in childhood on giving and volunteering when the children have 
a life of their own? These questions will be dealt with in chapters six and seven. In 
addition, chapter seven also touches upon the question how such socialization effects 
can be explained. 
 
Hypotheses on the effects of social conditions 
Based on the review of previous research above, a large number of hypotheses can 
be formulated about the relationships of social conditions with prosocial behavior. I 
will discuss only a few of these conditions: current religious involvement, religious 
socialization, the level of education, and community size.  
Religion – Persons with a stronger attachment to religion are more likely to 
engage in prosocial behavior because they are requested to donate time or money more 
often, and because they will be confronted with stronger disapproval for non-
participation. For long, societal norms regarding prosocial behavior have been 
embodied almost exclusively by religion. ‘Love thy neighbor’ is one of the central 
commandments in Dutch religion. Not only does religion support altruistic behavior in 
theology, but also by providing opportunities to volunteer and by requesting donations 
for charitable causes. Therefore it can be expected that religious involvement will be 
closely related to prosocial behavior. Previous research shows that this social network-
mechanism is indeed the main explanation for the overrepresentation of religious 
persons among volunteers (Becker & Dinghra, 2001; Bekkers, 2000, 2003a; Dekker & 
De Hart, 2002; Jackson, Bachmeier, Wood & Craft, 1995; Lam, 2002; Wilson & 
Janoski, 1995). Previous research has also found positive effects of religious 
involvement on blood donation, but it is unknown how this relation can be explained 
(Healy, 2000). A study of intentions to register as organ donors among youth did not 
find an effect of religious affiliation (Reubsaet et al., 2001). This result, however,    
should be considered with caution for three reasons: first, it concerns a study of 
intentions, not behavior; second, it is limited to youth, for whom religious beliefs may 
have a smaller influence than for older people; third, the study measured affiliation, 
and not church attendance. Church attendance is a better measure of social integration 
than religious affiliation because many people are passive church members. 
Religious socialization – Next to current religious involvement, religious 
socialization may also increase the likelihood that people engage in prosocial behavior. 
A higher frequency of church attendance in youth indicates that people have been 
exposed to a more intense socialization of altruistic values. The ‘cultural’ interpretation 
of Durkheims theory on norm conformity leads to the prediction that religious 
socialization increases prosocial behavior also for those who have left the church. 
There are few studies which have investigated the effects of religious socialization on 
giving and volunteering. One study reported positive relations between religious 
socialization and giving and volunteering in the US (Independent Sector, 2002), but this 
study did not control for present religious involvement. Studies of blood and organ 
donation have not investigated effects of religious socialization. 
Level of education – Indeed, many studies have found positive effects of the level 
of education on charitable giving (Bekkers, 2002a, 2003a) and volunteering 
(Kraaykamp, 1996; Lindeman, 1995; Wilson, 2000). A study of willingness to register 
as organ donors among youth also found a positive effect of the level of education 
(Reubsaet et al., 2001). Previous research on blood donation did not find effects of the 
level of education (Healy, 2000). Not many studies have tried to find the mechanisms 
that are mediating the effect of education. Although the nature of these mechanisms 
need not necessarily be social, the available evidence does point in that direction. The 
higher educated have larger networks than the lower educated (Lin, 2001), and are 
more likely to be asked as a volunteer (Brady, Schlozman & Verba, 1999). With regard 
to charitable giving, the higher income that comes with a higher education is not the 
explanation: controlling for household income, a higher education is still associated 
with a higher incidence of donation as well as with a higher amount donated (Bekkers, 
2002a, 2003a, 2003c).  
Community size - Previous research shows that blood donation, helping and 
volunteering are more common in smaller communities (Bekkers, 2003a; Oliver, 2001; 
Putnam, 2000, p. 119; Steblay, 1987). These findings match with the result of 
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Axelrod’s computer tournament that cooperation decreased with group size (Axelrod, 
1984). Experiments with helping behavior showed that helping is still more common in 
smaller communities when the frequency of exposure to requests for help is held 
constant (Steblay, 1987). This result could indicate that norms on helping behavior in 
rural areas are different (Foss, 1983). However, the effect of community size can also 
be explained by differences in the structure of social networks: in smaller communities, 
networks are more dense and consist of a higher proportion of kin (Van der Poel, 
1993), which may lead rural dwellers to expect compensation in the future through 
generalized reciprocity. Research on charitable giving shows that the incidence of 
giving is lower in larger communities (Gouwenberg et al., 2003) but that the amount 
donated does not vary with community size (Bekkers, 2002a, 2003a). This pattern 
could indicate that exposure to requests for charitable donations is higher in smaller 
communities. 
Together, the relations expected above constitute the hypotheses from a 
sociological perspective: 
 
H1.  The likelihood of prosocial behavior increases with the frequency of church 
attendance, religious socialization, the level of education, and community size. 
 
 
1.2.2. Psychology 
In experiments, psychologists have identified conditions that affect contributions 
to collective goods not through social mechanisms, but through cognitive and 
emotional processes. In addition, psychologists have also identified the personality 
characteristics of cooperators in social dilemma experiments and the personality 
characteristics of donors and volunteers in self-report questionnaires.  
 
Conditions for contributions to collective goods 
Experiments in two types of research traditions in psychology have contributed 
to our knowledge of conditions for cooperation in social dilemmas and contributions 
to collective goods: (a) experiments with social dilemmas; (b) field experiments on 
helping behavior. I will review a selection of studies from these research traditions that 
seems most relevant for giving and volunteering behaviors.    
Efficacy - Experiments with social dilemmas have shown that the more that an 
actor perceives his contribution as crucial for collective welfare (Van de Kragt, Orbell 
& Dawes, 1983), and the higher the returns to the public good (Blackwell & McKee, 
2003; Goeree, Holt & Laury, 2002), the higher the likelihood that he will contribute. 
The effect of perceived efficacy is also found in survey research on membership in 
voluntary associations such as unions (Chacko, 1985; Visser & Klandermans, 1993), 
and donations to charitable causes (Bekkers, 2003c): when people perceive the 
organization they are supporting to be more efficient, they are more likely to 
contribute. These results match findings of a study showing that civic engagement is 
correlated positively with a dispositional measure of self-efficacy (Scheufele & Shah, 
2000). In addition, there is some evidence that efficacy is also a norm: a more effective 
contribution is perceived as more appropriate (Horne, 2003). The effect of efficacy is 
an additional psychological mechanism that explains the negative effect of group size 
on contributions to collective goods. In large groups, the perceived efficacy of a 
contribution to a common resource is lower than in small groups, regardless of the 
objective efficacy (Kerr, 1989; Komorita & Parks, 1994, p. 55-68).  
Time lag - The period in which the effect of contribution becomes apparent is not 
dependent on group size, but also matters. The longer the time lag between a 
contribution and its effect - the longer it takes before the effect of a contribution 
appears - the less likely the contribution (Brechner, 1977). The effects of efficacy and 
time lag are important for charitable giving, because many charities solicit funds for 
long term objectives such as the development of new drugs through medical research, 
the conservation of wildlife or the development of disadvantaged regions in the world. 
Battling these problems is difficult, takes time, and is often not very efficient. 
Fundraising will be more difficult the less efficient donors estimate their contribution to 
be, and the longer it takes before the benefits become apparent. 
Similarity: identification & empathy - Experiments with helping behavior have 
shown that people are more likely to provide help when they feel more similar to the 
recipients (Dovidio, 1984; Schroeder et al., 1995, p. 48), probably because they 
identify more easily with their needs (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce & Neuberg, 1997). 
People also feel more empathy for people whom they are more likely to meet in the 
future (Cialdini et al., 1997). Numerous experiments have shown that manipulations 
directed at increasing feelings of empathy for the recipient increases the likelihood of 
27   
prosocial behavior (Batson, 1991; 1998). A field study of charitable giving, however, 
did not provide evidence for the effect of induced empathy (Warren & Walker, 1991), 
but this study used a very weak manipulation. A study of organ donation showed that 
manipulated feelings of empathy were positively related to intentions to sign an organ 
donor card (Skumanich & Kinsfather 1997). 
 
Personality characteristics associated with prosocial behavior 
The results obtained in social psychological studies of helping and cooperation 
discussed above are all concerned with aspects of the choice situation. The 
experimental methodology used in these studies is perfectly suited to discover in which 
conditions prosocial behavior thrives, and when it is undermined. However, even in 
very unfavorable conditions, there are always people who cooperate (Dawes & Thaler, 
1988; Ledyard, 1995). Experimental economists have tried to isolate situations in 
which there are hardly any incentives to cooperate. The results of ultimatum and 
dictator games are commonly interpreted as evidence for non-instrumental concerns 
such as fairness or altruism in social dilemma contexts. Even when the choice situation 
involves no material or social incentives, there are still people who seem to have an eye 
for the ‘other(s)’ in a social dilemma. One could assume that across different 
conditions, some persons are more likely to cooperate than others, and that these 
persons can be identified most easily when situational incentives are diminished or 
ruled out by design. Social psychologists have tried to capture these individual 
differences in the propensity to cooperate in social dilemmas. It is not unreasonable to 
assume that people may enter a social dilemma with very different goals, and that some 
people have more prosocial goals, and others have more egoistic concerns. This 
assumption stands in contrast to the received wisdom in economics that ‘de gustibus 
non est disputandum’ (Stigler & Becker, 1977) and to the common view in sociology 
that ‘the desire to do good is more or less evenly distributed, but that the resources to 
fulfill that desire are not’ (Wilson & Musick, 1999, p. 244). I want to treat this issue as 
an empirical matter (Heath, 1976; Caplan, 2003). Some psychologists assume that 
there is an ‘altruistic personality’ (Allen & Rushton, 1983; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; 
Oliner & Oliner, 1988). People with altruistic personalities arguably differ in their 
preferences for the outcomes of others in social dilemma situations from the rational 
actors assumed by neo-classical economics and orthodox versions of rational choice    
theory. Instead of assuming that all people are alike, I take measures of prosocial 
motives from personality psychology as measures of these preferences, and investigate 
their effects on different examples of prosocial behavior.  
Which characteristics are distinctive of people with an altruistic personality? 
Previous research shows that the following psychological characteristics are typical of 
donors and volunteers: empathic concern, perspective taking, prosocial value 
orientations, agreeableness, extraversion, emotional stability, self-efficacy, and self-
esteem (Allen & Rushton, 1983; Cohen, Vigoda & Samorly, 2001; Penner & 
Finkelstein, 1998; Smith, 1994). Unfortunately, the latter two cannot be studied 
because there was only limited space available in the Family Survey of the Dutch 
Population, the survey that will be used to test the hypotheses. How the remaining 
psychological characteristics are related to each other is shown in figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1.  Psychological characteristics of donors and volunteers 
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First, I distinguish between social values and personality characteristics. Not all 
of the psychological characteristics in figure 1.1 are stable personality characteristics. 
Social value orientations appear to be less stable than the other characteristics, and 
should be understood as cooperative intentions that may change from one situation to 
the next (Bekkers, 2004b). Second, I distinguish between general self-descriptions and 
specifically prosocial motives. Agreeableness, extraversion, and emotional stability are 
very general trait descriptions, while social value orientation, empathic concern, and 
perspective taking are specific measures of prosocial motives. Below, I will first discuss 
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agreeableness, then the more specific measures of prosocial motives, and finally the 
other general trait self-descriptions. 
Agreeableness - After a quest of several decades for a universal description of 
human personality, psychologists today generally believe that five basic traits are 
sufficient for such a description (John, 1990; Digman, 1990). These five traits are 
called the ‘Big Five’; together, they form the ‘Five Factor Model’ (FFM). Agreeableness 
is one of these traits. Extraversion and neuroticism (the opposite of emotional stability) 
are two other psychological characteristics that are probably related to prosocial 
behavior, and will be discussed below. The other two, openness and conscientiousness, 
are not expected to be related to prosocial behavior. The origin and the measurement 
of the ‘Big Five’ are discussed in the appendix.  
The important point for now is that the FFM relies on general self-descriptions. 
This is a limitation, because it remains unclear what these self-descriptions mean. To be 
sure, self-descriptions are not a perfect measure of prosocial motives, because they mix 
up preferences with past behavior and self-identity. Because agreeableness is simply a 
trait description of persons who engage in all kinds of prosocial and altruistic 
behaviors more often than others, it does not give a theoretical explanation of giving 
and volunteering. Showing an empirical relationship between self-reported 
agreeableness and prosocial behavior does not really give us an informative idea of why 
people engage in altruistic behavior. Therefore, we need more specific measures of 
prosocial motives. Empathy and prosocial value orientations are measures of two 
specific prosocial motives that may give an explanation of individual differences in 
prosocial behavior. 
Previous research has found that several examples of prosocial behavior are 
related to agreeableness. Volunteers describe themselves as more agreeable persons 
than paid workers engaged in the same tasks (Elshaug & Metzer, 2001). Persons who 
describe themselves as more agreeable are more likely to cooperate in social dilemmas 
than those who describe themselves as less agreeable (Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong & 
Magan, 2004). Agreeableness is positively related to intentions to give money to 
charity (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001). I am not aware of studies on the relationship of 
agreeableness to blood and organ donation. However, previous research does indicate 
that experienced blood donors have a more ‘altruistic’ self-image than ‘rookies’ 
(Piliavin & Callero, 1991) and that post mortem organ donation is considered as    
indicative of altruistic concerns (Hessing, 1983). These results suggest that 
agreeableness will be higher among blood donors and post mortem organ donors than 
among non-donors. 
Social value orientation – In contrast to agreeableness, social value orientations 
do not refer to a general self-description, but to a specific prosocial motive: the 
intention to cooperate in a social dilemma situation because of a concern for the joint 
outcome (Messick & McClintock, 1968; McClintock, 1972; Komorita & Parks, 1994, 
pp. 110-123; Van Lange, 2000). The social value orientation of a person is a 
psychological characteristic that may account for the base rate of cooperation in game 
theory: there is a type of people that is more likely to cooperate in social dilemmas, 
because they have the tendency to maximize collective welfare. In an ordinary game 
theoretic framework, actors are assumed to maximize only their own outcomes. In a 
game theoretic framework including social value orientations, actors are assumed to 
maximize their own outcomes, and, to some extent, the outcomes for others. Thus, 
actors are given weights for their own and other’s utility, reflecting their social value 
orientation (Rashevsky, 1950; Sawyer, 1966; Weesie, 1994; Van Lange, 1999).  
Social values are commonly considered as stable dispositions with which 
individuals enter a choice situation (Hulbert, Corrêa da Silva & Adegboyega, 2001; 
Ligthart, 1995; McClintock & Van Avermaet, 1982; Perugini & Gallucci, 2001; 
Snijders, 1996; Van Dijk, Sonnemans & Van Winden, 2002; Liebrand & Van Lange, 
1989). However, research on the stability of social value orientations has produced 
disappointing results. Over a period of nineteen months, the stability of the threefold 
social value orientation typology in a computerized survey among a national sample of 
the Dutch population was only .19 (Van Lange, 1999, note 6). Correcting for 
measurement error, and using a linear measure of social value orientation, the stability 
increased only a little, to .22 (Bekkers, 2004b). These low estimates indicate that social 
value orientations are not stable personality characteristics. In addition, the 
classification of subjects in types of social value orientations is sensitive to priming 
effects (Bekkers, 2004b; Hertel & Fiedler, 1998; Utz, Bovina, Green & Waldzus, 
1999). 
Tests of the effects of social value orientations on cooperation in experimental 
social dilemmas have produced mixed results: sometimes, social value orientations 
allow for significantly better predictions (Van Lange, 1991, p. 20-21; Takács, 2002, p. 
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90, 95), but sometimes, they do not (Ligthart, 1995; Parks, 1994; Snijders, 1996). 
Little is known about the external validity of social value orientation. Subjects 
classified as prosocial in an experiment are reported to be more willing to volunteer for 
administrative tasks in order to enable future experiments (McClintock & Allison, 
1989). Respondents classified as prosocial in surveys more often report gifts to 
charitable causes (Van Lange, 1997; Bekkers & Weesie, 2003) and higher rates of 
volunteering (Bekkers, 2004b). A recent observational study confirmed that prosocials 
actually gave more often to a health charity than competitors (Van Lange, Van Vugt, 
Bekkers & Schuyt, 2003).  
Empathy – Another answer to the question why some people are more likely to 
give anonymously to strangers than others is that they have a greater tendency to feel 
empathy for others. While the discussion above focused on manipulated feelings of 
empathy, induced by experimental stimuli, the present argument is that some people 
are more likely to feel empathy and experience stronger feelings of empathy than 
others. Empathy is believed to be the key aspect of the ‘altruistic personality’ 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Empathy has two dimensions, an affective and a cognitive 
dimension. Both consist of two subdimensions (Davis, 1994, 55-58). The affective 
dimension consists of empathic concern (feeling bad when others are hurt) and 
personal distress (emotional control in emergency situations). The cognitive dimension 
consists of perspective taking (the ability to take another person’s perspective) and 
fantasy (the tendency to transpose oneself in a fictional situation). Research on the 
relation between empathy and prosocial behavior indicates that perspective taking and 
empathic concern are the most important aspects of empathy: the more one is able and 
used to take the perspective of somebody else, and the more one is concerned with the 
welfare of others, the higher the chance that one will help another person in need 
(Batson, 1991, p. 93-96; Davis, 1994, p. 126-152; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). 
Empathy may be seen as a specific psychological process that provides an 
interpretation for the relation between prosocial value orientation and prosocial 
behavior (Romer, Gruder & Lizzadro, 1986).  
Studies on the effects of dispositional empathy (for a review, see Davis, 1994) 
are usually concerned with helping other individuals, mostly strangers (confederates of 
the experimenters). One should be cautious to relate these results to prosocial behavior 
in anonymous situations, where there is enough time available to weigh the alternatives    
and the beneficiary is not a specific other individual. However, there is some evidence 
from studies among specific populations that empathy is also important for non-
emergency helping. Studies of cooperation among children showed a positive effect of 
empathic concern (Johnson, 1975a, 1975b). Several studies have shown that volunteers 
(e.g., for a community mental health organization and a shelter for the homeless) show 
higher levels of empathic concern than non-volunteers (Allen & Rushton, 1983; Penner 
et al., 1995; Penner & Finkelstein, 1998; Penner, 2002). There is also evidence from a 
survey of random sample of the US population for a weak relation of empathy with an 
index of prosocial behavior (Smith, 2003). Although direct evidence of a relation 
between the cognitive aspect of empathy and prosocial behavior in anonymous social 
dilemma situations is lacking, it seems likely that such a relation exists. 
Extraversion – Next to general prosocial self-descriptions and specific prosocial 
motives, other personality characteristics have also been reported as distinctive of 
donors and volunteers. Extraversion is one of them. In the personality literature, 
extraversion is described as ‘positive emotionality’, comprising a cluster of qualities like 
energetic, ambitious, socially intelligent and warm (Watson & Clark, 1994). These 
qualities can be divided into two aspects: activity and sociability. These two qualities 
are distinctive of people who are engaged in voluntary associations, especially when 
they participate in activities organized by the association or do voluntary work. 
Extraverted people may be engaged in civil associations because they ‘like to do and 
organize things’, it does not matter what kind of collective action. On the other hand, 
extraverted people may be also be more likely to be asked to become members or 
volunteers, because they are more visible to recruiters because of their extraverted 
behavior. Lindeman (1995, p. 156) has shown in a study of participation in voluntary 
work that a preference for active stimulation (the activity aspect of extraversion) is 
related positively to the extent of voluntary activity in societal and recreative 
associations. This result confirmed older research (Smith, 1966). In contrast to 
expectations, the sociability aspect of extraversion was not related to voluntary work 
in general, and even had a negative relation with volunteering in recreative hobby clubs 
(Lindeman, 1995). 
Neuroticism – Neuroticism indicates emotional instability, a greater incidence of 
negative emotions, and a greater risk to fall prey to depression and psychopathology. 
Previous research has shown that civic engagement is negatively related to a depression 
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scale used in epidemiologic studies (Lin, 2000) and positively to feelings of optimism 
(Whiteley, 1999). On the other hand, field experiments on helping behavior have 
shown that helping may be not only be more typical of people in a good mood (for 
instance when they have found cookies in a phone booth), but also a means to alleviate 
bad moods (Schroeder et al., 1995, pp. 30, 47, 65-66). Because neurotic persons 
experience more bad moods, they may more often be in the position to alleviate these 
moods by prosocial behavior. A number of studies provide indications that emotional 
stability may be related to blood donation and post mortem organ donation. With 
regard to blood donation, many people are afraid of the medical tests involved (Piliavin 
& Callero, 1993, p. 19-21). In a study of adolescents, fear was indeed the key factor 
inhibiting intentions to donate organs after death (Reubsaet et al., 2001). Although 
these results may simply indicate effects of situational anxiety when people are asked to 
donate, it seems likely that these effects will be higher for more neurotic people.  
Together, the relations expected above constitute the hypotheses from a 
psychological perspective: 
 
H2.  The likelihood of prosocial behavior increases with the level of agreeableness, 
extraversion, emotional stability, prosocial value orientation, empathic concern 
and perspective taking. 
 
Limitations of psychological studies of prosocial behavior 
Laboratory experiments on behavior in social dilemma situations have identified 
important mechanisms, which are probably also at work when people decide about 
giving and volunteering. These results are valuable insights for researchers as well as 
for practitioners. Studies of the psychological characteristics of donors and volunteers 
have also provided interesting insights. However, several problems remain.  
A first problem with the experimental results is that they are not very often 
tested in the ‘real life’: it is usually assumed that the social dilemma situation is 
paradigmatic for many problems in the real world, but it remains unclear to what 
extent this is really the case. One should be cautious to generalize results from social 
dilemma experiments to prosocial behavior in anonymous contexts. The dependent 
variable in these experiments is cooperation in highly abstract games with a given and 
clearly described reward structure, a given number of players, and a clear set of    
alternatives. Actual decision situations are much more unclear, which gives room for 
different interpretations, which may be shaped by personality characteristics and social 
values. For instance, people with prosocial value orientations are more likely to view a 
social dilemma in terms of morality (‘defection is the wrong choice’), while people with 
‘pro-self’ orientations are more likely to view the dilemma in terms of intelligence 
(‘cooperation is stupid’) (De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 
1994). In addition, actual decisions about giving time, money, blood or organs do not 
take place in an abstract ‘game’ on a computer screen: the recipients are real people 
with real needs, which may also increase the role of prosocial motives such as empathy. 
The external validity of social dilemma games played by subjects in a laboratory is 
often questionable. These are old complaints (Nemeth, 1972; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977), 
but they still apply to much of the gaming literature. Although some work has been 
done outside the laboratory, it is clear that much can still be learned from a survey-
investigation of the effects of social value orientations and material and social 
incentives in real social dilemma-situations.  
A second problem is that the experiments are usually conducted with college 
students. It is unknown to what extent the results hold when ‘ordinary people’ decide 
about contributions to nonprofit organizations. A third problem is that experiments do 
not allow for a manipulation of many independent variables at once. Experimental 
studies usually investigate effects of only one or two conditions, sometimes in addition 
to effects of some psychological characteristics of subjects. The relative effects of the 
large variety of conditions for cooperation is unknown.  
The use of surveys in sociological research is a solution to the problems of the 
lack of external validity, the lack of a heterogeneous population, and the lack of insight 
into the relative effects of conditions for cooperation and psychological characteristics 
of subjects in social dilemma research. Random sample surveys have the advantage that 
respondents from the full range of societal layers report about real examples of 
prosocial behavior such as the amount of time they volunteered or the amount of 
money they donated to a variety of nonprofit organizations. Because surveys usually 
have a large variety of socio-demographic data available, adding questions on 
psychological characteristics and prosocial behavior allows for a study of many 
independent variables at once. Therefore, real life examples of social dilemma 
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situations as reported in a survey by a random sample of the Dutch population are 
studied in chapters four to seven. 
However, surveys also have drawbacks: it is difficult to show causality in the 
observed relations, and it is difficult to measure the exact incentive structure for 
potential donors and volunteers. Volunteering and giving can be related to a large 
number of indicators for the amount of time and money available and the 
embeddedness in social contexts which are supposed to support giving and 
volunteering. The outcomes of the decision making processes whether or not to give or 
volunteer (and if so, how much) are known, but the exact ‘input’ for these decisions is 
not. Relying on the theoretical ideas laid out above, I assume that the social rewards of 
contributions to collective goods will be higher for persons with more social capital, 
that the material costs will be lower for persons with more financial and human 
capital, and that intrinsic rewards will be higher for persons with more prosocial 
motives and personality characteristics. Although these assumptions seem reasonable, 
direct manipulation of material, social and psychological costs and rewards in an 
experiment would be better. Therefore, I will combine the advantages of an experiment 
and a survey in the scenario study of intentions to give money and volunteer labor for a 
range of voluntary associations reported in chapter three.  
 
1.3. INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CONDITIONS FOR 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE GOODS 
  Above, I have assumed that people with specific psychological characteristics are 
more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors that require a material sacrifice of time or 
money, also when there are little or no social incentives. However, this in itself is not a 
very informative step. It would be a more important achievement if it is possible to 
predict when psychological characteristics have an influence. One of the reasons why 
the search for effects of personality characteristics on social behavior may have 
produced such disappointing results is that the moderating influence of the social 
context has been ignored (Krahé, 1992). When can we expect the effects of 
psychological characteristics and prosocial motives to be strong, and when will they be 
weak (Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer & Speer, 1991)? In what kind of situations we 
will be more likely to find effects of psychological characteristics and prosocial 
motives? Interestingly, economists, sociologists and different types of psychologists    
have come up with similar ideas about this question. Economists (Eichenberger & 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1998; Tullock, 1971), sociologists (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 1998, 
2003; Mensch, 2000), personality psychologists (Mischel, 1977, 1993) and social 
psychologists (Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, Luce & Sagarin, 1997; Snyder & Ickes, 
1985) assume that psychological characteristics and prosocial motives are more 
strongly related to prosocial behavior when there hardly any material and social 
incentives. The idea that the effects of psychological characteristics on behavior are 
stronger when the material costs are lower is called the ‘low cost-hypothesis’. The idea 
that the effects of psychological characteristics on behavior are stronger when the 
social incentives are weaker is called the ‘weak situation-hypothesis’. However, these 
ideas have rarely been tested systematically. Chapters three to six contain different 
types of tests of these hypotheses, each time for different types of prosocial behavior: 
for intentions to give and volunteer (chapter three), for gifts of money, blood, and 
organs (chapter four), voluntary association membership (chapter five), and 
membership and volunteering (chapter six). 
 
1.3.1. The low cost-hypothesis  
In its most general form, the low cost-hypothesis states that values, attitudes, and 
other ‘soft incentives’ are more important for behaviors that entail smaller costs. The 
basic idea of this hypothesis is very old and occurs in many theories across different 
disciplines of the social sciences. In sociology, the low cost-hypothesis gained 
popularity in German speaking countries in discussions on the explanatory power of 
rational choice theory (Zintl, 1989, Kirchgässner & Pommerehne, 1993). It seemed 
that hypotheses derived from rational choice theory have limited value for predicting 
behaviors with small opportunity costs (Mensch, 2000). For instance, when recycling 
behavior costs little time and money, it is related to environmental attitudes, but not 
when environmental behavior entails higher costs (Diekmann, 1996; Diekmann & 
Preisendörfer, 1998). Another well-known example is voting behavior. Because one 
single vote does not affect the outcome of a general election, the opportunity costs of 
voting for one political party or another can be influenced by non-material concerns 
(Green & Shapiro, 1994; Tullock, 1971). 
A similar logic is followed in social psychology. In the polarized debate on the 
altruistic nature of empathy, one article asked the rhetorical question: ‘Does empathy 
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lead to anything more than superficial helping?’. The authors concluded their review 
and reanalysis of previous research as follows: “The ability of empathic concern to 
predict helping is limited to deciding between providing either relatively costless help or 
no help at all” and “under conditions of substantial cost to the helper, empathic 
concern does not facilitate helping” (Neuberg et al., 1997, p. 514-515). Although this 
conclusion concerned the effects of manipulated feelings of empathy, it can be 
supposed that it also holds for the effects of dispositional empathic tendencies. The 
weak power of psychological characteristics may also be the reason why psychologists 
usually focus on giving trivial amounts of money in their experiments. 
The low cost-hypothesis is related to the idea that prosocial behavior is a luxury 
good (Jencks, 1987; Mansbridge, 1990). The marginal utility of an addition of € 500 to 
the monthly income – or: the marginal disutility of foregoing € 500 – is much lower for 
the wealthy than for the average person. When a charitable donation of € 500 is not 
similar to the monthly rent for the apartment but to a second digital home cinema set, 
people can afford themselves to act upon their concern for others. It should be noted, 
however, that the low cost-hypothesis argues that prosocial motivation for prosocial 
behavior is a luxury good, not prosocial behavior itself. A test of the hypothesis that 
there are declining marginal costs of altruism requires nothing more than a detailed 
plot of the effect of income on charitable giving. A test of the low cost-hypothesis, 
however, requires a detailed plot of the effect of prosocial motives and personality 
characteristics for different levels of income. 
The low cost-hypothesis – although it is not always labeled as such – is often used 
to explain anomalies to rational choice models of human behavior. For instance, the 
absence or weakness of effects of material self-interest on voting is often explained by 
saying that voting involves no or little material costs (Eichenberger & Oberholzer-Gee, 
1998; Green & Shapiro, 1994; Tullock, 1971). Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1996), 
which also formed the basis for Inglehart’s (1977) theory of the rise of postmaterialism, 
reflects the same idea: once basic needs such as safety, food and reproduction are 
fulfilled, people start worrying about less urgent goals in life, such as social standing, 
and ultimately self-realization. The decreasing marginal utility of income is often 
discussed in the literature on happiness: it seems that above a certain level of income, 
subjective well being is not served by an even higher income but by satisfying ‘higher 
needs’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999).     
The low cost-hypothesis also occurs in the general statement that in human 
behavior, self-interested choices are the rule, and altruistic choices are the exception, 
especially when the stakes are high (Lenski, 1966, p. 30). Lenski also argued that at the 
macro-level, ideologies are more strongly related to social behavior in more advanced 
societies (Lenski, Lenski & Nolan, 1991). In economics, North (1981) is often credited 
for inventing a similar hypothesis. An application of the general formulation of the low 
cost-hypothesis to our research question yields the following expectation: 
 
H3.  The stronger the material incentives for prosocial behavior, the smaller the effects 
of psychological characteristics on prosocial behavior. 
 
If the conclusions about experimental research can be generalized to examples of 
prosocial behavior outside the laboratory, it follows that psychological characteristics 
will be related more strongly to examples of prosocial behavior that are demanding 
smaller sacrifices. This argument is reflected in the order of the examples of prosocial 
behavior studied in chapters three to seven. In chapter three, intentions to give money 
and volunteer time are studied with a scenario study. In chapters four to seven, 
examples of actual prosocial behavior are investigated. Because intentions do not 
require an actual sacrifice of time or money, the effects of psychological characteristics 
are expected to be stronger in chapter three than in the other chapters. In chapter four, 
I study donations of money, blood and organs, which do not take much time either. 
According to the low cost-hypothesis, the effects of psychological characteristics are 
smallest for volunteering, which requires a frequent sacrifice of leisure time for some 
collective good. Volunteering is studied in chapters six and seven. 
Another way to test this hypothesis is to compare the impact of individual 
differences on the decision to participate with the impact on the amount of time and 
money invested. The low cost-hypothesis would predict that individual differences 
matter more for the decision to participate, but less for the amount of time and money 
invested. With regard to the effect of political interest on political participation, this 
pattern has indeed been found (Brady, Verba & Schlozman, 1995). A comparison of 
effects of psychological characteristics on decisions to donate versus the decision how 
much to donate is made in chapters four and six.  
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A third way to test the low cost-hypothesis is to compare the effects of individual 
differences in prosocial motives for groups of respondents with varying opportunity 
costs for giving time or money. Giving to charity, for example, is often considered as a 
luxury good (Bekkers & Weesie, 2003; Jencks, 1987; Mansbridge, 1990). For people 
with high incomes, a gift represents a smaller loss than for people with a lower income. 
The rich can afford themselves more easily to translate prosocial values into action. 
Similar arguments can be made for the effects of psychological characteristics among 
persons with higher or lower hourly wages. This strategy will be followed in chapter 
three, four and six.  
Finally, the scenario experiment in chapter three contains a fourth way to test the 
low cost-hypothesis: by varying the amount of money requested in hypothetical 
situations, and comparing the effects of psychological characteristics in these 
conditions.  
 
1.3.2. The weak situation-hypothesis 
The weak situation-hypothesis states that psychological characteristics are only 
relevant in ‘weak situations’: social contexts that do not involve clear-cut expectations 
on how to behave (Mischel, 1977; 1993; Snyder & Ickes, 1985, p. 904-906). In 
contrast, when strong social norms or salient cues guide behavior, there is little room 
for the expression of individuality. The classical example of a strong situation is a 
funeral. In this situation, clear and strong expectations are present on how to behave, 
and individual differences in personality will not have observable effects on behavior.  
The weak situation-hypothesis originated in the debate in social and personality 
psychology on the consistency in social behavior and the effects of ‘the person’ and ‘the 
situation’ (Zanna, Higgins & Herman, 1982; Krahé, 1992). Originally, the basic idea 
was that situational constraints often inhibit the translation of personality 
characteristics into behavior. ‘Situational constraints’ included many things, for 
instance the presence of experimenters and explicit instructions (Block, 1977; Snyder & 
Ickes, 1985, p. 905) and high monetary incentives (Monson, Hesley & Chernick, 
1982). In this dissertation, I test a specific version of the weak situation-hypothesis, 
referring to the moderating effects of social incentives. Moderating effects of monetary 
incentives concern the low cost-hypothesis. Potential moderating effects of 
experimental methods are not studied; all hypotheses are tested with self-report data,    
which should increase the chance that significant effects of personality characteristics 
emerge. 
On a macro level, the weak situation-hypothesis resembles the argument in 
sociology that modern societies grant the individual more room for expressing his 
individual preferences and interests because social norms on how to behave have 
become less strict than in traditional societies (e.g., Van der Loo & Van Rijen, 1990). 
Movie pictures such as ‘The Truman Show’ (Niccol, 1998) illustrate the popularity of 
the idea that modernity has liberated the individual from the strong pressures to 
conformity. The weak situation-hypothesis resembles this idea: personalities are most 
clearly visible when there is no social pressure. 
Although the weak situation-hypothesis is very well known in personality 
psychology, empirical tests of this hypothesis are very scarce. A study that is often cited 
as supporting the weak situation-hypothesis did in fact test the low cost-hypothesis, 
because it compared the incidence of introvert or extravert behaviour under conditions 
of high or low monetary incentives (Monson, Hesley & Chernick, 1982). Participants 
in the weak incentive condition behaved more often according to their dispositional 
extraversion than participants in the strong incentive condition. Another ‘test’ of the 
weak situation-hypothesis compared the effects of prosocial motives on helping when 
leaving the experiment was made easy or difficult (Carlo et al., 1991). Again, this 
experiment did not compare weak and strong situations, but low and high cost 
situations. Nevertheless, the results supported the expectations: when escape was made 
easy, prosocial motives correlated more strongly with prosocial behavior. In sum, there 
is no convincing evidence for the weak situation-hypothesis because it has not been 
tested properly. This makes it worthwhile to conduct such a test. Applied to our 
research question, the weak situation-hypothesis predicts: 
 
H4.  The stronger the social incentives for prosocial behavior, the weaker the effects of 
psychological characteristics. 
 
  The weak situation-hypothesis can be tested with the same strategies that are 
used to test the low cost-hypothesis. First: by comparing effects of psychological 
characteristics on different types of prosocial behavior, which differ in the extent to 
which social incentives play a role. Examples of prosocial behavior that are more 
41   
visible for others such as volunteering should be less strongly related to psychological 
characteristics than more anonymous types of giving such as charitable donations of 
money. The weak situation-hypothesis is also reflected in the order of the chapters. In 
chapter four I analyze donations of money, blood, and organs, which are more 
anonymous than the types of civic engagement investigated in the remaining chapters. 
A second way to test the weak situation-hypothesis is to compare the effects of 
individual differences for religious and non-religious people and for citizens in urban 
and rural areas. Religious people and rural dwellers are more likely to be asked to 
volunteer and to donate money, and are integrated in denser networks. This means that 
religious people and rural dwellers face stronger social incentives for prosocial 
behavior. According to the weak situation-hypothesis, the effects of psychological 
characteristics should be weaker for religious people and for rural dwellers. Finally, a 
third way to test the weak situation-hypothesis is to compare the effects of 
psychological characteristics on intentions to give and volunteer in hypothetical 
situations that differ systematically in the strength of social incentives for prosocial 
behavior. This strategy will be used in chapter three. 
 
1.4. The structure of the dissertation 
After this introduction, I will present a description of the extent and variety of 
giving and volunteering in the Netherlands in chapter two. In chapters three to seven, I 
present detailed descriptions of the persons who are active in different types of giving 
and volunteering. What are the psychological characteristics of donors and volunteers? 
What are the social conditions that they live in? Do data on psychological 
characteristics allow for a more accurate prediction of giving and volunteering when 
social incentives are taken into account? As shown above, the types of prosocial 
behavior investigated in chapters three to seven are ordered according to the 
predictions of the low cost-hypothesis and the weak situation-hypothesis (see table 
1.1). 
    
Table  1.1.  Overview of dependent variables and main independent variables in 
chapters three to seven 
 
Chapter Dependent  variable(s)  Main independent variables 
3. Who gives what and why?  Intentions to give and 
volunteer in a variety of 
hypothetical situations 
Material, social and 
psychological incentives; 
income, education, religion, 
urbanization; social value 
orientation, agreeableness, 
empathy 
4. Anonymous gifts  Charitable giving, blood 
donation, post mortem organ 
donation 
Income, education, religion, 
urbanization; social value 
orientation, agreeableness, 
empathy 
5. Participation in voluntary 
associations 
Membership of voluntary 
associations; volunteering 
Income, education, religion, 
urbanization; social value 
orientation, agreeableness, 
empathy 
6. Shifting backgrounds of 
participation 
Membership of pillarized and 
secular voluntary associations, 
selective incentives for 
membership 
Income, education, religion, 
urbanization; social value 
orientation, agreeableness, 
empathy, postmaterialism 
7. Intergenerational 
transmission of volunteerism 
Volunteering for religious, 
pillarized and secular 
associations  
Income, education, religion; 
parental volunteering; 
agreeableness, empathy, social 
value orientation  
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Chapter three, “Who gives what and why? The power of social and 
psychological incentives in social dilemmas”, is a scenario experiment incorporated in 
the Family Survey of the Dutch Population 2000 (De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp & 
Ultee, 2000; henceforth abbreviated as FSDP2000). The respondents answered a 
questions like “What would you do if your neighbor asked you to help him with 
something?” The answers to these questions reveal their intentions to contribute to 
collective goods in hypothetical situations. The characteristics of the situations were 
varied systematically. Because the respondents indicated their intentions to give and 
volunteer, they may mirror their psychological characteristics more closely than the 
self-reports on actual giving and volunteering behaviors, which are restricted by 
material costs and social rewards.  
In chapters four to seven I focus on self-reports of actual behavior instead of 
giving intentions. In chapter four, “Anonymous gifts: personal decisions, social 
backgrounds”, I investigate examples of prosocial behavior that are relatively 
anonymous, and are commonly regarded as reflecting altruistic motives, such as blood 
donation, post mortem organ donation, and charitable giving. The question answered 
in this chapter is to what extent donations are related to social conditions an 
psychological characteristics of people. The low cost-hypothesis and the weak 
situation-hypothesis predict that psychological characteristics will be related more 
strongly to these examples than to examples of prosocial behavior that may provide 
material and social rewards such as membership of voluntary associations and 
volunteering.  
Chapter five, “Participation in voluntary associations: personality, resources, or 
both?” is similar to chapter four and investigates the relationship of social conditions 
and psychological characteristics on membership and unpaid work in voluntary 
associations.  
Chapter six, “Shifting backgrounds of participation in voluntary associations”, 
investigates why membership of voluntary associations has not declined despite the 
massive secularisation of the Netherlands. If church attendance is declining, and 
religion is an important factor in participation in voluntary associations, then why did 
membership rates not decline? It is often assumed that the social process of 
individualization increases the effects of individual preferences on social behavior. 
Therefore, chapter six compares the effects of social conditions and psychological    
characteristics on participation in organizations that emerged since World War II to the 
effects on participation in organizations that already existed in the pillarized civil 
society. In addition, effects of postmaterialistic value orientations and selective 
incentives for membership are considered. 
Chapter seven, “The transmission of volunteerism”, investigates how 
volunteerism is transmitted from one generation to the next. Are children of parents 
who volunteered more likely to volunteer because they have been subject to parental 
modeling, or because they have inherited personality characteristics or financial 
resources and human capital? 
Finally, chapter eight, “Conclusion and discussion”, gives answers to the two 
main research questions, discusses limitations of chapters three to seven, and gives 
some clues for further research. 
45    
Chapter 2 
Giving and volunteering in the Netherlands 
 
This chapter sketches trends in giving and volunteering in the Netherlands and 
provides a more detailed view on the size of these phenomena. How many people 
give and volunteer, and how much do they contribute? The estimates are based 
on the Family Survey of the Dutch Population 2000, which will be used in 
chapters three to seven. The estimates are compared with estimates from other 
data sources.  
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Forms of contributions to voluntary associations 
Contributions to voluntary associations may take various forms, with a more or 
less altruistic character, depending on the costs for the individual and the benefits for 
the collective. The most common and least demanding form of participation is nominal 
membership: paying a membership fee for an organization, without taking part in 
organizational activities or helping the organization. Nominal membership may be 
guided by self-interest only, in exchange for services by the organization. A more 
demanding form of participation is active membership: taking part in activities of the 
organization such as attending meetings. This form of participation takes more time 
than simply being a member. The most demanding form of participation is voluntary 
work: unpaid work for an organization on a frequent basis. Obviously, this form of 
participation creates the largest obligations for the individual and the largest benefits 
for the organization.  
People do not only give time, but also give money to voluntary associations. On 
the one hand, charitable donations may be less demanding than active membership or 
voluntary work because they require less time. This also holds true for donations of 
blood and postmortem organ donation. On the other hand, these donations are 
unilateral: they do not produce tangible rewards for the individual. They help the 
organization or society at large, but not the donor. Active membership and voluntary 
work may enhance the social network of the member or volunteer and elicit positive 
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social evaluations by third parties. These benefits are largely absent for donations, 
because they are more anonymous and unreciprocated.  
 
Trends in civic engagement 
In the USA, membership of traditional associations seems to be dwindling, 
especially the local forms of participation with a high level of face-to-face contacts 
(Putnam, 2000). These developments have given rise to serious concerns about the 
‘decline of social capital and cohesion in society’. The claims made by Putnam have 
been debated by numerous scholars. Re-analyses of the same data that Putnam used on 
civic engagement in the USA and analyses of other data have given rise to different 
conclusions: local organizations are declining, but cosmopolitan organizations such as 
environmentalist groups and organizations defending human rights have grown 
enormously (Baer, Curtis & Grabb, 2001; Magee & Lin, 2001; Paxton, 1998). In 
Western Europe, academic observers have been less concerned right from the start. 
Membership in traditional associations such as those with a religious, political or 
unionist character have declined, but this decline has been compensated by new 
associations and social movements like environmentalist groups, human and animal 
rights organizations, and cultural expressionist groups like amateur theatre, choir, and 
musical clubs (SCP, 1998). It is clear that modernization does not imply a quantitative 
decline of involvement in associations (Dekker & Van den Broek, 1998) but rather a 
qualitative change. This reconfiguration of civic engagement can be described as an 
individualization of the civil society (SCP, 1994). Civic engagement in the western 
world is less often coinciding with class interests or bound up with religious 
involvement, but takes on a more global character, and is more often an expression of 
values and individual differences in personality. 
The number of blood donors has declined slowly from 650,000 in the mid 
1990s to 600,000 in 2001, and declined more rapidly to 530,000 in 2002. The recent 
decline is due to a reorganization of the blood collection regime. The decline in the 
number of donors has been compensated by a higher number of donations per donor 
(Sanquin, 2003). 
Contrary to expectations, the number of organ donors has declined after the 
registration campaign by the Ministry of Health in 1998. Recently, the number of 
organ donors has increased (Volkskrant, 2002). This increase has been called the ‘Bart    
de Graaff-effect’. Bart de Graaff was TV-celebrity with a kidney disease, appealing 
mainly to a younger age group with his broadcasting station BNN. Allegedly, his 
exposure of the lot of kidney-dialysis patients on television has increased the number of 
organ donors.  
An important development in Dutch civil society is the rise of ‘checkbook 
participation’ and the growth of tertiary organizations that do not require face-to-face 
contacts. In the Netherlands, charitable giving by households has increased enormously 
in the last decades, amounting to an all time high of € 1.7 billion in 2001, which equals 
about 1.7% of the GDP (Schuyt, 2001a). The corresponding figure for the USA is 
about 2%, but taxes are much higher in the Netherlands. In the 1990s, fundraising 
income of the 200 largest charities more than doubled from € 340 million to € 800 
million (Bekkers, 2003c). As fundraising income grew steadily, a process of 
professionalization occurred (Schuyt, 2001b): fundraisers and other charitable 
organizations have organized themselves in several branch organizations, and an 
increasing number of charitable organizations employed paid staff for fundraising. A 
sizeable portion of the donations goes to cosmopolitan associations, which have 
compensated for the decline in memberships of local associations, and do not require 
face-to-face contacts. In the Netherlands, the argument that charitable giving has 
increased as a compensation for the lack of active involvement in voluntary 
associations does not hold true. While working hours were on the rise, volunteer rates 
have not dropped since 1975. Furthermore, the relationship between giving money and 
giving time is not compensatory. Volunteers actually donate more money to charity 
than non-volunteers (Bekkers, 2001a). The same holds true in the USA (Putnam, 
2000). 
The Family Survey of the Dutch Population 2000 (FSDP2000; De Graaf, De 
Graaf, Kraaykamp & Ultee, 2000) contains measures of charitable giving, membership 
of voluntary associations, volunteer work, blood donation and post mortem organ 
donation, that will be used as dependent variables in chapters three to seven. These 
measurements are discussed below. More information on the design and sampling 
procedure of the FSDP2000 can be found in appendix A. For the descriptive purposes 
in this chapter, sampling weights were used. In chapters three to seven, sampling 
weights were not used. 
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2.2. MEASURES OF GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING 
 
2.2.1. Charitable giving 
Because of limited space, charitable giving was measured in the FSDP2000 with 
two short items. The first question asked whether the respondent had made any 
donations in the previous year to voluntary associations, charities or nonprofit 
organizations. The respondents were instructed not to include lotteries and 
membership dues in their response. Those who said yes were asked how much money 
they had donated. These amounts were originally reported in Dutch Guilders, and later 
transformed in Euros. 70% of the respondents indicated having made donations to 
charitable causes (see table 2.1). The distribution of the amount donated (see figure 
2.1) is very skewed: there are many respondents reporting small gifts, but there are also 
a few respondents indicating large gifts.
*  
The mean amount donated in the past year was € 85,85. The median donation 
was € 22,86. Among households that donated at least some money, the mean amount 
donated was € 133,06. The median donation among the group of households that 
donated was € 45,38 (fl.100,-).  
A natural logarithm transformation of the amount donated was used to reduce 
the skewness of the distribution in order to use an ordinary least squares regression 
analysis. The transformation reduces the skewness of the distribution from 4.06 to 
0.27 and the kurtosis from 18.58 to 0.37. 
 
                                                 
* One respondent indicated a very large gift (fl. 100,000 = € 45,378). Inspection of the original write-in 
questionnaire revealed that there was no mistake in the data entry. However, the partner of this 
respondent reported a much lower amount donated: the partner reported annual donations of fl. 300,- 
(€136.18). The report of the very large gift was recoded into the value for the spouse.    
Figure 2.1.  Distribution of amount donated 
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Figure 2.2.  Distribution of natural logarithm of amount donated 
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Table 2.1.  Amount donated in past year (FSDP2000, weighted sample, n=1554) 
 
 % 
a % 
b n
No donation  29.7 462
€ 1-15  16.2 23.0 251
€ 15-25  10.8 15.3 167
€ 25-50  17.6 25.0 273
€ 50-100  9.7 13.8 151
€ 100-200  6.1 8.7 95
€ 200-400  4.9 7.0 76
€ 400-800  3.2 4.5 49
€ 800-1,600  1.4 1.9 21
More than € 1,600  .5 0.7 8
% a - Among all respondents; % b - Among donors only 
 
The reports on charitable giving in the FSDP2000 are considerably lower than 
the reports by respondents in the GIN2001-survey. The differences are not due to 
different definitions of charity: both surveys excluded membership dues and 
contributions that may generate a profit (e.g., lotteries). The GIN-survey used a much 
more extensive questionnaire on charitable giving, cueing respondents first with a list 
of 24 different types of requests for contributions. Next, respondents in the GIN-survey 
were asked whether they had donated any money to 9 different types of charitable 
causes in the past year, and if so, how much. Using this extensive questionnaire, the 
GIN-survey uncovered donations among 86% of the households, with a mean amount 
of € 235 and a median donation of € 90 among households that donated at least some 
money. The differences between the GIN-data and the FSDP-data are in line with the 
results of an experiment using different types of questionnaires on charitable giving in 
the US (Rooney, Steinberg & Schervisch, 2001, 2002). Using a concise questionnaire, a 
smaller proportion of households is classified as donating money, and the amounts 
donated are underestimated. 
The underestimation of donations using concise questionnaires as in the 
FSDP2000 is not necessarily problematic for the main purpose of this dissertation. The 
issue not whether the absolute magnitude of charitable giving is correctly estimated, 
but whether statistical tests of hypotheses are robust to the underestimation of giving.    
This could be the case, for instance, if charitable giving is systematically underreported 
in specific categories of respondents. This assumption is not unreasonable, because 
some categories of respondents (e.g., the lower educated and the elderly) will be more 
likely to forget some of their donations. In addition, it can be expected that the 
extensive cues in the GIN-survey mainly help respondents to remember small 
donations, and some groups will be more likely to have made many small donations 
(e.g., females (Andreoni, Brown & Rishall, 2003), and those with a lower income).  
Appendix B contains a comparison of the effects of relevant independent 
variables in the FSDP2000 on charitable giving with the effects of the same variables in 
the GIN-survey. This comparison suggests that the incidence of giving in the FSDP2000 
may have been underreported by lower educated persons and by Catholics, and that 
the amount donated in the FSDP2000 may have been underreported by the elderly, by 
protestants, and to a smaller extent also by the lower educated. These analyses suggest 
that the effect of the level of education on charitable giving may have been somewhat 
overestimated in the FSDP2000.  
 
2.2.2. Donation of blood 
  There were two short questions on blood donation in the FSDP2000. In the first 
question, respondents indicated whether they were currently registered as a blood 
donor. If not, they were asked whether they had ever served as a blood donor. If so, the 
respondents indicated from when to when they had donated blood. Current blood 
donors indicated since when they were donors. Table 2.2 summarizes the responses to 
these questions. 
 
Table 2.2.  Blood donation (FSDP2000, weighted sample, n=1561) 
 
  n %
Currently registered as blood donor  166  10.6
Used to be registered  202  12.9
Never registered  1193  76.4
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About one in ten of the respondents indicated being a blood donor right now 
(10.6%). An additional 12.9% had been a donor in the past. The longest ‘career’ of 
blood donation was 50 years. On average present donors had served 14.93 years. 
Among past donors, the average career was 6.13 years.  
Sanquin (2003) reports only 4% blood donors in the Dutch population. This 
estimate is considerably lower than in the percentage of self-reported blood donors 
among the respondents of the FSDP2000. There are at least three possible reasons for 
this discrepancy. First, the Sanquin-estimate is based on the whole population. The 
FSDP-sample has a limited age range (18-70). Unfortunately, the proportion of blood 
donors in this age range among the whole population is unknown. Second, not all 
potential blood donors are called for a donation every year. Third, there may be a self-
selection of blood donors among survey respondents. To the extent that blood 
donation and cooperation with a request to participate in a survey are motivated by the 
same underlying disposition or the same social conditions, the proportion of blood 
donors may be overestimated. This issue will be addressed in section 2.5. 
 
2.2.3. Post mortem donation of organs 
In the FSDP2000, the questionnaire on organ donation was introduced by 
mentioning the registration campaign that the Ministry of Health started in 1998. 
Every adult Dutch citizen received a registration form, in which a decision on organ 
donation was asked. After this introduction, the first question was whether the 
respondents carried a donor card before the registration campaign. More than one 
quarter of the respondents indicated they had carried a donor card (26.4%). Then it 
was asked whether the respondents had sent back the registration form. Slightly more 
than half of the respondents (51.5%) indicated that they had. This was considerably 
more than the proportion of the Dutch population who actually received a 
questionnaire (36.0%), according to the Ministry of Health (Reubsaet et al., 2001). A 
small number of respondents claimed they had never received a registration form 
(1.7%). 46.9% indicated they had not returned the form; seven respondents did not 
provide a valid answer. 
Table 2.3 shows the choices made by the respondents on the registration form. 
About 30% of the respondents indicated they had consented with post mortem 
donation of all organs. This was the majority (58.4%) of all respondents who had    
returned the registration form. A small number had given their consent for post 
mortem donation of specific organs, but not for others (8.9% of those who returned 
the form). Compared with the choices registered of the total population, our 
respondents were more likely to send back the form and to give consent for donation. 
This is not strange, because sending back registration forms, consenting with donation 
as well as participating in household surveys are all examples of prosocial behavior. 
Because post mortem organ donation is one of the few behaviors for which population 
values are known (another example is voting behavior), it is an interesting variable that 
can be used for weighting data. To the extent that organ donation correlates positively 
with other examples of prosocial behavior, the difference between the FSDP2000 
respondents and the potential donor population suggests that population estimates of 
other examples of prosocial behavior may be overestimated. In this case, applying a 
sampling weight based on responses to the organ donation question would lead to 
lower estimates of giving and volunteering. This issue is discussed below (2.5). 
 
Table 2.3.  Choices on the post mortem organ donation registration form issued in 
1998 (FSDP2000, weighted sample, n=1561; Reubsaet et al., 2001) 
 
 % 
a % 
b n %
c
I donate all my organs  29.9 58.4 466  36.0
I donate some of my organs  4.5 8.9 71  7.7
My family has to decide  5.5 10.7 86  10.1
I do not donate any organs  11.2 22.0 176  34.5
a - Among all respondents; b - Among respondents who indicated they had returned the registration 
form (n=800); c – Choices among the potential donor population (source: Reubsaet et al., 2001) 
 
There were a large number of changes in organ donor status since 1998 (see 
table 2.4). Although the majority of the respondent who carried an organ donor card 
before 1998 (54.6%) decided to donate all their organs, more than one quarter did not 
even return the registration form (26.4%), which turned them from donors into non-
donors. In addition, of those who carried an organ donor card before 1998, 14.1% left 
the decision up to their next of kin or decided to donate only specific organs; among 
those who did not carry a donor card this was almost the same (10.5%). Of those who 
decided to donate their organs, 50% did not carry a donor card before 1998. 
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Table 2.4.  Changes in organ donor status since 1998 (FSDP2000, not weighted, 
n=1536) 
 
  Did not send 
back form 
No 
donation
Family 
decides 
Some 
organs 
All 
organs 
n
Did not have donor codicil  633  151  72  46  222  1124
Did have donor codicil  111  18  26  32  225  412
n 744  169  98  78  447  1536
 
All respondents were asked whether they had had discussions with others about 
their decision on post mortem organ donation, and if so, with whom. Table 2.5 shows 
the responses to these questions.  
 
Table 2.5.  Discussions about post mortem organ donation decision (FSDP2000, 
weighted sample, n=1563) 
 
 % 
a % 
b  n
Had no discussions  30.8   470
Had discussions  69.2   1058
With partner  57.0 84.1  890
With family members  31.2 46.1  488
With friends  19.3 28.5  301
a - Among all respondents; b - Among respondents who had discussed the donation issue 
 
Three in ten respondents (30.8%) indicated that they had not discussed their 
decision with anybody. The majority of all respondents had discussed the donation 
issue with their partner (84.1% of those who had discussed the issue). About three in 
ten had discussed the issue with family members (46.1% of those who had discussed 
the issue). About twenty percent of the respondents (28.5% of those who had discussed 
the issue) talked about organ donation with friends. These results indicate that post 
mortem organ donation is far from anonymous in the sense that nobody knows about 
the donation decision. As a consequence, social incentives may be important for post    
mortem organ donation. However, organ donation is anonymous in the sense that 
there is no contact between organ donor and recipient: it is a form of unilateral giving, 
that cannot be motivated by a ‘quid pro quo’. 
 
2.2.4. Membership and volunteering in nonprofit associations 
Membership and volunteering in nonprofit associations were measured in the 
Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI; see appendix A). The interviewer had a 
list of ten different types of voluntary associations: a union or professional association, 
political party, church group, societal group, environmental association, cultural 
association, youth organization, school, sports club, or ‘other organization’. The 
interviewer mentioned these types of associations one by one, and asked the 
respondents whether they were presently members of these associations. When the 
respondents indicated they were members, the interviewer asked whether the 
respondents were also active members (attended meetings, participated in activities 
organized by the association). Finally, the interviewer asked whether the respondents 
had performed any unpaid work for this type of organization on a regular basis. With 
this method, membership is assumed to be a precondition for volunteering, which 
excludes ‘episodic volunteers’. Table 2.6 shows how many respondents were members, 
active members, and volunteers in the ten types of voluntary associations. 
Table 2.6 shows that the more than 35% of the respondents were members of a 
sports club, which was the most popular type of association. Somewhat more than one 
quarter of the respondents indicated membership of a union or professional 
association, and almost one quarter indicated membership of environmental 
associations. Political parties and youth organizations had the lowest number of 
members. Sports clubs by far had the highest number of active members (32.1%) and 
volunteers (11.9%). Cultural groups ranked second: 9.2% of the respondents were 
active members, and 4.4% were volunteers. Active membership and volunteering were 
least common in political parties (1.2% and 0.8%, respectively) and youth 
organizations (1.9% and 1%). If one looks at the participation rates among members 
only, the picture is somewhat different. Although religious organizations have only a 
small group of members (6%), almost all of the members are also active members, and 
more than half of the members also volunteer for the same (type of) organization. The 
same holds for schools and cultural groups. Almost all members of sports clubs are 
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also active members, and about one third of the members of sports club also volunteer 
this type of association. 
 
Table  2.6.  Engagement in voluntary associations (FSDP2000, weighted sample, 
n=1560) 
 
 Membership Active  membership  Volunteering 
   % 
a n 
c % 
a % 
b n%  
a % 
b n
Union or professional association  26.5 414 5.4 20.5 85 1.9  7.2 30
Political party  3.5 54 1.2 33.3 18 0.8  22.2 12
Church group  6.0 94 5.3 87.2 82 3.3  54.3 51
Societal group  10.6 165 2.9 27.3 45 2.2  20.6 34
Environment 24.7 385 3.3 13.2 51 1.3  5.5 21
Culture 10.2 158 9.2 91.1 144 4.4  43.0 68
Youth 2.7 42 1.9 71.4 30 1.0  35.7 15
School 3.9 61 3.4 86.9 53 2.7  68.9 42
Sport   36.7 573 32.1 87.3 500 11.9  32.3 185
Other 18.8 293 14.7 78.2 229 8.1  43.3 127
a - Among all respondents; 
b - Among members only; Row totals exceed 100% because people can hold 
multiple memberships in different types of associations 
 
 
Table 2.7 contains information on the number of memberships in voluntary 
associations. At the time of the interviews, 74.4 % of the respondents was a member of 
at least one type of voluntary association. Multiple memberships are quite common. 
More than one fifth holds two memberships, about one in seven respondents hold three 
memberships, and 9% is a member of four or more types of associations. 55.2 % was 
an active member for at least one type of association. The majority of active members 
are involved with one association (30.8% of all respondents, and 56.9% of all active 
members). 28.5% was volunteering for at least one type of association; 63.7% of all 
volunteers was active for one type of association.  
    
Table 2.7.  Number of voluntary associations engaged in (FSDP2000, weighted 
sample, n=1560) 
 
 Membership  Active  membership  Volunteering 
 % 
a % 
b n%  
a % 
b n%  
a % 
b n
0  25.6   399 45.8 714 71.5   1117
1  28.4 38.8  451 30.8 56.9 484 18.1 63.7  283
2  21.7 29.2  339 13.4 24.7 210 6.4 22.5  100
3  14.3 19.3  224 7.7 14.1 120 2.9 10.4  46
4  6.1 8.2  95 1.6 2.9 25 0.4 3.2  14
5  2.0 3.5  41 0.5 1.1 9 0.1 0.2  1
6 0.7  0.9  10 0.1 0.2 2    
7 0.1  0.1  1    
mean   1.37  1.07  0.44 
% a - Among all respondents; % b - Among members only 
 
The proportion of volunteers among the respondents of the Family Survey of the 
Dutch Population is similar to other research using a similar definition of volunteering 
(Schuyt, 2001; Knulst & Van Eijck, 2003). In the ‘Giving in the Netherlands’ (GIN) 
survey that was held in the same period as the Family Survey of the Dutch Population, 
for instance, 25% reported volunteering activities at least once a month (Van Daal & 
Plemper, 2001, p. 96). When volunteering is more loosely defined, including irregular 
volunteering activities and providing informal help to people outside the household is 
included, the proportion of volunteers is usually about 10% higher. In the GIN-survey, 
37% reported volunteering activities in the past year (Van Daal & Plemper, 2001, p. 
95). The number of organizations that volunteers are active for as reported in the GIN-
survey is also very similar to the data from the FSDP2000. 
The volunteers were asked how they became a volunteer: whether they were 
asked by someone, or whether they approached the association on their own initiative. 
Table 2.8 shows that almost two thirds of the volunteers (64.2%) were asked. Almost 
all volunteers who were asked (95.2%) to become a volunteer were recruited by 
someone who was already volunteering for the association. In contrast to reports from 
previous research in the USA (Snow, Zurcher & Ekland-Olson, 1980), it appears that 
volunteers are not found through strong ties, but are recruited by persons who have 
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rather weak ties to the new volunteer. On the other hand, the results in table 2.8 
reinforce the conclusion of previous research that the start of a career in volunteering 
depends on social selection. 
 
Table 2.8.  How current volunteers were recruited (FSDP2000, subsample of 
volunteers, n=444)  
 
 %  n 
Own initiative  35.8  159
Recruited by partner   2.0  6
Recruited by family member  2.0  6
Recruited by friend/acquaintance  29.7  85
Recruited by colleague  9.5  27
Recruited by somebody else  56.8  161
 
 
Table 2.9.  Type of volunteer activity (FSDP2000, weighted sample, n=1560) 
 
 % 
a % 
b n
Management, organizing  19.9 69.9 310
Supervision of activities  20.3 71.5 317
Helping or caring for people  3.3 11.5 51
Maintenance, technical work  7.2 25.4 113
Fundraising, member acquisition  8.3 29.3 130
Other 1.4 5.0 22
% a - Among all respondents; % b - Among volunteers only. Row totals exceed 100% because 
respondents can hold multiple memberships in different types of associations 
 
 
Table 2.9 shows which types of activities the volunteers performed. The 
majority of volunteers was performing management tasks, and supervised or organized 
activities (about 70%). Fundraising and technical work were less common. Although 
volunteering is often associated with helping people, caring tasks were performed by    
only 11.5% of the volunteers. The numbers in table 2.9 are very similar to the data 
from the Giving in the Netherlands survey (Van Daal & Plemper, 2001, p. 97). 
Table 2.10 shows that two thirds of the volunteers perform more than one of 
the activities mentioned in table 2.9. The mean number of tasks performed was 2.13. 
The volunteers also indicated how many hours they spent volunteering in an average 
month. The mean number of hours volunteered was 11.0 (among volunteers only). The 
distribution of the number of hours volunteered is very skewed (see table 2.11). 
 
Table 2.10.  Number of types of volunteering activities (FSDP2000, weighted sample, 
n=1560) 
 
 % 
a % 
b  n
1 9.2 33.7  143
2 12.1 44.6  189
3 2.8 10.4  44
4 2.5 9.2  39
5 0.6 2.1  9
% a - Among all respondents; % b - Among volunteers only 
 
 
Table 2.11.  Number of hours volunteered (FSDP2000, weighted sample, n=1560) 
 
 % 
a % 
b  n
0 77.8 22.1  98
1-5 8.3 29.3  130
6-10 5.7 20.0  89
11-20 4.5 15.7  70
20 or more  3.7 12.9  58
% a - Among all respondents; % b - Among volunteers only 
 
2.3. RELATIONS AMONG PROSOCIAL BEHAVIORS 
If some people with specific psychological characteristics are indeed more likely 
to engage in prosocial behavior, different examples of prosocial behavior should be 
positively related to each other. The same is true for the assumption that social 
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incentives promote prosocial behavior. Table 2.12 shows the relations of the examples 
of prosocial behavior that will be studied in this dissertation with each other. The 
relation of membership of voluntary associations with volunteering is not shown 
because the questionnaire assumed that all volunteers were also members of voluntary 
associations. As expected, all forms of anonymous giving were positively related to 
each other. Charitable giving was most strongly related to the other examples of 
prosocial behavior. Post mortem organ donation showed the weakest relations with the 
other examples of prosocial behavior. This result is fortunate because organ donors 
were overrepresented among the respondents who participated in the FSDP2000. The 
relatively weak correlation of post mortem organ donation with the other examples of 
prosocial behavior suggests that the population estimates of giving and volunteering 
made above may be overestimated, but are less strongly biased than in the worst case 
scenario. 
 
Table 2.12.  Relations among different examples of prosocial behavior 
 
 1234   5
1. Charitable giving  ----- **17.7 **10.0 ***20.3 ***17.1
2. Blood donation  1.99 ----- **8.2 *5.5  *6.1
3. Post mortem organ donation  1.60 1.59 ----- *6.6  ~3.0
4. Membership of voluntary associations  1.89 1.61 1.38 -----  -----
5. Volunteering  1.92 1.50 1.22 -----  -----
Entries represent Chi Squares (above diagonal) and odds ratios (relative risk ratios, below diagonal) 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; ~p<.10 
 
 
Table 2.12 shows that different examples of prosocial behavior can be found 
among specific clusters of respondents. The question to be answered in the chapters to 
follow is: what is so characteristic of these people who give money, time and body 
parts now and in the after life? Do they share specific personality characteristics and 
prosocial motives with each other? Or do they live in similar circumstances? These are 
the questions that will be addressed in the chapters to follow. 
 
 Chapter 3 
Who Gives What and Why? 
A quasi-experimental study of the power of social  
and psychological incentives in social dilemmas
* 
 
This chapter investigates the effects of material, social, and psychological 
incentives on intentions to give and volunteer with a scenario study. Social 
incentives for giving turn out to be very important for intentions to give money 
and time. In addition, requests for more effective ways of contributing as well as 
requests for contributions to local as opposed to (inter)national organizations are 
more likely to be honored. The results do not give much support for the 
hypotheses that the influence of personality characteristics on giving and 
volunteering is larger when the material costs of helping are lower (‘low cost-
hypothesis’), and social rewards are smaller (‘weak situation-hypothesis’). More 
empathic respondents were more likely to contribute, sometimes even more so 
when material and social incentives were weaker, and were more sensitive to the 
psychological rewards of helping. 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Why do people contribute to collective goods that they may never profit from? 
Donations of money and time to charitable causes constitute a significant part of the 
economy (AAFRC, 2003; Schuyt, 2003). What principles govern the donation of 
money and time? Or, in parallel to Lenski (1966): Who gives what, and why? A large 
body of research has shown that a wide variety of motives can underly prosocial 
behavior (for a review, see Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio and Piliavin, 1995). Simplifying 
the complicated picture, it can be argued that many of these factors affect three 
different types of incentives for prosocial behavior: material, social, and psychological 
incentives (Wilson, 1973; Klandermans, 1984). Next to these aspects of the choice 
situation, individual differences in personality and prosocial motivation are also related 
to prosocial behavior. However, the effects of personality may be relatively weak when 
                                                 
* A previous version of this chapter was presented at the Symposium for Economic Psychology, Tilburg 
University, September, 20, 2002. Harry Ganzeboom, Nan Dirk de Graaf and Frans van Winden 
provided useful comments on previous versions of this paper. Jeroen Weesie and Chris Snijders provided 
helpful ideas for the statistical analyses. 
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material and social incentives are strong, as suggested by the low cost-hypothesis 
(Diekmann and Preisendörfer, 2003; Mensch, 2000) and the weak situation-hypothesis 
(Mischel, 1977, 1993; Snyder and Ickes, 1985).  
This chapter presents a scenario study of the effects of material, social and 
psychological incentives simultaneously with the effects of personality characteristics 
and prosocial motivations on contributions of time and money to nonprofit 
organizations and charitable causes. Using a factorial survey (Rossi and Anderson, 
1982), the advantage of an experimental design can be combined with the advantage of 
survey research with a large sample of respondents in households: having a natural 
variation in personality and socio-demographic characteristics. With this design, the 
low cost and the weak situation-hypothesis can be tested. Furthermore, it is 
investigated how the sensitivity to material, social and psychological incentives in the 
decision to contribute to a charitable cause is related to the economic value of time and 
money, measures of social integration, and prosocial motives and personality 
characteristics. 
 
3.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The observation that economic models of behavior, relying on the assumption 
that persons will rationally seek to maximize their utility, have difficulties explaining 
many forms of prosocial behavior such as voting, membership of unions, volunteering 
for non-profit organizations, charitable giving and blood donation has become a 
commonplace (Elster, 1989, 1990; Green and Shapiro, 1994; Heath, 1976; Olson, 
1965; Wilson, 1973). How such behaviors should be modelled with a theory based on 
rational choice is subject to much debate. According to the Logic of collective action 
(Olson, 1965), rational persons will not easily contribute to such collective goods, 
because the expected benefits of contributing are in most cases lower than the costs. 
However, Olson (1965) already noted that selective incentives could make it 
worthwhile for an individual to contribute to a collective good. Selective incentives are 
individual benefits that have the character of private goods. Unions, for instance, often 
provide legal assistance to their members. Membership, which is a contribution to the 
public good of advocating the collective rights of workers, gives the member the 
individual right to use these legal assistance services. This chapter investigates how two 
types of selective incentives may make citizens willing to contribute to public goods    
that they may never profit from: social incentives, and psychological incentives. 
Although Olson (1965: 144-148) mentioned the possibility that selective incentives are 
social or psychological in nature, he excluded contributions to philanthropic 
organizations and concentrated on examples of collective goods that seemed more 
strongly affected by material selective incentives. This is strange, because Olson’s 
theory is in essence a very general theory of prosocial behavior of individuals. Even for 
philanthropic contributions to collective goods that the individual may never profit 
from, the theory can be used. Decision makers are responsive to the incentives of 
possible actions, and consider three broad types of incentives in situations in which 
they may display prosocial behavior: the immediate material costs required, social 
incentives, and psychological incentives. The likelihood that a person gives his time or 
money to some collective good, be it the well being of another person, a group of 
persons, or society as a whole, will increase as a function of the total net benefits. The 
decision maker weighs the material costs of a contribution against the social rewards 
and the psychological rewards that will be obtained. In other words, the utility of 
helping is determined by the net social and psychological benefits relative to the direct 
material costs. If the social and psychological rewards for helping outweigh the 
material cost of helping, people will help. This entails that the higher the social rewards 
for helping (or the higher the social costs for not helping), the more likely that a person 
will spend some of her resources to help. The same holds for psychological rewards.  
Others have expressed parts of this decision process in utility functions, adding 
components representing altruistic concerns for the utility of others (Becker, 1974; 
Weesie, 1994), the satisfaction of the act of giving (Andreoni, 1989, 1990) and the 
social prestige obtained by giving (Harbaugh, 1998; Van de Ven, 2003). These models 
have not addressed the issue how strong the effects of various sources of utility are, 
whether they interact, and if so, how. This chapter explores the effects of psychological 
incentives and intrinsic rewards and their potential interactions in order to facilitate 
decisions for model builders which types of utility arguments to focus on in future 
research and how to model them. There is no good reason to invest a lot of time in 
formal analyses and mathematical models of the effects of psychological incentives and 
intrinsic rewards on prosocial behavior when these effects are negligible. Although I do 
not present utility-functions to explain prosocial behavior, I do want to argue that 
thinking about giving and volunteering as a weighing of the material, social and 
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psychological pros and cons is a useful perspective. It is not a new perspective; neither 
is it confined to economics or rational choice sociology. The ‘costs-rewards model’ is a 
basic insight in social psychological textbooks on altruism and prosocial behavior (e.g., 
Schroeder et al., 1995), and others have proposed similar threefold typologies of costs 
and benefits (e.g., Wilson, 1973; Klandermans, 1984). What this chapter adds to the 
literature is that I test several hypotheses based on this perspective simultaneously with 
a scenario experiment incorporated in a household survey. Usually, hypotheses about 
the effects of material, social and psychological incentives are tested separately or at 
best two at a time because experiments with college students allow for a limited 
number of conditions only. Furthermore, using a large sample of respondents, 
hypotheses on the effects of individual differences in prosocial motives can be tested as 
well, while experimental research usually regards effects of psychological 
characteristics either as error variance within conditions, or does not allow for an 
estimation of these effects due to the low number of observations.  
 
3.2.1. Material incentives: costs of contributing 
Considering the decision whether or not to help some (group) of other 
individual(s), the first thing that an actor will consider is the immediate material costs 
for him/herself. The more time or money is requested, the less likely that it will be 
given. In other words: the higher the amount of time or money requested, the higher 
the social and psychological rewards have to be to make helping an attractive option. 
The amount of money or time that a person is willing to spend in an act of helping 
depends on the amount of social and psychological rewards that are gained. Many 
results of field experiments in social psychology showing that characteristics of the 
situation in which a request for help is made affect the likelihood that help will be 
given, can be explained as the effect of increasing material costs of helping (Dovidio, 
Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder and Clark, 1991). Laboratory experiments with social 
dilemmas also show that contributions to collective goods are less likely as the costs 
increase (Komorita and Parks, 1994; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965). Therefore, the 
hypothesis is tested that  
H1.  The higher the material costs of contributing, the less likely a contribution will 
be offered. 
    
3.2.2. Social incentives: rewards through repeated interaction 
Next to the material costs, an actor will consider selective social incentives that 
are produced when others observe the act of helping. When it is socially desirable to 
help others, which is usually the case, not helping entails the risk of negative social 
sanctions, while helping may bring social rewards or may avoid social sanctions. The 
magnitude of the effect of social incentives depends most strongly on the relationship 
with bystanders who are in the position to (dis)approve of the observed behavior. The 
social distance to the intermediary is a very important aspect of the relation between 
giver and observer. When a friend acts as an intermediary on behalf of a charitable 
cause, and asks for a contribution, it is much harder to refuse than when a stranger 
makes the same request. Socially undesirable behavior is more easily displayed towards 
strangers than towards friends. With a computer tournament, Axelrod (1984) showed 
that the likelihood of future interaction determines the value of mutual cooperation in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The positive effect of future interaction on cooperation is 
observed in many types of social dilemmas (e.g., Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce and 
Neuberg, 1997; Shapiro, 1975) and reinforces the effect of material incentives. 
However, there are also important effects of social incentives that do not coincide with 
material self-interest. Prosocial behavior is more likely when the giver has positive past 
experiences with the receiver, also when there is no prospect of future interaction 
(Gautschi, 2000). Prosocial behavior is more likely when the giver can expect social 
approval from third parties outside the dilemma, who are not able to reciprocate, even 
when there is no prospect of future interaction with them (Deutsch and Lamberti, 
1986; Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee, 1998). These results can be understood as the 
effect of increasing social rewards for helping. Field studies of charitable giving have 
also supported the insight that the expectation of repeated interaction in the future 
with an intermediary person making the request increase the likelihood of a 
contribution, as well as the amount contributed (Long, 1976). In sum, the hypothesis 
will be tested that 
H2.  The smaller the social distance to the intermediary, the more likely a 
contribution will be offered. 
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3.2.3. Psychological incentives: distance to the beneficiary and the efficacy of 
contribution 
Finally, a person who is asked for help will probably experience psychological 
rewards when helping increases the welfare of another person or the collective. 
Experimental studies of mood effects of giving show that giving makes people feel good 
about themselves (Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio and Piliavin, 1995). In the economic 
literature on philanthropy, the ‘warm glow’ from giving is assumed to be an important 
ingredient in donor motivation (Andreoni, 1989; Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002). This 
chapter focuses on two dimensions of helping situations that affect the magnitude of 
the psychological rewards of giving: the efficacy of the contribution for relieving the 
need of the beneficiary, and the psychological distance to the beneficiary. The key 
assumptions are that more effective contributions and contributions to causes that are 
psychologically closer are more rewarding, and generate a ‘wamer glow’.  
Distance - The psychological value of a contribution to a public good for an 
individual depends on the psychological distance to the beneficiary. For many forms of 
prosocial behavior, it is unclear to the actor what the exact consequences are of his 
contribution to a collective good. Hypotheses on the effects of control and learning in 
social dilemmas (Buskens and Raub, 2002) predict that people will be more strongly 
attracted to collective goods in the local community than to the problems of a third 
world country or to global issues. People are more able to monitor and influence the 
provision of local collective goods such as schools or leisure clubs than global collective 
goods such as ‘the environment’. In addition, the benefits of contributions to local 
collective goods can be observed more easily, reducing uncertainty on the quality of the 
public good. Finally, biological evolution has equipped humans with a general 
tendency to be more emotionally responsive to the well being of persons who are closer 
to them (Davis, 1994). Empathy more easily leads to contributions to the needs of a 
specific person than to contributions targeting group needs (Batson et al., 1995; Batson 
and Moran, 1999). In sum, it can be assumed that the closer a person feels towards the 
beneficiary (or beneficiaries), the higher the degree of psychological satisfaction of a 
contribution to the well being of this (group of) person(s). This gives rise to the 
hypothesis that 
H3.  The larger the psychological distance to the beneficiary, the less likely a 
contribution will be offered.    
Efficacy - Next to the psychological distance to the beneficiary, the efficacy of 
the contribution for relieving the need of the beneficiary affects the psychological 
reward for giving. When it is uncertain whether the contribution actually relieves the 
need of the beneficiary, people are less inclined to give (Bekkers, 2003a). When 
charities are said to be inefficient in spending their resources, e.g. by paying large 
salaries for CEOs, corruption or other misgivings, public support declines rapidly. It 
can be expected that the same holds for differences between types of activities as 
contributions to charitable causes. The less certain that a type of contribution yields a 
benefit for a group in need, the less likely people will help in this way. For instance, 
while distributing flyers in which people are asked to become members or donors is not 
very efficient because it is likely that many people will disregard them, a direct 
monetary gift is a more efficient contribution. Evidence on the relation between 
efficacy and likelihood of prosocial behavior is found in experimental studies on 
cooperation in social dilemmas and in studies on mobilization strategies by social 
movements for collective action. Experimental social dilemma studies have shown that 
the more effective people feel their contribution will be, the more likely they will 
contribute (Komorita and Parks, 1994: 55-68). Persons in small groups (Kerr, 1989) 
and with more prosocial value orientations (Kerr and Harris, 1996) are more likely to 
think their contribution is effective. Mobilization studies have shown that persons who 
think collective action is more effective are more likely to take part in collective action 
(Klandermans, 1984). In sum, it is expected that  
H4.  The less effective the act of contributing to increase the well being of the 
beneficiary, the less likely that a contribution will be offered. 
 
3.2.4. Individual differences in the value of material, social and psychological 
incentives  
Implicitly, it was assumed above that the effects of material, social and 
psychological incentives are the same for all persons. This is probably an unrealistic 
assumption. Persons facing stronger constraints in their time and financial budgets will 
be more responsive to the material costs of helping. And persons with more empathic 
abilities and a more prosocial value orientation will be more responsive to the 
psychological rewards of helping.  
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The value that a person attaches to the material costs of helping will be 
determined by the availability of leisure time and the hourly wages (for giving time), or 
household income (for giving money). Because the opportunity costs of helping are 
higher for persons with higher hourly wages and less leisure time available, they will be 
more sensitive to the material costs of helping. The same holds for income: a 
contribution of €10 represents a smaller value for those with higher household incomes 
than for those with lower household incomes.  
The value that a person attaches to the social incentives that may be associated 
with helping is assumed to be constant. According to the classical theory of Durkheim 
(1897) on suicide, persons in more cohesive intermediary social groups are more likely 
to follow social norms because they are more likely to experience social sanctions for 
not helping (or social approval for helping). Examples of intermediary groups are 
religious groups, the village, and schools. From the perspective of rational choice 
theory, the mechanism of social control may explain these regularities. Persons in 
religious networks, in smaller communities and higher educated persons are more 
strongly embedded in groups holding positive norms on giving and volunteering than 
the non-religious, urban residents, and the lower educated. Note that it is not necessary 
to assume that this embeddedness results in a higher sensitivity to social norms. It is 
more parsimonious to assume that a stronger embeddedness results in a higher 
willingness to give, simply because it is more likely that violation of the group norm on 
helping will be punished more severely in these groups. Survey research on giving and 
volunteering shows that the greater contributions of church members compared to 
non-members are mainly rooted in the social incentives for giving in religious 
networks, and not in (religious) norms (Bekkers, 2000, 2003a; Jackson et al., 1995; 
Park and Smith, 2000). 
The value that a person attaches to the psychological rewards of helping will 
also vary between persons. This value will depend on individual differences in prosocial 
motives. These motives may also be expected to have direct effects on the willingness to 
give money and time for public goods because they indicate a preference for the well 
being of others. The literature on prosocial behavior in social and personality 
psychology suggests at least three kinds of psychological characteristics that may be 
related to helping: social value orientations, empathy, and agreeableness. Agreeableness 
is one of the ‘Big 5’ (McCrae and John, 1992). Agreeable persons are described as    
friendly, helpful and sympathetic. This trait description leads to the expectation that 
agreeableness is positively related to volunteering and donation of money (Ben-Ner, 
Putterman, Kong and Magan, 2004; Graziano and Eisenberg, 1994; Elshaug and 
Metzer, 2001; Kraaykamp and Vullings, 2002). However, agreeableness as a 
personality trait may not be the panacea in the explanation of prosocial behavior, 
because it does not specify a process through which people come to value the utility of 
others. More specific individual characteristics that make people pay attention to the 
well being of others are social value orientations and empathy. 
Social psychological experiments on the effects of social value orientations on 
cooperation show that people differ widely in the goals they strive for in situations of 
interdependence (Van Lange, 2000). Some persons are motivated primarily by their 
own outcomes, while others are more concerned for joint outcomes. Previous research 
has indicated that social value orientations are not very stable (Bekkers, 2004b; Van 
Lange, 1999), but that they are related to cooperation in abstract social dilemma games 
(e.g., Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; McClintock and Liebrand, 1988), motives for 
charitable donations (Bekkers, 2004b), and several forms of prosocial behavior in the 
‘real life’: negotiation behavior (De Dreu and Van Lange, 1995), helping behavior 
(McClintock and Allison, 1989), volunteering (Bekkers, 2004b) and charitable giving 
(Van Lange, 1997; Van Lange, Van Vugt, Bekkers and Schuyt, 2003). 
Empathy (Davis, 1994) is an alternative explanation for how people come to be 
concerned for the welfare of others. Empathy is often divided in two dimensions: an 
affective and a cognitive dimension. The cognitive dimension is also called ‘role taking’ 
or ‘perspective taking’ and refers to the ability to see the world from another person’s 
viewpoint. The affective dimension is also called ‘empathic concern’ and refers to the 
emotional responsiveness to the situation of others. There is substantial evidence that 
there are stable individual differences at the trait-level on these two dimensions of 
empathy (Davis, 1994), and that these differences are correlated with prosocial 
behavior (Batson, 1998; Eisenberg et al., 1989), also in experimental social dilemmas 
(Batson et al., 1995; Batson and Moran, 1999). Recent research has shown that 
empathic concern is the most distinctive personality characteristic of charitable donors 
(Bekkers, 2004a) and volunteers (Bekkers, 2004b). In sum, it is expected that 
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H5.  The higher the level of empathic concern, perspective taking, agreeableness and 
prosocial value orientation of a person, the more likely that this person offers a 
contribution. 
 
3.2.5. Interactions among psychological, social and material incentives: low cost and 
weak situation 
Low cost-hypothesis - Many social scientists, especially those holding strong 
assumptions on self-interest, such as game theorists, economists and rational choice 
sociologists, doubt the causal force of ‘soft’ psychological incentives. They prefer to 
believe that ‘hard’ incentives such as time and budget restrictions, and legal or social 
sanctions have a much more powerful effect on human behaviour. This general belief 
leads to the hypothesis that the effects of material and social incentives on 
contributions to collective goods are stronger than the effects of psychological 
incentives. Of course, such a general statement cannot be tested easily. However, it 
does lead to the expectation that socio-demographic characteristics are more strongly 
correlated to the willingness to give money and time than personality characteristics 
and social values. A more specific hypothesis that is based on the general belief in ‘hard 
incentives’ holds that values, attitudes, cognitions and so on, may play a role when 
stakes are small, but will ultimately lose their causal power when stakes are high. In 
sociology, this idea is often called the ‘low cost-hypothesis’ (Diekmann, 1996; 
Diekmann and Preisendörfer, 2003; Mensch, 2000). Although the low cost-hypothesis 
is very general, its empirical support is mainly limited to the specific domain of 
environmental behavior. Pro-environmental attitudes may lead to pro-environmental 
behavior when it is relatively cheap, but not when it involves substantial costs 
(Diekmann, 1996; Diekmann and Preisendörfer, 1998, 2003). Psychologists also 
believe that psychological rewards for helping will have an influence on prosocial 
behaviour when it is relatively costless, but not when it is relatively costly (Neuberg, 
Cialdini, Brown, Luce and Sagarin, 1997). This insight echoes the claim by Lenski 
(1966: 30) that ‘altruistic action is concentrated on the level of lesser events and 
decisions’. Psychological rewards can be derived from the situation (such as the 
distance to the beneficiary and the efficacy of the act of helping) as well as from the 
person (prosocial motives such as social value orientations and empathy). This chapter 
tests the generality of the low cost-hypothesis by investigating the effect of    
psychological incentives, prosocial motives and personality characteristics on intentions 
to contribute to collective goods under high and low cost conditions. 
Weak situation-hypothesis - The low cost-hypothesis in rational choice 
sociology bears some resemblance to the ‘power of the situation-hypothesis’ in social 
and personality psychology (Mischel, 1977; Snyder and Ickes, 1985). This hypothesis 
states that personality characteristics have larger effects in ‘weak situations’ than in 
strong situations. In strong situations, individual behavior is constrained by social 
norms, while in weak situations, actors’ decisions are free. Consider the difference 
between a picnic and a funeral (Mischel, 1977). At a picnic, it is perfectly natural to 
talk loud, make jokes and do other things that can be seen as expressions of personality 
traits. At a funeral, however, everyone is expected to behave in the same way, quietly 
mourning over the deceased. At the picnic, human behavior is pretty unrestricted by 
social norms, and individual differences in personality become apparent. The power of 
the situation hypothesis predicts that when a friend acts as an intermediary for a 
collective goal and asks for a contribution, psychological rewards gained by a more 
efficient contribution or by an empathic warm glow will be relatively unimportant 
because most people would comply with a request from a friend anyway. But when a 
stranger asks for a contribution, only persons with high levels of empathy will comply.  
The low cost-hypothesis and the power of the situation hypothesis are two 
forms of the same idea: the larger the situational constraints, either in the form of 
material or social incentives, the smaller the influence of personality traits. The power 
of the situation hypothesis and the low cost-hypothesis are two different answers to the 
question ‘Under which conditions do prosocial dispositions predict prosocial 
behaviour?’ (Carlo et al., 1991). 
 
3.2.6. Summary of hypotheses 
The goal of this chapter is threefold. First, hypotheses on the effects of material, 
social, and psychological incentives for prosocial behavior will be tested. It is expected 
that: 
H1.  The higher the material costs of contributing, the less likely a contribution will 
be offered. 
H2.  The smaller the social distance to the intermediary, the more likely a 
contribution will be offered. 
73   
H3.  The larger the psychological distance to the beneficiary, the less likely a 
contribution will be offered. 
H4.  The less effective the act of contributing to increase the well being of the 
beneficiary, the less likely that a contribution will be offered. 
 
The second goal is to give an answer to the question which personality 
characteristics are important predictors of behavior by testing the following hypothesis: 
H5.  The higher the level of empathic concern, perspective taking, agreeableness and 
prosocial value orientation of a person, the more likely that this person offers a 
contribution.  
 
The third goal is to give an answer to the question which psychological rewards 
and personality characteristics are important predictors of behavior by testing 
hypotheses on interactions between psychological rewards on the one hand and 
material costs and social rewards on the other hand. The effect of material costs may 
override the weak force of prosocial dispositions, as predicted by the ‘low cost’-
hypothesis: 
H6.   Psychological rewards and personality characteristics will be less predictive of 
helping when material costs for helping are higher. 
In a similar vein, the ‘weak situation’-hypothesis argues: 
H7.  Psychological rewards and personality characteristics will be less predictive of 
helping when social rewards for helping are higher. 
  
The fourth goal is to investigate whether the responsiveness to material, social, 
and psychological incentives differs systematically between persons as a function of 
socio-demographic and personality characteristics. More specifically, it is expected that 
H8.  Increasing material costs of a contribution will be more strongly decreasing the 
willingness to give and volunteer for persons with a high value of time or 
money. 
H9.  Increasing psychological rewards of a contribution will be more strongly 
increasing the willingness to give and volunteer for persons with more prosocial 
value orientations, and higher levels of empathy and agreeableness. 
The effects of social incentives are expected to be constant.    
3.3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
3.3.1. Data 
The third edition of the Family Survey of the Dutch Population, 2000 
(FSDP2000; De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp and Ultee, 2000) is used to test the 
hypotheses formulated above. Chapter two and Appendix A provide details on the 
sampling procedure, questionnaire design and measures of psychological characteristics 
and prosocial motives. 
 
3.3.2. Construction of scenarios 
In the real world, material, social and psychological incentives for prosocial 
behavior in social dilemmas are often correlated. Laboratory experiments would be 
best suited to disentangle the effects of these dimensions, but they impose limitations 
on the number of independent variables that can be manipulated at once. The factorial 
survey approach (Rossi and Anderson 1982) offers the possibility to manipulate all 
four aspects of the helping situation in one design. Factorial surveys are often used to 
measure norms by asking respondents about the social appropriateness of specific 
responses in the scenarios (Horne, 2003). In the present study, however, the 
respondents are asked what they would do in the scenarios to obtain a measure of the 
intention to contribute. Below I will present evidence that these intentions are 
positively related to actual contributions to collective goods. The scenarios (or 
‘vignettes’, as they are called in Buskens and Raub 2002) used in this study were 
constructed to cover a wide range of situations in which an individual is asked to 
perform a specific type of activity for a specific 'common good'. These are all social 
dilemma situations because the individual is asked to give time or money to an 
organization, for which no compensation is given. The questionnaire contained eight 
short scenarios describing possible helping situations. Respondents were asked to 
imagine that they were in the situation described in the scenario. An example of a 
scenario is: “Your neighbour asks you for one evening of door to door fundraising for 
the local soccer club. Would you do this?” Table 3.1 shows how material costs, social 
rewards and psychological rewards were manipulated in the scenarios.  
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Table 3.1. Values of dimensions in scenarios 
 
Material incentives 
Material costs for donations: money 
1. f. 2,50 (=€1.13)
1 
2. f. 5,- (=€2.27) 
3. f. 10,- (=€4.54) 
4. f. 25,- (=€11.34) 
Material costs for activities: time 
1. one hour 
2. one evening 
3. several evenings 
Social incentives 
Repeated interaction with intermediary 
1. Letter 
2. Stranger 
3. Distant neighbour 
4. Neighbour  
5. Family  
6. Friend  
7. Sibling  
8. Partner  
Psychological incentives 
Efficacy of activity 
1. Distributing flyers/clothes bags 
2. Door to door fundraising 
3. Building/collecting clothes  
4. Giving Money 
Distance to beneficiary 
1. Third world people 
2. Political prisoners 
3. Red Cross 
4. Local soccer club 
    
Material costs were manipulated in terms of amounts of time requested in case 
an activity was asked, and in terms of money in case a donation was asked. Social 
rewards were manipulated by describing the identity of the intermediary person asking 
for a contribution: the value of future interaction with a person will increase as the 
social distance to this person decreases. Requests by intermediaries who are closer to 
the respondent are more difficult to deny. Psychological rewards were manipulated by 
describing more or less efficient activities to contribute and more or less 
psychologically distant beneficiaries. With regard to efficacy, it was assumed that some 
activities are more efficiently contributing to the well-being of the beneficiaries than 
others, and that more efficient activities are psychologically more rewarding. For 
instance, while distributing flyers is not very efficient because it is likely that many 
people will disregard them, a direct monetary gift is a more efficient contribution. 
People will feel themselves better when they have performed an activity that benefits a 
group of persons with a higher degree of certainty, than when they are not so sure 
whether their contribution was useful. With regard to psychological distance, it was 
assumed that people feel better about contributing to more local and less distant goals.  
Space constraints in the survey allowed for a maximum of eight scenarios per 
respondent. For methodological reasons that are irrelevant in the present discussion, 
one specific scenario was placed first in all sets of scenarios (‘Your neighbour asks you 
for one evening of door to door fundraising for the local soccer club’).
2 After the fixed 
scenario, the random part started, consisting of seven scenarios. First, three or four 
scenarios followed in which an amount of time was requested. In the last three or four 
scenarios, a monetary contribution was requested. The respondents were asked 
whether they would say yes or no to a request for a specific effort (e.g., giving f. 5,- or 
spending one evening).  
Because one scenario was the same for all respondents, and the organization of 
the data collection allowed for, 20 different sets of scenarios, a sample of 140 (7x20) 
scenarios was drawn randomly from the 338 possible scenarios identified as realistic 
situations in a pre-test.
3 The procedure resulted in 55 scenarios with a request for a 
monetary donation, and 85 scenarios with a helping request.  
Because the scenarios were not selected from a population of real helping 
situations, the relative effects of the three types of incentives represent the effects of 
these dimensions in the artificial population of possible helping situations, determined 
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by the values chosen on these dimensions. It should be kept in mind that the magnitude 
of these effects is determined partly by the operationalization and scaling of the 
dimensions in the scenarios. One has to be careful putting too much weight on these 
differences as their values are somewhat arbitrary – with a range of, say, fl 1,-- to fl 
50,- for material costs, the effect of material costs would probably have been larger. 
However, these values would be rather absurd in combination with the values on other 
dimensions. One hardly ever gets a request for a very small contribution by mail or a 
request for a very large contribution by a completely unknown person. To the extent 
that the combinations of values in the scenarios are realistic, the estimated effects of the 
three types of incentives are also realistic. 
 
3.3.3. Socio-demographic and personality characteristics 
The respondents in the FSDP2000 completed a computer assisted personal 
interview as well as a write-in questionnaire. In the personal interview, data were 
obtained on the highest completed educational level (7 categories, ranging from 
primary school to post-academic degree), yearly household income (sum of all sources 
of income of both partners in 1000 €), working hours per week, the frequency of 
church attendance (number of visits per year), and level of urbanization (from 0: rural 
to 4: very urban). These characteristics were included because they are indicators of 
human and social capital, which facilitate prosocial behavior (Wilson & Musick, 
1997). Measures of empathic concern and perspective taking as subdimensions of 
empathy and the ‘Big Five’ personality characteristics are discussed in appendix A.  
 
3.3.4. Analytical strategy 
The data in the present study differ from ordinary survey data because there are 
multiple observations per respondent. The respondents indicated in 8 different 
scenarios whether they would or would not be willing to offer help. These observations 
are not independent of each other: the residual variance in scenario responses is 
clustered within respondents. In order to avoid biased standard errors for the effects of 
individual characteristics, a multiple observation time series regression model is used, 
applying the Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance (Huber, 1967).
5 A 
comparison of model 3 and 4 shows the reduction of the individual level variance in 
scenario responses explained by psychological characteristics (such as individual    
differences in personality) versus social conditions such as the level of education and 
the frequency of church attendance.
6 
The results are analyzed separately for scenarios in which time or money is 
requested, because the scenario characteristic of efficacy is constant across all requests 
for monetary donations. To facilitate the interpretation of the logit coefficients, all 
socio-demographic and personality characteristics were standardized into z-scores 
(except the dummy variable for gender, of course). This enables a comparison of the 
effects of socio-demographic and personality characteristics. To avoid an 
overestimation of the effects of scenario characteristics due to peculiar selections of 
extreme scenario characteristics within specific sets of scenarios, two variables were 
created for all four scenario characteristics: the mean of the scenario characteristic in 
the set of scenarios that the respondent received, and the difference from the mean in 
the set. With this procedure, the disturbing effects of extreme values of scenario 
characteristics in specific sets are controlled. After all, what we are really interested in 
are the effects of the differences from the mean values of scenario characteristics in a 
given set of scenarios, not in the effect of sampling errors in the selection of scenarios.
7 
The results were obtained with the xtlogit-command in Stata6, correcting for within-
respondent clustering.
8 
The analyses were conducted in several steps, introducing blocks of variables in 
each step. First, an ‘empty model’ with an intercept only was run to obtain a baseline 
estimate of the residual individual level variance (ρ). In model 1, the main effects of 
scenario characteristics were entered, allowing for a test of hypotheses 1 to 4. In model 
2, sociological characteristics indicating the availability of material and social resources 
were entered. In model 3, individual differences in personality characteristics and 
prosocial motives are added, testing hypothesis 5. A comparison of the results of model 
3 and 2 gives insight in the relative strength of the effects of personality and socio-
demographic characteristics. Because one could argue that introducing socio-
demographic characteristics before personality characteristics favors the chances for 
personality characteristics, the same test was also conducted reversing the order of 
introduction of the two blocks of variables. In model 4, interactions between material 
costs and these individual differences in personality were added to test the low cost-
hypothesis (H6). In model 5, interactions between repeated interaction and individual 
differences in personality were added to test the weak situation-hypothesis (H7). In 
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separate analyses, the hypotheses on the sensitivity to material, social and 
psychological incentives were tested. Model 3 served as a baseline for these analyses. 
By adding interactions between indicators of material resources from the survey and 
material costs from the scenarios hypothesis 8 was tested. Hypothesis 9 was tested by 
adding interactions between personality characteristics and the two psychological 
incentives manipulated in the scenarios.  
 
3.4. RESULTS 
 
3.4.1. Giving time: intentions to volunteer 
In table 3.2, the results are presented of a random effects logistic multi-level 
analysis of the likelihood of making a contribution of time. The effects of the 
manipulated scenario characteristics (see model 1) are in the expected direction for all 
four dimensions.
9 As expected, help is more likely to be offered when it takes less time 
to help and when a person from a smaller social distance makes the request. The effects 
of efficacy and distance are in line with the hypothesis that psychological incentives for 
contributions to collective goods increase the likelihood of such contributions. The 
more efficient the type of activity requested, the more likely that a person offers to 
help. The effect of psychological distance also seems to be in line with expectations: as 
the beneficiary is a more distant organization, the tendency to offer help decreases. 
However, this effect is probably not linear (see table 1 in appendix C). Contributions 
to soccer clubs and political prisoners were less likely to be offered than contributions 
to the Red Cross and the poor in developing countries.
10 In sum, the results support 
hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, but support hypothesis 3 only partially. 
Next to scenario characteristics, a number of individual characteristics increase 
the likelihood of offering assistance. Model 2 shows that women, younger people, the 
higher educated, and those living in less urban environments are more likely to offer 
help. Except for the age effect, these relations are consistent with research on actual 
volunteering. The non-significant effect of church attendance seems surprising given 
that the literature on volunteering using ordinary survey data consistently shows a 
positive relation between church attendance and volunteering (Bekkers, 2000, 2003a; 
Lam, 2002). However, the present analysis shows that frequent church attendees are 
not more likely to offer help if they are asked than persons who never attend church.    
This result is in line with previous research showing that church attendees are more 
likely to volunteer because they are more likely to be asked (Bekkers, 2000, 2003a). 
Model 3 shows that only two personality characteristics are related to 
volunteering intentions: agreeableness and empathic concern. The effects of these two 
personality characteristics are equally strong.
11 None of the other personality 
characteristics predict helping. The positive effects of agreeableness and empathic 
concern are consistent with research on actual volunteering, but the absence of an 
effect of extraversion is not. As in the case of church attendance, it could be that the 
relation of extraversion with actual volunteering originates in the selection process of 
volunteers. It is not unlikely that extraverted behavior signals volunteering abilities to 
recruiters who are prospecting for participants. 
An interesting finding is that the gender difference found in the first model 
disappears almost completely when personality characteristics are introduced. This 
indicates that the greater willingness of women to help others is due to their higher 
levels of agreeableness and empathic concern. Chi-square tests for the blocks of 
variables added in model 2 (χ
2 =73.1, df=6, p<.000) and 3 (χ
2=54.94, df=8, p<.000) 
indicated that the socio-demographic variables are stronger predictors of helping 
intentions than the personality characteristics. However, if the same test is conducted 
within model 3, comparing the improvement of the model fit due to socio-demographic 
characteristics and personality characteristics, the Chi-square for socio-demographic 
characteristics declines (χ
2=44.09, df=6, p<.000) because gender and age differences are 
mediated by personality characteristics. Comparing the decline in the residual 
individual level variance in model 2 and 3 also gives an indication of the relative effect 
of personality and socio-demographic characteristics.
12 Although the residual 
individual level variance remains high, even in model 3, it appears that the residual 
variance on the individual level declines more strongly when personality characteristics 
are introduced (from .598 to .572, a decline of 4.3%) than when socio-demographic 
characteristics are introduced (a decline from .620 to .598, a decline of 3.5%). In sum, 
intentions to volunteer are not much more strongly related to socio-demographic 
characteristics than to personality characteristics. 
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Table 3.2.  Results of logistic random-effects model of intentions to give time (nij=6411, nj=1262) 
 
 0.  Empty 
model 
1. Scenario 
characteristics 
2. Socio-
demographic 
characteristics 
3. Personality 
characteristics  
4. Low cost-
hypothesis 
5. Weak 
situation- 
hypothesis 
Scenario characteristics  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Material costs (m) *-.298 .149 -.279 .146 -.270 .143 -.227 .143 -.181 .146 
Material costs (d) ***-.222 .041 ***-.223 .041 ***-.219 .041 ***-.228 .041 ***-.225 .042 
Social rewards: repeated interaction (m) ***.378 .086 ***.365 .084 ***.377 .082 ***.393 .083 ***.418 .084 
Social rewards: repeated interaction (d) ***.475 .020 ***.476 .020 ***.475 .020 ***.466 .020 ***.491 .022 
Psychological rewards: distance (m) -.010 .180 -.015 .176 -.010 .172 -.142 .176 -.137 .178 
Psychological rewards: distance (d) ***-.117 .035 ***-.118 .035 ***-.121 .035 ***-.124 .035 ***-.103 .036 
Psychological rewards: efficacy (m) -.058 .303 -.120 .296 -.185 .250 -.318 .292 -.222 .299 
Psychological rewards: efficacy (d) ***.137 .051 ***.136 .051 *.132 .051 *.129 .052 *.136 .053 
Respondent characteristics   
Female ***.370 .094 .158 .099 .157 .100 .150 .101 
Age ***-.267 .049 ***-.226 .050 ***-.228 .050 ***-.230 .050 
Education ***.164 .049 ***.136 .048 ***.137 .049 ***.137 .049 
Hourly wages -.107 .059 -.098 .057 -.097 .057 .099 .057 
Church attendance .010 .047 .002 .047 -.000 .047 -.001 .047 
Urbanization *-.114 .047 *-.113 .046 *-.113 .046 *-.116 .047 
Agreeableness ***.191 .054 ***.192 .054 ***.199 .055 
Extraversion .066 .050 .065 .050 .065 .052 
Openness -.017 .050 -.019 .050 -.018 .051 
Conscientiousness -.074 .049 -.071 .049 -.072 .050    
Neuroticism .021 .050 .020 .050 .021 .051 
Perspective taking .061 .050 .061 .050 .061 .051 
Empathy ***.192 .051 ***.196 .052 ***.201 .052 
Social Value Orientation .067 .046 .068 .046 .060 .047 
Low cost-hypothesis   
Costs*distance ***-.211 .048 ***-.168 .049 
Costs*efficacy -.076 .070 .025 .071 
Costs*Agreeableness -.040 .042 -.037 .042 
Costs*Empathy *.087 .042 .068 .042 
Costs*Perspective Taking -.034 .041 -.040 .029 
Costs*social value orientation .041 .038 .064 .039 
Weak situation-hypothesis   
Repeated interaction*costs -.040 .029 
Repeated interaction*distance ***-.099 .023 
Repeated interaction*efficacy -.037 .033 
Repeated interaction*Agreeableness -.005 .021 
Repeated interaction*Empathy ***.077 .021 
Repeated interaction*perspective taking  -.000 .021 
Repeated interaction*social orientation  ***-.087 .020 
Constant .127 .038 .452 1.302 .225 1.273 .409 1.249 .738 1.256 .145 1.277 
Sigma U  1.094 .046 1.277 .058 1.220 .057 1.155 .056 1.161 .056 1.181 .057 
Residual individual level variance (ρ)  .545 .021 .620 .021 .598 .022 .572 .024 .574 .024 .582 .023 
Log Likelihood  -5143 -3886 -3849 -3786 -3772 -3747 
Wald-statistic 0 600 638 662 677 688 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05 
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Table 3.3.  Results of logistic random-effects model of intentions to give money (nij=3474, nj=1292) 
 
 0.  Empty 
model 
1. Scenario 
characteristics 
2. Socio-
demographic 
characteristics 
3. Personality 
characteristics  
4. Low cost-
hypothesis 
5. Weak 
situation- 
hypothesis 
Scenario characteristics  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Material costs (m) -.072 .129 -.073 .125 -.071 .125 .064 .128 .083 .134 
Material costs (d) ***-.480 .040 ***-.476 .040 ***-.483 .040 ***-.436 .042 ***-.429 .043 
Social rewards: repeated interaction (m) ***.588 .080 ***.581 .078 ***.591 .078 ***.553 .078 ***.542 .086 
Social rewards: repeated interaction (d) ***.322 .028 ***.321 .028 ***.327 .028 ***.342 .029 ***.347 .030 
Psychological rewards: distance (m) ***-.609 .121 ***-.617 .117 ***-.638 .116 ***-.682 .118 ***-.644 .120 
Psychological rewards: distance (d) ***-.367 .061 ***-.369 .061 ***-.360 .062 ***-.364 .063 ***-.361 .064 
Respondent characteristics   
Socio-demographic characteristics:   
Female ***.424 .141 *.316 .151 *.327 .152 *.328 .154 
Age ***-.243 .072 **-.213 .075 **-.228 .075 ***-.227 .076 
Education ***.412 .076 ***.367 .076 ***.378 .077 ***.380 .077 
Yearly household income ***.233 .081 ***.237 .090 **.230 .090 ***.236 .082 
Church attendance *.178 .071 *.157 .072 *.157 .072 *.163 .073 
Urbanization -.060 .070 -.076 .070 -.079 .071 -.079 .071 
Personality characteristics   
Agreeableness -.095 .081 -.105 .082 -.090 .083 
Extraversion -.087 .078 -.107 .078 -.099 .079 
Openness .026 .075 .031 .076 .030 .076 
Conscientiousness -.092 .075 -.095 .075 -.095 .076    
Neuroticism -.109 .076 -.107 .076 -.109 .077 
Perspective taking -.005 .075 -.010 .076 -.022 .077 
Empathy ***.323 .078 ***.331 .078 ***.336 .079 
Social Value Orientation .058 .070 .051 .071 .048 .072 
Low cost-hypothesis   
Costs*distance ***-.300 .050 ***-.318 .051 
Costs*Agreeableness .018 .038 .022 .039 
Costs*Empathy -.027 .039 -.021 .039 
Costs*Perspective Taking .012 .039 .009 .039 
Costs*social value orientation .021 .036 .017 .036 
Weak situation-hypothesis   
Repeated interaction*costs **.063 .023 
Repeated interaction*distance .061 .045 
Repeated interaction*Agreeableness .043 .027 
Repeated interaction*Empathy .024 .029 
Repeated interaction*perspective taking  -.004 .028 
Repeated interaction*social orientation  -.014 .026 
Constant 1.222 .059 -2.692 .490 -2.879 .486 -2.940 .486 -3.137 .495 -2.989 .511 
Sigma U  1.264 .084 1.751 .119 1.628 .117 1.600 .118 1.595 .118 1.620 .120 
Residual individual level variance (ρ)  .615 .031 .754 .025 .726 .028 .717 .030 .718 .030 .724 .029 
Log Likelihood  -2433 -1746 -1710 -1674 -1655 -1646 
Wald-statistic 0 347 366 370 377 378 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05
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3.4.2. Giving money: intentions to donate 
In the analysis of intentions to contribute money (see table 3.3), the effects 
of the scenario characteristics were all in the expected direction: the lower the 
material costs, the higher the social rewards, and the less distant the beneficiary, the 
more likely people will give money. These results support hypotheses 1 to 3.
13  
Model 2 shows that females, younger persons, the higher educated, those 
with higher household incomes, and frequent church attendees are more likely to 
respond positively to a request for money. In contrast to the analysis of giving time, 
the degree of urbanization is not related to giving money. These results are in line 
with survey research on philanthropy in the Netherlands (Bekkers, 2003a), except 
for the negative age effect and the absence of an urbanization effect. Once again, 
these differences may be interpreted as the result of differences in fundraising 
exposure. Model 3 shows that neither agreeableness, nor social value orientation 
has a significant main effect on donation of money. Empathic concern, however, 
shows a positive relation. Next to the potential effect of empathy on the sensitivity 
to psychological rewards associated with helping which will be examined later, it 
also increases the likelihood to help at all. A comparison of the fit statistics shows 
that the improvement of the fit in model 2 (χ
2=72.3, df=6, p<.000) is much larger 
than in model 3 (χ
2=23.7, df=8, p<.003). Even when the contribution of socio-
demographic characteristics in model 3 is compared controlling for personality 
characteristics, the improvement is larger (χ
2=56.3, df=6, p<.000). These results are 
consistent with a similar analysis of actual contributions to charitable causes 
reported in chapter four, showing that charitable giving is more strongly related to 
the availability of resources than to personality characteristics and social values. 
However, this conclusion in itself does not support the low cost-hypothesis. 
Charitable giving is often regarded as ‘easier’ than volunteering (Maloney, 1999). 
Intentions to volunteer, however, were not much more strongly related to the 
availability of resources than to personality characteristics and social values (see 
above). 
    
3.4.3. Interactions: when do psychological rewards have an effect? 
In models 4 and 5 of tables 3.2 and 3.3, a number of interactions among 
scenario characteristics and interactions of scenario characteristics with personality 
characteristics are added to test the low cost-hypothesis and the weak situation-
hypothesis.  
In the analysis of giving time in table 3.2, the effect of distance turned out to 
decline at higher levels of material costs, in line with the low cost-hypothesis. The 
same interaction was found in the analysis of giving money in table 3.3. Requests 
for donations by more distant organizations are less likely to be honored when the 
amount of time or money requested is higher. Efficacy did not interact with costs. 
In contrast to the low cost-hypothesis, empathic concern interacts positively with 
costs in the analysis of intentions to volunteer, indicating that more empathic 
individuals express a greater willingness to volunteer when a greater investment of 
time is being requested. None of the other effects of personality characteristics 
declined at higher costs. 
The weak situation-hypothesis also received limited support in the analyses. 
In line with the weak situation-hypothesis, requests for contributions of time on 
behalf of more distant organizations were more likely to be honored when they 
were made by persons from a smaller social distance. The negative interaction of 
social value orientation with social distance in table 3.2 is also in the expected 
direction. Prosocial values are less strongly predictive of helping behavior when 
persons at a smaller social distance make a request. In contrast to the weak 
situation-hypothesis, the positive effect of empathic concern, increased with the 
value of future interaction. More empathic respondents were even more likely to 
honor requests by persons at a smaller social distance than requests by strangers. In 
the analysis of giving money, there are no significant interaction effects observed 
supporting the weak situation-hypothesis, although there is one interesting result: 
the positive interaction of repeated interaction and material costs. Requests by 
people who are close to us are even more likely to be honored when the costs are 
high rather than low. In sum, both the low cost-hypothesis as well as the weak 
situation-hypothesis received only partial support. In both cases, empathic concern 
is involved in the exceptions.  
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Table 3.4.  Results of logistic random-effects model of intentions to give time and 
money with interactions 
 
  1. Giving time  2. Giving money 
 Coeff. SE Coeff.  SE
Scenario characteristics    
Material costs (m) -.269 .144 -.066 .127
Material costs (d) ***-.228 .041 ***-.481 .041
Social rewards: repeated interaction (m) ***.379 .083 ***.597  .079
Social rewards: repeated interaction (d) ***.480 .020 ***.331  .029
Psychological rewards: distance (m) -.001 .174 ***-.645  .118
Psychological rewards: distance (d) ***-.117 .036 ***-.368  .063
Psychological rewards: efficacy (m) -.187 .292  
Psychological rewards: efficacy (d) *.128 .052  
Respondent characteristics   
Socio-demographic characteristics   
Female .159 .100 *.334 .153
Age ***-.229 .050 ***-.211 .076
Education ***.136 .049 ***.380 .078
Hourly wages -.109 .058  
Yearly household income **.235  .082
Church attendance .000 .047 *.142  .072
Urbanization *-.116 .046 -.068 .072
Personality characteristics   
Agreeableness ***.189 .055 -.100 .082
Extraversion .069 .050 -.097 .079
Openness -.017 .051 .025 .076
Conscientiousness -.074 .050 -.105 .076
Neuroticism .022 .051 -.114 .077
Perspective taking .061 .051 -.019  .076
Empathy ***.195 .052 ***.327 .079
Social Value Orientation .067 .046 .050  .071
 
(continued on next page)   
Table 3.4 (continued) 
 
  1. Giving time  2. Giving money 
 Coeff. SE Coeff.  SE
Sensitivity to material costs   
Costs*wages *-.118 .050  
Costs*income .019 .044
Costs*education .058 .040 -.042 .040
Costs*working hours -.039 .041 .060  .039
Sensitivity to social rewards   
Repeated interaction*church attendance -.033 .019 .066  .036
Repeated interaction*urbanization -.009 .019 -.032  .037
Sensitivity to psychological rewards   
Distance*Agreeableness *-.074 .036 .116 .064
Distance*Empathy *.082 .037 -.039 .063
Distance*Perspective taking .013 .035 .087  .064
Distance*Social value orientation .039 .033 .018  .060
Efficacy*Agreeableness -.012 .056  
Efficacy*Empathy -.061 .057  
Efficacy*Perspective taking .104 .055  
Efficacy*Social value orientation -.047 .050  
Constant .368 1.262 -2.996  .492
Sigma U  1.169 .056 1.617  .119
Residual individual level variance (ρ)  .577 .024 .723 .030
Log Likelihood  -3764 -1663
Wald-statistic 673 367
nij  6411 3434
nj  1262 1277
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05 
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Finally, hypotheses 8 and 9, on the sensitivity to material, social, and 
psychological rewards, are tested in table 3.4. As expected in hypothesis 8, the 
sensitivity to material costs for giving time depends upon the actual costs of one 
time unit, as indicated by the negative interaction effect of costs with hourly wages. 
Contributions of higher amounts of time are less likely to be offered by those with 
higher wages. Surprisingly, the sensitivity to material costs for giving money is not 
dependent upon the available income, at least not in a linear form.
14 These results 
only partially support hypothesis 8. As expected, the sensitivity to social incentives 
for giving time does not depend on the frequency of church attendance and 
urbanization. Church attendance and rural residence increase the willingness to 
give money and time directly, and not through the sensitivity to social incentives. 
This result fits nicely with previous research on the effect of church involvement on 
giving and volunteering (Bekkers, 2000, 2003a). The sensitivity to psychological 
incentives for volunteering depends on personality characteristics, but not in the 
manner expected in hypothesis 9. In line with the prediction, a higher level of 
agreeableness was associated with a greater willingness to give time, the smaller the 
distance to the beneficiary. Empathic concern, however, led to a greater willingness 
to give time, the larger the distance to the beneficiary. These results do not give 
very much support for hypothesis 9. It seems that the effects of prosocial motives 
on intentions to give and volunteer are mostly direct, and not through the 
sensitivity to psychological rewards. 
 
 
3.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
3.5.1. Discussion 
The validity of the results can be challenged on several grounds. First, it is 
unknown to what extent the different scenarios effectively manipulated the value of 
future interaction, the psychological distance to the beneficiary and the efficacy of a 
contribution because it was impossible to include manipulation checks in the 
factorial survey. Although a pretest of the experiment supported the internal 
validity, it is possible to explain the differences between types of activities and types    
of organizations on other grounds. For instance, the effect of social distance may 
also represent material self-interest when the respondents expect to be repaid by the 
intermediary person in exchange for their donation. In addition, it can be argued 
that distance and efficacy are not exclusively psychological dimensions, but also 
activated concerns for social approval or internalized social norms. Less effective 
contributions to collective goods are often viewed as less appropriate (Horne, 
2003), and the same can be argued for contributions to more distant goals. 
Second, it is unknown to what extent the combinations of values on the 
dimensions manipulated in the scenarios correspond to the distribution these 
combinations in actual requests for contributions. This makes it impossible to make 
claims on the relative effects of material, social and psychological incentives in the 
‘real world’. The effects reported in the analyses can only be generalized to the 
artificial population of scenarios. Future research could improve upon the present 
study by measuring the prevalence of mobilization strategies by nonprofit 
organizations, and having respondents complete scenarios with probabilities 
matching the actual distribution. 
Third, it can be questioned whether the results reported here can be 
generalized to actual prosocial behavior. From a skeptical point of view, the 
analyses merely show how people think about hypothetical contributions, not how 
they make choices in real life. This objection is legitimate to some extent. Probably, 
the proportion of respondents saying they are willing to give time or money (see 
table 1 in appendix C) is too high in an absolute sense. It is hard to believe that half 
of all people would actually help out collecting money for a charitable cause for 
several evenings, or that 45% would donate money in response to a letter. 
Response rates to direct-mail fundraising campaigns are usually much lower. 
Intentions are usually more positive than actual behavior. An obvious possibility is 
that the scenarios elicited socially desirable responses. However, the problem of a 
tendency to give socially desirable responses in surveys is serious only when some 
types of respondents are more likely to give socially desirable responses than others, 
which is often argued in social psychology (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964). In the 
present study, responses to the scenarios were not related to scales measuring 
individual differences in ‘social desirability’, and including these scales did not 
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affect the correlations with the independent variables.
15 In addition, there are two 
types of evidence supporting the external validity of the results. First, an analysis 
comparing responses in the scenario experiment with answers to questions about 
actual volunteering and charitable giving in the past year showed that actual 
volunteers offered help in the scenarios more often (on average, 1.96 times) and 
offered to help for longer periods of time (on average, (11.55 hours) than non-
volunteers (1.81 times and 10.08 hours, F-values (df=1) of 4.68 and 7.72, p<.05 
and p<01, respectively). Donors offered help more often (1.93 times), they offered 
money more often (1.99 times), and offered to help for longer periods of time 
(10.89 hours) than non-donors (1.58 times, 1.69 times, and 9.08 hours, with F-
values (df=1) of 16.68 (p<.001), 15.63 (p<.001) and 8.38 (p<.01), respectively. The 
amount of money offered did not differ between volunteers and non-volunteers or 
between donors and non-donors (F-value (df=1): 2.85). Second, the effects of 
independent variables in the analyses presented above are largely consistent with 
their effects in analyses of actual giving and volunteering. The exceptions to this 
rule (e.g., non-significant effects of extraversion and church attendance on 
volunteering intentions) can be explained by differences in exposure to requests for 
contributions. In sum, the responses in the scenario experiment are consistent with 
reports on actual giving and volunteering, and both types of data have similar 
backgrounds. This makes it more likely that the responses in the scenarios are not 
merely socially desirable answers but reflect how actual decisions in social dilemma 
situations are being made. 
 
3.5.2. Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the effects of material, social, and psychological 
incentives on prosocial behavior in social dilemma situations with a scenario study 
incorporated in a household survey in the Netherlands. Social incentives for giving 
turn out to be very important for both giving money as well as time: if asked by a 
person from a smaller social distance, it is more likely that people give time and 
money. The effect of material incentives was tested by having respondents evaluate 
requests for contributions of varying amounts of money and time. The higher the 
costs, the less likely that a request for a contribution will be honored. Psychological    
incentives were manipulated by having respondents evaluate requests for 
contributions to local versus more distant causes – assuming that contributions to 
organizations at a smaller distance yield more satisfaction – and having the 
respondents evaluate more or less efficient contributions to the public good. In line 
with the predictions, requests for more efficient ways of contributing time to a 
nonprofit organization are more likely to be honored, as well as requests for 
contributions of time to local as opposed to (inter)national organizations.  
In addition to scenario characteristics, the effects of available financial and 
social capital were investigated, and contrasted with the effects of personality 
characteristics. It was expected that resource indicators would be more strongly 
related to prosocial intentions than personality characteristics. For giving time, it 
turns out that personality characteristics such as agreeableness and empathy add 
more to the proportion of explained variance than the available financial and social 
capital through income, education, and religious involvement. With regard to 
giving money, personality characteristics are of minor relevance compared to the 
effects of financial and social capital. The differential pattern of results for giving 
time and money was not of primary interest here. However, this pattern is in line 
with the weak situation-hypothesis because charitable giving is a more anonymous 
form of prosocial behavior than volunteering.  
Finally, it was investigated how the effects of the incentives manipulated in 
the scenarios are dependent on economic and sociological conditions and 
personality characteristics, and whether the influence of personality characteristics 
is larger when the material costs of helping are lower (‘low cost-hypothesis’), and 
social rewards are smaller (‘weak situation-hypothesis’). Both the low cost-
hypothesis as well as the weak situation-hypothesis receive only partial support. 
One of the manipulated psychological incentives for giving – the distance to the 
beneficiary – interacted with material and social incentives in the predicted negative 
direction, but the other – the efficacy of a donation for relieving the needs of the 
beneficiary – did not, and neither did empathic concern. Apparently, empathic 
concern generates a willingness to sacrifice personal welfare for distant, collective 
goals, which is even larger when the situational incentives more strongly lead to 
self-interested choices. This result supports the claim that empathy can motivate 
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altruistic behavior (Batson, 1991, 1998). In sum, the results give only limited 
support to the weak situation-hypothesis and the low cost-hypothesis. Effects of 
psychological incentives and individual differences in personality traits and 
prosocial motives on prosocial behavior do not simply decline as a function of the 
material and social incentives. This conclusion is in line with evidence from 
experiments with ultimatum games, showing that the effects of fairness concerns do 
not decline as a function of stakes (Cameron, 1999). 
As expected, the sensitivity to material costs for giving time depended on 
hourly wages. However, the sensitivity to material costs for giving money did not 
depend on the available income. The sensitivity to social rewards was largely 
independent of indicators of social capital. The sensitivity to psychological 
incentives for volunteering increased with agreeableness and decreased with 
empathic concern. 
Which implications do the results suggest for rational choice models of 
contributions to collective goods? These models have focused on the effects of 
material incentives and various types of psychic income, such as the enjoyment of 
an improvement of the utility of others (Becker, 1974) or the enjoyment of the act 
of contributing itself (Andreoni, 1989, 1990). Recently, economists have started to 
pay attention to the social incentives for giving (Harbaugh, 1998; Freeman, 1997; 
Soetevent, 2003; Van de Ven, 2003). A first implication of the results reported 
above is that models including monetary and altruistic concerns only lack a very 
important set of determinants of giving and volunteering: the social incentives for a 
contribution. If asked by a person from a smaller social distance, people are very 
willing to give money or time to nonprofit organizations. Moreover, the effect of 
social rewards was even more pronounced when substantial amounts of money or 
time are being asked. Rational choice models of altruistic behavior should pay 
more attention to how requests for contributions of time and money are embedded 
in social networks. Future research should focus not only on the value of future 
interaction (as in Buskens, 1999 and Snijders, 1996), but also on other social 
incentives, such as past interaction (Buskens and Raub, 2002; Gautschi, 2000), 
network closure (Coleman, 1990), and prestige (Harbaugh, 1998; Van de Ven, 
2003).     
Secondly, the results shed some light on the complex role of altruistic 
concerns for the collective good. The effect of efficacy indicates that people do have 
a distinctive preference for more effective contributions. This result violates the 
assumption made by ‘warm glow’ models of altruism that it is the act of 
contributing rather than the collective benefit that motivates giving (Goeree, Holt 
and Laury, 2002). The implication of the negative effect of distance to the 
beneficiary is unclear, because this result could indicate that uncertainty on the 
quality of the public good reduces contributions – a pattern that is more likely to 
occur in combination with altruistic concerns – but also that people imitate others 
to obtain social approval – when they expect that others are more likely to 
contribute to local organizations.  
Thirdly, the results show that the decision to contribute or not to contribute 
is not simply the outcome of subtracting all types of costs from all types of benefits. 
The weights of material, social, and psychological costs and benefits in this decision 
depend on each other. Increasing material costs for a contribution weaken the 
effect of psychological rewards, but not of social rewards. Increasing social rewards 
also tend to weaken the effects of internalized prosocial values.  
Fourthly, the weights of material, social, and psychological incentives vary 
systematically between individuals with specific characteristics. The most striking 
result was that more empathic individuals are willing to make larger sacrifices, 
especially when they are asked by persons from a smaller social distance. This 
result is in line with a ‘selfish gene’ argument (Dawkins, 1976). If there is anything 
in the argument that humans developed empathic emotions as a result of 
evolutionary pressures, it seems logical that their activation declines with social 
distance. 
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Notes 
 
1. Exchange rate: 1$ ≈ € 0.85 (January, 2004). 
2. The results reported below were very similar when responses to this scenario were excluded. 
3. First, all 416 (for money: 4 x 8 x 1 x 4 = 128; for time: 3 x 8 x 3 x 4 = 288) possible 
combinations of text-elements were generated with a simple computer program. In the pre-test, 
random selections of scenarios were presented to five subjects, who identified unrealistic 
combinations of scenario characteristics (e.g., building a clubhouse for political prisoners in China) 
and made suggestions to improve the internal validity of the manipulations. As suggested by Faia 
(1980), the unrealistic combinations were removed, leaving 338 useful scenarios. This set of 
scenarios formed the population from which a random sample was drawn. Chi square tests 
indicated that the actual distribution of values on the four dimensions in the sample of scenarios did 
not differ from the expected values based on a random selection. 
4. Details are available from the author. 
5. Statistically, the data have a cross-classified structure, because scenarios are not only nested 
within respondents, but respondents are also nested within scenarios. However, a cross-classified 
model only makes sense when the clustering of residuals within sets of scenarios can be expected to 
be systematic, and not random. This is often the case when there is a ‘natural selection’ of 
respondents in higher-level units such as pupils in parental homes and schools (for an example, see 
Nagel & Ganzeboom, 2002). In our case, where respondents were unable to choose a specific set of 
scenarios but were given a set, it is unlikely that clustering of residuals within sets of scenarios is 
systematic. 
6. Unfortunately, logistic regression models assume that the variance explained at the scenario level 
is completely determined (Hox, 2002, p. 116). 
7. With a random sampling of scenarios in sets I tried to avoid this problem (see note 1 above). 
However, this attempt was not completely successful. An ordinary OLS regression analyses 
indicated that the variance in scenario responses explained by the selection of scenarios in sets was 
only .022. Still, respondents for two sets offered help a significant lower number of times than the 
average (which was 4.62 out of 8 scenarios) and respondents in one set offered help a significant 
higher number of times than the average. Subsequent analyses introducing differences in mean 
values for scenario characteristics in the sets explained two of these significant differences. 
Responses in only one set remained significantly less often prosocial. In the meantime, the mean 
values of two scenario characteristics for the sets were significant predictors of the number of times 
the respondents offered to give time or money. Therefore, the inclusion of the means of scenario 
characteristics in the random-effects logit is useful. 
8. A random-coefficient model is appropriate because cluster sizes are sufficiently large and 
observations within clusters are not highly correlated (Guo & Zhao, 2000).    
9. The discussion of the results is focused on the variables representing differences in scenario 
characteristics from the mean in the specific set completed by the respondent, denoted with (d). The 
significant effects of two variables representing mean values for scenario characteristics shows that 
some clustering of scenario characteristics within sets in fact occurred (see note 6 above). 
10. However, including dummy variables for all categories was not an option because this resulted 
in a multitude of effects that were hard to interpret, and because it was not possible to disentangle 
the effects of clustering of scenario characteristics in the set and the ‘true’ effects of the scenario 
characteristics (see note 8). Including dummy variables ‘SOCCER’ and ‘POLPRIS’ for intended 
contributions of time to soccer clubs and political prisoners, the effect of distance diminished to near 
zero, and showed large negative effects of SOCCER and POLPRIS (results available from author). 
11. In an additional analysis without empathy, the effect of agreeableness was larger, indicating that 
that empathy mediated the effect of agreeableness (details available from author). 
12. Unfortunately, the residual individual level variance increased in model 1. This is due to the fact 
that there is less between-group variability in scenario characteristics because they were 
approximately randomly distributed over respondents (Hox, 2002, p. 67-68). When ordinary 
computations of explained variance are used, this would result in negative explained variances. 
Snijders & Bosker (1999) give a solution for this problem, but this solution can not be used with 
logistic regression models because they assume that the scenario level variance is completely 
determined (see note 5 above). Therefore, the residual individual level variance of model 1 is taken 
as a baseline. 
13. Including the dummy variable SOCCER, the effect of distance increased and showed a large 
negative effect of SOCCER. 
14. Additional analyses (available from author) show that the income effect declines at higher 
income levels, and that the marginal effect of costs also tends to decline.  
15. This result is not surprising because psychometric reviews of instruments intended to measure 
individual differences in the tendency to give socially desirable responses have concluded that they 
are both invalid and unreliable (Costa & McCrae, 1983; Barger, 2002). Socially desirable responses 
about eating habits hardly correlate with socially desirable responses about cheating and jealousy, 
for instance. Individual differences in the tendency to give socially desirable responses in the 
scenarios are not rooted in a general tendency to give socially desirable responses in any kind of 
situation (if such a general tendency exists at all). 
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Chapter 4 
Anonymous gifts: personal decisions, social backgrounds
* 
 
This chapter investigates charitable giving, blood donation and post mortem organ 
donation. These examples of prosocial behavior are anonymous in the sense that 
the recipients cannot reciprocate because the identity of the donor is unknown. In 
addition, they are less observable by others, inhibiting social rewards. Therefore, it 
can be expected that individual differences in prosocial motives are more strongly 
related to giving money, blood and organs than to membership and unpaid work 
in voluntary associations. However, the results of this chapter show that giving is 
most strongly related to social and economic conditions, and especially the level of 
education and religiosity. Prosocial motives and personality characteristics are less 
strongly related to giving. 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Why do people display prosocial behavior? Sociologists and psychologists 
differ widely in their answers to this question. Sociologists stress the importance of 
reciprocity in social networks and individual resources such as income and 
education, arguing that material and social constraints are important forces in 
prosocial behavior. Social psychologists, on the other hand, stress the importance 
of enduring individual differences in role identities (Lee, Piliavin & Call, 1999) and 
prosocial personality characteristics such as empathy (Penner , 2002). They argue 
that over time and across different social contexts, some people are more helpful 
than others because they tend to feel more concerned for other people’s welfare and 
because they have merged their donor role with their sense of self (Callero, Howard 
& Piliavin, 1987; Lee, Piliavin & Call, 1999). Because the latter argument has been 
studied empirically and the former has not, this study focuses on the effects of 
individual differences in prosocial motives on anonymous gifts to unknown others. 
It has often been argued that one should look at individual differences in prosocial 
motives to account for examples of sustained helping behaviors and purely 
altruistic behaviors (Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Kohn, 1990; Batson, 1991; Carlo et 
                                                 
* An abridged version of this chapter is currently under review. 
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al., 1991; Penner et al., 1995; Penner , 2002). Three examples of this category are 
studied: blood donation, post mortem organ donation, and monetary contributions 
to charitable causes. The different types of donations involve a material cost to the 
donor, while social rewards can hardly be gained. Donations to charity obviously 
require money. Blood donation takes time, while blood donors in the Netherlands 
do not receive a monetary compensation. Donations of money, blood and organs 
are anonymous in the sense that there is no direct contact between donors and 
recipients. Usually, the recipients are completely unknown to donors. Furthermore, 
donation of money and organs do not even involve any personal contact at all. The 
bulk of monetary donations to charities in the Netherlands is received in response 
to direct mail (Bekkers, 2003c). Post mortem organ donation is solicited by a letter 
from the Department of Health as soon as people become 18 years of age. 
Although blood donation may involve some personal contact with medical staff at 
the regional blood banks who may encourage continuation of donorship, initial 
registration as a blood donor is voluntary. 
Because material or social incentives are largely absent for these behaviors, 
there must be some intrinsic reward in giving. This article investigates the strength 
of the relationship between three examples of altruistic behavior and a set of 
validated psychological measurements of prosocial motives, compared to social 
conditions. 
 
 
4.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
4.2.1. The effects of prosocial motives on anonymous giving 
Psychologists have argued that prosocial behavior is unlikely to be related to 
immediate situational factors when examples of sustained helping are considered 
(Penner, 2002; Lee, Piliavin & Call, 1999). When there are no external incentives, 
such as a future profit, a monetary compensation or a social reward, some intrinsic 
or psychic motive must be responsible for giving (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997, p. 
815). Three prosocial motives that may be related to anonymous giving are    
discussed: agreeableness (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997), empathy (Davis, 1994) and 
prosocial value orientations (Van Lange, 2000).  
Agreeableness - Recently, the so-called Five Factor Model (McCrae & John, 
1992) has become a general framework in personality psychology. According to 
this model, one of the five basic dimensions of human personality is agreeableness. 
Agreeable persons are described as more friendly, helpful, sympathetic and 
cooperative across a variety of contexts. Such trait evaluations are fairly stable over 
time (Ardelt, 2000). While prosocial behaviors may be the result of a variety of 
motives, including self-centered reasons, anonymous gifts are more purely altruistic. 
Therefore, agreeableness is believed to be particularly predictive of altruistic 
behaviors (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997, p. 808). However, there is very little 
research available showing an empirical link between agreeableness as a personality 
trait to prosocial behavior. A study that compared self-reported personality 
characteristics of volunteers with those of paid workers engaged in similar 
occupations found that volunteers were more agreeable (Elshaug & Metzer, 2001). 
In another study that focused on behavioral intentions, agreeableness and all of its 
facets also correlated with the willingness to share money (Paunonen & Ashton, 
2001). Research on blood donation shows that long term blood donors more often 
have an altruistic self-image than ‘rookies’ (Piliavin & Callero, 1991). Research on 
attitudes towards post mortem organ donation in the Netherlands has shown that 
donation is regarded as an altruistic act (Hessing, 1983). Given these results, it is 
assumed that more agreeable persons are more likely to give money, blood and 
organs.  
Because agreeableness is simply a trait description of persons who engage in 
all kinds of prosocial and altruistic behaviors more often than others, it does not 
give a theoretical explanation of acts of giving. Showing an empirical relationship 
between self-reported agreeableness and altruistic behaviors does not really give us 
an informative idea of why people engage in altruistic behavior. Empathy and 
prosocial value orientations are measures of two more specific motives that may 
give an explanation of individual differences in prosocial behavior.  
Prosocial value orientation - Social value orientations have been widely used 
in experimental studies of cooperation in social dilemmas to capture pre-existing 
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differences in cooperative intentions and altruistic tendencies (Van Lange, 2000). In 
this research tradition, social value orientations are measured prior to the actual 
experiment with a hypothetical social dilemma involving an ‘unknown other’. The 
respondents are asked to make a choice between several combinations of pay-offs 
for themselves and the unknown other. Respondents keeping more points to 
themselves than they give away to the unknown other are labeled ‘proself 
individuals’, and are assumed to be motivated primarily by their own outcomes. 
Respondents who choose an equal distribution are labeled ‘prosocial respondents’ 
and are assumed to be more concerned for equality and joint outcomes. The 
relation of social value orientations to agreeableness has not been investigated in 
previous studies, but theoretically they should be positively related. Social value 
orientations can be viewed as a measure of the altruism facet of agreeableness. 
Previous research has indicated that social value orientations are related to 
cooperation in experimental social dilemma games (e.g., Kuhlman & Marshello, 
1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988) and to helping behavior (McClintock & 
Allison, 1989), and charitable giving (Van Lange, 1997; Van Lange, Van Vugt, 
Bekkers & Schuyt, 2003) in the real world outside the laboratory. 
Empathy - Another answer to the question why some people are more likely 
to give anonymously to strangers than others is empathy. Empathy refers to the 
cognitive capacity to take the perspective of others as well as the emotional 
responsiveness for the well being of others. The cognitive aspect of empathy is often 
called perspective taking; the emotional aspect is called empathic concern. Social 
and developmental psychologists have noticed that there are strong individual 
differences in empathy (Davis, 1994; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Seeing that people 
are in need, more empathically concerned persons will be more willing to share 
their possessions with the less fortunate than others (Eisenberg et al., 1989). 
Previous research has reported positive relations of empathy with agreeableness 
(Ashton & Lee, 2001) as well as several forms of prosocial behavior, such as 
helping behavior (Penner et al, 1995) volunteering behaviors (Penner & Finkelstein, 
1998; Penner, 2002) and an index of prosocial behavior (Smith, 2003). There is 
very little research available on the relationship between empathy and donations of 
money, blood and organs. One experimental study of intentions to sign an organ    
donor card showed that empathy arousal was positively related to willingness to 
donate (Skumanich & Kinsfather, 1997). In the present article, the relation of 
empathic concern as well as perspective taking with anonymous giving is 
investigated, assuming that both of these relations will be positive.  
Usually, more specific measures of attitudes, values and other psychological 
characteristics do a better job in explaining specific behaviors than more general 
measures (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001). Therefore, the 
relationship of the general measure of agreeableness with anonymous giving - if 
there is any - should be mediated by the more specific measures of perspective 
taking, empathic concern, and social value orientation. 
 
4.2.2. Sociological accounts of anonymous giving 
In contrast to psychologists, sociologists usually assume that ‘the desire to 
do good is more or less evenly distributed, but that the resources to fulfill that 
desire are not’ (Wilson & Musick, 1999, p. 244). They argue that differences in 
prosocial behavior are the result of the differential availability of three types of 
resources: financial, human and social capital (Wilson & Musick, 1997). The 
underlying assumption is that prosocial behavior involves material costs that may 
be compensated by social rewards. If the social rewards for prosocial behavior are 
high enough, people may be willing to incur a material cost to themselves. The 
actual value of the material costs required for prosocial behavior will depend on the 
available time and financial budget: for those with higher incomes, a $25 donation 
is less costly than for persons with lower incomes. Likewise, spending an hour to 
donate blood has higher opportunity costs for people with higher wages (Freeman, 
1997). Consequently, the availability of financial resources through income will 
increase the likelihood of charitable giving, while the availability of leisure time 
may facilitate blood donation because it takes time to give blood. Because 
registration as a postmortem organ donor hardly costs time or money, income or 
working hours are not expected to be related to organ donation. 
Social rewards for anonymous gifts depend on the norms and the degree of 
social control in the social network. In most groups, charitable giving, postmortem 
organ donation and blood donation are positively evaluated. However, in some 
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groups the norm on giving is more positive than in others. Higher educated people 
commonly regard donations to charitable causes as laudable, more so than the 
lower educated. Recent data from the ‘Giving in the Netherlands’-survey (Schuyt, 
2003) show that of those with a university degree, almost nine in ten (87.5%) 
agreed with the statement that ‘The world needs responsible citizens’ compared to 
two thirds (66.7%) of those who completed primary education (own computation). 
With regard to the statement ‘No matter what the government does, I give to 
charitable causes’ 56% of the higher educated agreed, versus 45% of those with 
primary education. Furthermore, the enforcement of social norms may differ 
between social groups. For instance, in rural environments non-compliance would 
be noticed more easily than in urban settings (Steblay, 1987). Consistent with this 
idea, a study in the US showed that blood donation was more common on smaller 
college campuses (Foss, 1983). The most prominent differences in social norms on 
giving are with respect to religion. The small group of Calvinists, the most 
orthodox religious denomination in the Netherlands, gives six times as much to 
charitable causes than the non-religious. This difference is not only rooted in the 
higher degree of cohesion in religious networks, but also in more strict norms on 
charitable giving (Bekkers, 2002a, 2003a). Religious teachings clearly advocate 
donations to the poor, and churches have built an infrastructure of charitable 
causes and nonprofit organizations in which this ideology is institutionalized. 
Church members are more likely to be asked for a donation to a charitable cause 
(Bekkers, 2004a). Healy (2000) found that religious persons are also more likely to 
give blood. While religious norms will strongly prescribe donation of money and to 
a smaller extent also the donation of blood, post mortem organ donation is an 
exception. Although none of the major religions explicitly disapproves of post 
mortem organ donation, religious beliefs in the after life and concerns for next of 
kin empirically inhibit post mortem organ and tissue donation (Pranger, 1998; 
Sanders, 2003). 
    
4.2.3. When does personality make a difference? 
Ever since its early beginnings (Hartshorne & May, 1929), personality 
psychologists have been facing low correlations of personality characteristics with 
behavioral measures. In the debate that followed the powerful critique of 
personality psychology by Mischel (1968), a consensus emerged on at least two 
conclusions: (1) personality interacts with situational conditions, and the interactive 
effects are usually stronger than the main effects of personality characteristics; (2) 
personality characteristics are more strongly related to aggregate indices of 
behaviors than to single act criteria (Epstein & O’Brien, 1985).  
 
The low cost-hypothesis 
Identifying the conditions in which personality characteristics are more 
predictive of behavior is an important task for social psychology (Snyder & Ickes, 
1985; Carlo et al., 1991; Krahé, 1992). One of the ideas is that values, attitudes, 
and personality characteristics are more strongly predictive of behaviors that have 
low material costs. When the costs are low, people will act upon their individual 
attitudes and idiosyncrasies, but not when substantial costs are involved. In the 
polarized debate on the altruistic nature of empathy, one article asked the 
rhetorical question: ‘Does empathy lead to anything more than superficial helping?’ 
(Neuberg et al., 1997). The authors concluded their review and reanalysis of 
previous research as follows: “The ability of empathic concern to predict helping is 
limited to deciding between providing either relatively costless help or no help at 
all”...”under conditions of substantial cost to the helper, empathic concern does 
not facilitate helping” (Neuberg et al., 1997: 514-5). In rational choice sociology, 
this hypothesis is called the ‘low cost-hypothesis’: values, attitudes, and personality 
characteristics have smaller effects, when more material resources are required 
(Diekmann, 1996; Mensch, 2000). Research on pro-environmental behavior has 
provided evidence for the low-cost hypothesis: when pro-environmental behavior is 
‘easy’, such as paper recycling in neighborhoods where it is collected frequently, it 
is correlated with ‘environmental awareness’, but not when it takes a personal 
sacrifice - such as using less water (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 1998).  
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The low cost-hypothesis can be tested in two ways: (1) by comparing the 
effects of prosocial motives on behaviors with varying material costs; (2) by 
comparing the effects of prosocial motives for groups of respondents with varying 
material resources. Using the first strategy, personality characteristics should be 
most strongly related to the type of giving that involves the lowest material costs – 
which is post mortem organ donation – if the low cost-hypothesis is correct. A 
signature on a donor registration form takes hardly any time or money. Blood 
donation should also be related rather strongly to personality characteristics, 
because it takes just a small amount of time – due to medical regulations, blood 
donors in the Netherlands can only donate once or twice a year. Charitable giving 
obviously involves giving own money for the benefit of another. Requests for 
charitable donations in door-to-door collections usually involve small amounts, but 
they occur at least once a month, up to several times per week. Furthermore, many 
charitable causes have direct mail strategies asking for more sizeable contributions. 
The low cost-hypothesis would predict that prosocial motives will be most strongly 
related to organ donation, less strongly to blood donation, and least strongly to 
charitable donations of money. Another way to test the low cost-hypothesis is to 
compare the effects of individual differences in prosocial motives on the decision to 
give (yes or no) with the effects on the amount of time or money invested. The low 
cost-hypothesis assumes that prosocial motives motivate only small gifts. In an 
analysis of the amount donated to charitable causes, the effects of prosocial motives 
will be negligible and the availability of financial capital should dominate. 
Using the second strategy, prosocial personality characteristics should be 
most strongly related to anonymous giving for those who have a lower opportunity 
cost for blood donation, and for respondents with higher incomes, if the low cost-
hypothesis is correct. For instance, for respondents with high hourly wages, blood 
donation is a high-cost activity, while for respondents with lower wages, blood 
donation is low-cost. In other words, the low cost-hypothesis would predict that 
psychological characteristics matter more for those with lower wages. 
    
The weak situation-hypothesis  
Another hypothesis specifying conditions in which personality characteristics 
have stronger effects on social behavior is called the weak situation-hypothesis 
(Mischel, 1977, 1996; Snyder & Ickes, 1985). The weak situation-hypothesis states 
that psychological characteristics are only relevant in ‘weak situations’: social 
contexts that do not involve clear cut expectations on how to behave (Snyder & 
Ickes, 1985, p. 904-906). In contrast, when strong social norms or salient cues 
guide behavior, there is little room for the expression of individuality. The classical 
example of a strong situation is a funeral. In this situation, clear and strong 
expectations are present on how to behave, and individual differences in 
personality will not have observable effects on behavior. 
The weak situation-hypothesis can be tested in two ways: (1) by comparing 
the effects of prosocial motives on behaviors with varying social rewards; (2) by 
comparing the effects of prosocial motives for respondents in groups with varying 
social norms on prosocial behavior. Using the first strategy, personality 
characteristics should be most strongly related to the type of giving that is least 
strongly surrounded by social norms – which is blood donation – if the low cost-
hypothesis is correct. Blood donation is not often discussed in everyday 
conversation, and there are no strong statements in current religious teachings for 
or against blood donation. Charitable giving and post mortem organ donation, on 
the other hand, are surrounded by strong moral connotations. Post mortem organ 
donation, on the other hand, is surrounded with negative social norms. In sum, the 
weak situation -hypothesis would predict that prosocial motives will be more 
strongly related to blood donation than to organ donation and charitable donations 
of money. Using the second strategy, prosocial personality characteristics should be 
most strongly related to anonymous giving for those respondents who face weaker 
sanctions for failures to display prosocial behavior because they are members of 
social groups that hold less strict norms on prosocial behavior. For instance, for 
those who attend church more often, charitable giving and organ donation are 
more strongly surrounded by social norms than for the non-religious. In other 
words, the low cost-hypothesis would predict that psychological characteristics 
matter more for the non-religious. 
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4.3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
4.3.1. Data 
To test the hypotheses of this chapter, the Family Survey of the Dutch 
Population (FSDP2000; De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp & Ultee, 2000) is used. 
Details on sampling procedure and measures of personality characteristics and 
prosocial motives can be found in appendix A. Details on measures of donations 
can be found in chapter two.  
 
4.3.2. Measures 
The following socio-demographic variables were measured: highest 
completed educational level (in 8 categories, ranging from primary school to post-
academic degree), yearly household income (sum of all sources of income of both 
partners; for 80 households in which both respondents did not report any source of 
income at all were given the median value (€23,000), incomes above €300,000 were 
truncated), working hours per week, the frequency of church attendance (number 
of visits per year), and level of urbanization (from 0: rural to 4: very urban). For a 
description of the measures for personality characteristics (the ‘Big Five’) and 
individual differences in prosocial motives (social value orientation, empathic 
concern and perspective taking), see chapter two and appendix A. 
 
4.3.3. Analytical strategy 
The choice of an appropriate statistical model to analyze monetary 
contributions to charitable causes is not straightforward. Because charitable 
contributions cannot be negative, the distribution of contributions is left-censored 
and ordinary least squares analysis produces biased estimates. Therefore, charitable 
contributions have often been analyzed using tobit regression models, which 
provide better estimates than OLS regression models. However, an additional 
problem in the analysis of charitable contributions is the large number of zero-
observations, which may have a different meaning than positive observations. The 
decision to engage in philanthropy or not may be governed by different 
mechanisms than the decision how much to contribute (Smith, Kehoe and Cremer,    
1995). This possibility is ignored in the tobit-model. A statistical model analyzing 
the decision to engage in philanthropy separately from the decision how much to 
contribute is Heckman’s two-stage regression model (Heckman, 1979). This model 
is more appropriate than either Tobit or OLS. This model is a specific form of the 
general censored selection model (Chay & Powell, 2001), which can be represented 
as:  
 
y = d · (x ′ β + ε )  (1)
 
where y is the amount donated, d is a dummy variable indicating whether a 
donation is observed or not, x is a vector of explanatory variables, and β is a vector 
of regression coefficients. In our case, a Heckman two-stage regression model of 
donations first models the decision to give: 
 
d * = d (Z, v)  (2)
 
where d = 1 if d * > 0 and d = 0 if d * < 0, and then 
 
D = D (X, u)  (3)
 
where D is the amount donated, observed only when d=1, Z and X are vectors of 
explanatory variables, and v and u are error terms in the first and second stage, 
respectively (Smith, Kehoe and Cremer, 1995). The results of the first stage indicate 
which characteristics of respondents increase the likelihood to be engaged in 
philanthropy; the results of the second stage indicate which characteristics of 
respondents increase the amount donated to charitable causes. 
  The two-stage regression model is also suitable for the analysis of the 
number of years served as a blood donor. The results of the first stage indicate 
which characteristics of respondents increase the likelihood of ever having served as 
a blood donor; the results of the second stage indicate which characteristics 
increase the number of years served as a blood donor. 
The regression analyses proceed in five steps, each introducing an additional 
set of explanatory variables. A first model includes the control variables gender and 
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age only and serves as a base line. A second model introduces the ‘Big Five’-
personality dimensions. In the third model, individual differences in perspective 
taking, empathic concern and social value orientation are introduced. The fourth 
model adds indicators of material resources (household income and working hours) 
and indicators of social rewards for donations are introduced (educational level, 
church attendance and urbanization level). In the fifth model interactions between 
prosocial motives and household income, church attendance and the level of 
urbanization are added to test the low cost-hypothesis and the weak situation-
hypothesis. By introducing personality characteristics before the sociological 
characteristics, the claim of personality psychologists that individual differences in 
personality are rather stable across the life cycle is given full credit. By entering 
empathic concern, perspective taking and social value orientations after the ‘Big 
Five’, it can be investigated whether the hypothesized relation of agreeableness with 
giving is mediated by more specific measures of prosocial motives. 
 
4.4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.4.1. Charitable giving 
Table 4.1a shows the results of the first stage of the two stage regression 
analysis of donations to charitable causes, modelling the likelihood of having made 
any donations to charitable causes in the previous year. In contrast to the 
prediction, Model II does not show a significantly positive relation between 
agreeableness and donations to charitable causes. The sign for agreeableness is even 
negative, indicating that non-donors consider themselves to be somewhat more 
agreeable than those who did contribute to charities. More extraverted persons are 
more likely to have made charitable donations. The other ‘Big Five’ personality 
characteristics are not related to charitable giving. Taken together, the ‘Big Five’ 
increase the explained variance only slightly. This result stands in contrast to the 
14.1% increase in explained variance in the willingness to share money (Paunonen 
& Ashton, 2001: 532) and the weakly positive relationship of agreeableness with 
intentions to give that was reported in chapter three.     
Table 4.1.a.  Results of Heckman two-stage regression analysis of giving to  
  charity  (first  stage; N=1471, 1108 uncensored) 
 
Female  .14 * .15 * .09   .20  * .20 * 
Age  -.16 *** -.13 ** -.12 ** -.03    -.05  
Agreeableness  -.05  -.06  -.03   -.08  
Conscientiousness  -.01  -.01  -.01   -.00  
Extraversion  .08 *  .07 (*) .07  (*) .07 (*) 
Neuroticism  -.02  -.03   .00   -.00  
Openness  .00  -.01  -.05   -.04  
Social value orientation (svo)  -.01   -.01    -.01  
Perspective taking (pt)  -.04   -.07    -.11 * 
Empathic concern (ec)  .15 *** .13  **  .14 ** 
Education   .24  ***  .24 ***
Working hours    .09  (*)  .08 (*) 
Income (ln)    .12  **  .12 * 
Church  attendance   .07   .08 (*) 
Urbanization     .09  *  .09 * 
Income * agreeableness      .00
Income * svo      -.01
Income * pt       .00
Income * ec      .00
Attendance * agreeableness      .05
Attendance * svo      .07
Attendance * pt       .05
Attendance * ec      -.12 ** 
Urbanization * agreeableness      -.03
Urbanization * svo      -.03
Urbanization * pt       -.10
Urbanization * ec      -.01
Entries represent coefficients for z-standardized independent variables.  
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10 
 
111   
Clearly, personality self-reports are more strongly related to the willingness 
to share money than to actual behavior. Model III shows that those with a more 
prosocial value orientation are not more likely to give to charitable causes than 
‘proselfs’. This result seems to stand in contrast with previous research (Van Lange, 
1997; Van Lange, Van Vugt, Bekkers & Schuyt, 2003), but these studies did not 
contain any personality characteristics. In the present analysis, empathic concern is 
positively correlated with charitable giving and weakens the relation with social 
value orientation. The relation of perspective taking with charitable giving is 
weakly negative, which is not in the expected direction, but this relation is not 
significant. A comparison of models II and III learns that the more specific 
measures of prosocial motives were more successful in the explanation of charitable 
giving than the more general Big Five characteristics. However, the two empathy 
scales and the measure of prosocial value orientation did not mediate the 
relationship of agreeableness with charitable giving because the relationship of 
agreeableness with charitable giving was negative in model II to start with. As in 
chapter three, gender differences in the likelihood of making donations disappear 
controlling for personality characteristics. This results suggests that greater 
exposure to fundraising attempts is not the reason why females are more likely to 
make donations. However, females may be targeted more often by fundraisers 
because they have more prosocial personality characteristics. Model IV shows that 
education has a very strong positive relation with charitable giving. The other 
sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents were all correlated with 
charitable giving in the expected direction, except for the frequency of church 
attendance. People with higher incomes, those working more hours, the higher 
educated, and those living in more rural places are more likely to give to charitable 
causes. In contrast with the low cost-hypothesis, model V shows that none of the 
prosocial motives interacts positively with household income. In line with the weak 
situation-hypothesis, empathic concern is less strongly related to charitable giving 
among frequent church attendees. The effects of the other prosocial motives did not 
vary with the level of urbanization or church attendance.  
 
    
Table 4.1.b.  Results of Heckman two-stage regression analysis of giving to charity 
(second stage; N=1471, 1108 uncensored) 
 
Female -.17 **  -.14 *  -.27 *** -.03    -.14 (*) 
Age .39 *** .41 *** .38 *** .44  ***  .48 ***
Agreeableness  .01  -.04  -.05    .01  
Conscientiousness  -.05  -.04  -.04   -.04  
Extraversion  .05 *  .04  .05   .02  
Neuroticism  -.05   -.06  .00   .01  
Openness  .05  .03   -.02   .01  
Social value orientation (svo)  .10 *  .07  (*)  .08 (*) 
Perspective taking (pt)  .04   .01    .05 * 
Empathic concern (ec)  .21 *** .24  ***  .14 * 
Education   .45  ***  .33 ***
Working hours    .16  **  .12 * 
Income (ln)    .19  ***  .12 * 
Church attendance    .35  ***  .30 ***
Urbanization     .08  (*)  .03  
Income * agreeableness      .00
Income * svo      -.01
Income * pt       .00
Income * ec      .00
Attendance * agreeableness      .03
Attendance * svo      .01
Attendance * pt       -.06
Attendance * ec      .01  
Urbanization * agreeableness      .01
Urbanization * svo      -.03
Urbanization * pt       .08 * 
Urbanization * ec      -.02
Chi-Square 68  77  72  264  278 
Rho -.10(*)  -.02  -.06  .53*  -.43 
Entries represent coefficients for z-standardized independent variables.  
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10  
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In sum, the results give rise to three conclusions: (1) charitable giving is 
strongly related to socio-demographic characteristics, with those having access to 
more human and social capital being more likely to donate; (2) charitable giving is 
positively related to empathic concern, but not very strongly, and none of the other 
personality characteristics are related to charitable giving; (3) the effect of empathic 
concern is less pronounced as church attendance is higher, but does not vary with 
income or the level of urbanization. 
 
4.4.2. Amount donated 
Table 4.1b shows the results of a regression analysis of the natural logarithm 
of the amount given to charities. Because these results are somewhat hard to 
interpret, table 4.2 in appendix C contains the results of a similar regression of the 
untransformed amount donated on unstandardized independent variables. 
Although these results are to be interpreted with caution, they are illustrative for 
the size of the effects reported in table 4.1b. Model I shows that donations increase 
with age and are lower among females. These results fit with other research 
showing that women give to a higher number of charitable causes but donate lower 
amounts (Andreoni, Brown & Rischall, 2003). Model II shows that agreeableness 
is not related to the amount donated. Extraversion shows a weakly positive relation 
with the amount donated. Model III shows positive effects of both social value 
orientation as well as empathic concern. The fact that social value orientation is 
related to the amount donated controlling for empathic concern suggests that a 
concern for equality is a motive for donations besides altruistic concern for the well 
being of others. The standardized beta-coefficients reveal that the effect of empathic 
concern is about twice as large as the effect of social value orientation. The effect of 
age decreases slightly in this model, indicating that to a small extent older people 
give more because they have more prosocial value orientations (Bekkers, 2003b).  
The results of the regression analysis of the untransformed amount donated, 
reported in table 2 of appendix C, illustrate the size of the effects. For instance, the 
difference in annual donations between those giving away less than the average 
proportion of the points in the social value orientation task and those giving away 
more than the average is €40. The difference between persons with an average    
empathy score below 3 (on a scale of 5) and those with a score of 4.5 or higher is 
€85. A comparison of the results in models II and III from table 4.1a with the 
results of these models in table 4.1b does not support the low cost-hypothesis. 
Empathic concern does not only affect the decision whether or not to give at all, 
but also the decision how much to give; and this effect is not smaller.  
Model IV shows significantly positive effects of all the socio-demographic 
characteristics except the level of urbanization. The level of education and church 
attendance are most strongly related to the amount donated. The results of the 
untransformed amount donated (see table 2 of appendix C) are illustrative: annual 
donations by those who never attend church are on average €95, while those who 
attend church more than once a month are €315. The difference between 
respondents with primary education only and those holding a college or university 
degree is €120 (net of all other variables, including household income). The income 
elasticity of charitable giving is .19, indicating that a 10% increase in household 
income increases donations with about 2%. This estimate is much lower than in the 
United States, where the income elasticity varies between .4 and .8 (Clotfelter, 
1997; Wolff, 1999), and also lower than in the UK, where it is almost .4 (Banks & 
Tanner, 1999). It should be noted, however, that these studies did not control for 
the effects of education and working hours, which are positively correlated with 
income. The effect of income is substantially smaller than the effect of church 
attendance. Those with household incomes below €11,500 (the bottom 10% of the 
income distribution in the sample) donate an average of €100, while the average 
annual donation among household incomes exceeding €100,000 (the top 10%) is 
€170 (controlling for other variables). The effect of social value orientation declines 
to non-significance in this model, probably because social value orientation is a 
proxy for religious involvement (Bekkers, 2003b). Model V shows that none of the 
individual differences in prosocial motives interact positively with household 
income. These results contradict the low cost-hypothesis. Model V also shows a 
negative interaction of urbanization with perspective taking, indicating that the 
effect of perspective taking on the amount donated is more strongly negative in 
urbanized areas than in rural areas. The fact that the effect of perspective taking is 
more pronounced in urbanized areas is in line with the weak situation-hypothesis 
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because norms on giving to charity will be less strict and less strongly enforced in 
cities than in rural areas. Including the interaction of urbanization with perspective 
taking the expected positive main effect of perspective taking on the amount 
donated emerges.  
 
4.4.3. Post mortem organ donation 
Table 4.2 shows the results of a logistic regression analysis of post mortem 
organ donation. Model II shows that the five major personality characteristics are 
not strongly linked to post mortem organ donation decisions. Only extraversion 
has a weakly positive significant effect. Extraverted people appear to be registered 
as a post mortem organ donor somewhat more often than introverted persons. The 
weakly negative relation with agreeableness is in contrast to the expectation and 
previous research focusing on attitudes with regard to organ donation (Hessing, 
1983). Apparently, attitudes with regard to organ donation are much more strongly 
related to an altruistic self-image than actual organ donation decisions. Together, 
the Big Five personality characteristics increase the proportion of explained 
variance only slightly. This is in striking contrast with the low cost-hypothesis, 
because post mortem organ donation involves lower material costs than blood 
donation and charitable giving. Model III shows a very weakly positive relation of 
social value orientation to post mortem organ donation: prosocial persons are more 
likely to consent with post mortem organ donation than ‘proselfs’. However, this 
relationship is only marginally significant. In contrast to the expectation, individual 
differences in perspective taking and empathic concern are not related to post 
mortem organ donation decisions. Model IV shows that social and economic 
conditions are much more strongly related to post mortem organ donation than 
personality characteristics. The higher the level of education of a person, the higher 
the likelihood that this person consents with post mortem organ donation. This 
result is in line with studies in the US (Gallup Organization, 1993). Frequent 
church attendance lowers the likelihood of post mortem organ donation. Working 
hours, income and the level of urbanization are not related to post mortem organ 
donation. Model V shows that the relation of social value orientation is more 
strongly positive as income increases, in line with the low cost-hypothesis.     
Table 4.2.  Logistic regression analysis of post mortem organ donation (N=1495) 
 
Female  1.04  1.05  1.01  1.09    1.05  
Age  .78 *** .78 *** .76 *** .80  ** .81 ** 
Agreeableness  .93  .93  .94    .93  
Conscientiousness  1.00  1.01  1.03    1.04  
Extraversion  1.14 * 1.14 * 1.12  (*)  1.14 * 
Neuroticism  .92  .92  .92    .92  
Openness  .99  .99  .96    .97  
Social Value Orientation (svo)  1.09   1.10    1.11 (*)
Perspective taking (pt)  .97   .94    .93  
Empathic concern (ec)  1.07   1.09    1.09  
Education   1.20  **  1.20 ** 
Working hours    1.02    1.00  
Income (ln)    1.07    1.00  
Church attendance    .79  ***  .76 ** 
Urbanization     1.08    1.08  
Income * agreeableness        .92  
Income * svo        1.22 * 
Income * pt         .92  
Income * ec        1.05  
Attendance * agreeableness        .94  
Attendance * svo        1.12  
Attendance * pt         1.00  
Attendance * ec        .95  
Urbanization * agreeableness        .91  
Urbanization * svo        .98  
Urbanization * pt         1.09  
Urbanization * ec        .92  
Chi-Square 13  23  28  43  58 
Nagelkerke R
2 .010  .016  .018  .034  .044 
Entries represent odds ratios for z-standardized independent variables.  
All Chi Square tests are significant at the p<.001 level.  
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10 
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Model V shows no other interactions of individual differences in prosocial motives 
with income, church attendance or urbanization level. 
 
4.4.4. Blood donation  
Table 4.3a shows the results of the first stage of a two stage regression 
analysis of blood donation. The results of the first stage indicate which 
characteristics of respondents increase the likelihood of ever having served as a 
blood donor. As expected, agreeableness is positively related to blood donation. 
Model II also shows significantly negative relationships of conscientiousness and 
neuroticism with blood donation. Apparently, blood donors are not only more 
friendly people, but also less orderly and systematic and more emotionally stable 
persons. In contrast to the expectation, model III reveals no effects of social value 
orientation and perspective taking. Empathic concern shows a very weak positive 
relationship with blood donation. The weak relations of prosocial motives with 
blood donation are striking, because blood donation is often considered to be an 
example of pure altruism (Heath, 1976; Elster, 1989). Although blood donation 
may be a form of altruistic behavior, this does not mean that it has strong roots in 
specifically prosocial motives. Model IV shows that the level of education is a key 
factor for blood donation: a higher education increases the likelihood of giving 
blood. Blood donation is not related to working hours, household income, 
community size or frequency of church attendance. Most of the relations with 
social conditions are in contrast to previous research (Healy, 2000). However, the 
present research uses a much larger sample (n=1,560 vs n=347), was conducted six 
years later (in, 2000 instead of, 1994), and used a more advanced statistical model. 
In an ordinary logistic regression analysis, some of the relations found in previous 
research emerge (see table 3 in appendix C). Model V shows marginally positive 
interactions of hourly wages with both social value orientation and empathic 
concern. These results are in line with the low cost-hypothesis, because the 
opportunity costs of spending time to donate blood are lower for respondents with 
lower wages. Model V also shows a positive interaction of church attendance with 
empathic concern and a negative interaction with perspective taking.     
Table  4.3.a.  Heckman two-stage regression analysis of years served as a blood 
donor (first stage; N=1497, 351 uncensored) 
 
Female -.20 *** -.27 *** -.32 ***  -.24  **  -.22 * 
Age  .14 *** .15 *** .15 *** .21  *** .21 ***
Agreeableness  .07 (*)  .05  .07   .08 (*) 
Conscientiousness  -.09 * -.10 **  -.09  * -.10 * 
Extraversion  .01  .01   -.00   .00  
Neuroticism  -.07 (*) -.07 (*) -.06    -.06  
Openness  -.02  -.05  -.06   -.06  
Social value orientation (svo)  .00   .00    .01  
Perspective taking (pt)  .05   .04    .03  
Empathic  concern  (ec)  .07 (*) .07  (*) .08 * 
Education   .12  **  .12 ** 
Working  hours   .07   .07  
Income  (ln)   -.02   -.02  
Church  attendance   -.01   -.05  
Urbanization     .02   .02  
Income * agreeableness        .06 (*) 
Income * svo        .03  
Income * pt         -.07 (*) 
Income * ec        .15 ** 
Attendance * agreeableness        -.00  
Attendance * svo        .01  
Attendance * pt         -.09 * 
Attendance * ec        .08 * 
Urbanization * agreeableness        .00  
Urbanization * svo        .01  
Urbanization * pt         .04  
Urbanization * ec        .02  
Entries represent coefficients for z-standardized independent variables.  
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10  
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The former stands in contrast to the weak situation-hypothesis. The latter is in line 
with the weak situation-hypothesis, but, as in the analysis of the amount donated 
to charity, the non-significant negative main effect of perspective taking contradicts 
our expectations. 
 
4.4.5. Donor years 
Table 4.3b shows the results of a regression analysis of the number of years 
that present and former blood donors served as a blood donor. Model I shows a 
negative effect of gender, indicating that females serve as blood donors for shorter 
periods of time than males. Obviously, older persons reported having served for 
longer periods. Model II shows a weakly positive effect of neuroticism and a 
weakly negative effect of openness to experience. The former result stands in 
contrast to the hypothesis. Also, the positive effect of neuroticism in the second 
stage is in contrast with the negative effect in the first stage, indicating that neurotic 
persons are less likely to engage in blood donation, but once engaged, they tend to 
remain donors for a longer period. The positive relation with openness was not 
expected. It could be that persons who are more open to new experiences try out 
blood donation because it is exciting, and then discontinue their donations when it 
is no longer a new experience. Model III shows that none of the prosocial motives 
are related to the number of years served as a blood donor. The absence of a 
relation with agreeableness stands in contrast to previous research (Piliavin & 
Callero, 1991). Again, differences may be due to the more complete coverage of 
personality effects as well as the more advanced statistical model used in the 
present analysis. Model IV shows that socio-demographic characteristics are not 
strongly related to the number of years that blood donors serve. Persons from 
households with higher incomes tend to discontinue the donation career at an 
earlier stage than persons from lower income households.  
    
Table 4.3.b.  Heckman two-stage regression analysis of years served as a blood 
donor (second stage; N=1497, 351 uncensored) 
 
Female  -32.68   -1.39   -1.02  -.83   -.57  
Age 25.89   5.29 *** 5.25 *** 5.33  ***  5.39 ** 
Agreeableness  .59  .68  .49   .43  
Conscientiousness  .24  .21  .08   .06  
Extraversion  .06  .17  .20   .31  
Neuroticism  1.10 (*) 1.22 (*) 1.23  *  1.29 * 
Openness -1.26 *  -1.08 (*)  -1.14  (*)  -.91  
Social value orientation (svo)  .11   .35    .40  
Perspective taking (pt)  .37   .40    -.02  
Empathic  concern  (ec)  -1.09  -.92   -.66  
Education   -.03   -.10  
Working  hours   .69   .67  
Income (ln)    -1.41  *  -1.53 ** 
Church  attendance   -.16   -.65  
Urbanization     -.73   -.81  
Income * agreeableness      .33  
Income * svo      .65 (*) 
Income * pt       -3.03 ***
Income * ec      1.13 (*) 
Attendance * agreeableness      .02  
Attendance * svo      .10  
Attendance * pt       -.42  
Attendance * ec      .98  
Urbanization * agreeableness      .12  
Urbanization * svo      -.90 (*) 
Urbanization * pt       .19  
Urbanization * ec      .21  
Chi-Square ?  85 *** 87 *** 102  ***  160 ***
Rho  ?  -.32 ** -.35 ** -.36  ** -.39 ** 
Entries represent coefficients for z-standardized independent variables.  
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10. ? indicates value could not be computed. 
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In contrast to the low cost-hypothesis, model V shows weakly positive but 
nonsignificant interactions of social value orientation and empathic concern with 
hourly wages. The negative interaction with perspective taking is in line with the 
low cost-hypothesis. The weak situation-hypothesis is not supported because none 
of the prosocial motives interact with church attendance or the level of 
urbanization. A comparison of the results of the two stages in tables 2a and 2b 
suggests that personality characteristics are less strongly related to the likelihood of 
ever having served as a blood donor than to the number of years served as a donor, 
in contrast to the low cost-hypothesis. 
 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
All in all, the results of the analyses are reminiscent of a review of the debate 
about bystander intervention by Latané & Darley (1970: 119-20): “Individual 
difference variables account for remarkably little variance in helping behavior”. 
Latané & Darley have been criticized because they generalized findings from 
experimental studies of helping in an emergency to all kinds of prosocial behavior 
and because they did not investigate an exhaustive number of individual differences 
in personality (Kohn, 1990: 82-3). It is often argued that research on helping 
behavior has underestimated the role of personality because of the experimental 
design and because it investigated mainly helping in emergencies. Non-spontaneous 
sustained helping behaviors should be more strongly related to personality (Kohn, 
1990: 298; Penner et al., 1995), especially when respondents are not in controlled 
conditions (Amelang & Borkenau, 1986; Block, 1977; Krahé, 1992). It has been 
argued that prosocial motives are especially influential for more altruistic behaviors 
(Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997). Therefore, the present study focused on three forms 
of non-spontaneous sustained helping behaviors instead of helping in emergencies. 
Personality self-reports were obtained in a representative survey; respondents were 
not forced into experimental conditions. The three examples of prosocial behavior 
that were investigated (charitable giving, blood donation and post mortem organ 
donation) are altruistic behaviors in the sense that they do not generate material 
benefits and are anonymous in the sense that donors do not know the recipients 
personally, inhibiting reciprocity. Furthermore, a broad range of personality    
characteristics was investigated in this study: the Big Five (McCrae & John, 1992), 
and, in addition, three specifically prosocial motives: prosocial value orientations 
(Van Lange, 2000), perspective taking, and empathic concern (Davis, 1994). 
However, none of the psychological characteristics had a consistently positive 
relationship with all examples of altruistic behavior. Empathic concern was most 
strongly related to charitable giving, and to a smaller extent also to blood donation. 
Extraversion increased the likelihood of post mortem organ donation and 
charitable giving. The effects of prosocial motives and personality characteristics 
were rather small compared to the effect of the level of education, for instance. The 
effect of the level of education on the amount donated to charitable causes was 
twice as large as the effect of empathic concern. The analyses provided little 
support for the idea that individual differences in prosocial motives have stronger 
effects on prosocial behaviors that entail lower costs (the low cost-hypothesis) and 
are surrounded by less strong social norms (the weak situation-hypothesis).  
Although donations of money, blood and organs may seem to be 
anonymous, personal decisions, they have social backgrounds. The most consistent 
predictor of anonymous giving was the level of education. The higher educated are 
more likely to be engaged in any type of anonymous giving. With the present data, 
however, it was impossible to investigate why education increases the likelihood of 
anonymous giving. Theoretically, there are numerous possibilities: the higher 
educated may have a greater awareness of future consequences, more trust in the 
organizations involved in charity and blood donation, a greater sense of personal 
responsibility for public welfare, a greater sense of self-efficacy, more 
postmaterialistic value orientations, a larger social network increasing the 
likelihood of being asked for a donation and knowing somebody who may profit 
from blood and organ donation, to name just a few. Recent research has shown 
that the effect of the level of education on charitable giving remains when 
differences in exposure to fundraising attempts, generalized social trust, and 
network structure are taken into account (Bekkers, 2003c, 2004a; Bekkers, Völker, 
Van der Gaag & Flap, fortchoming), leaving time preferences, postmaterialistic 
values and feelings of self-efficacy and personal responsibility as likely candidates. 
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Chapter 5 
Participation in voluntary associations: resources, personality, or both?
* 
 
 
This chapter investigates participation in voluntary associations. Because 
membership and volunteering are more observable examples of prosocial 
behavior and may generate generalized reciprocity, it is expected that the 
availability of resources through social capital and human capital are the 
main conditions increasing participation, and that individual differences in 
personality and prosocial motives are less strongly related to participation. 
The results indicate that all types of participation in voluntary associations 
are strongly related to social conditions, especially the level of education 
and religiosity. In contrast to the expectation, personality characteristics are 
more strongly related to membership and volunteering than to giving 
money, blood and organs. 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Volunteer work, membership of voluntary associations and giving to charity 
are attractive topics of attention for both sociologists and social psychologists. In 
sociology, association membership and volunteering are studied as indicators of 
social capital and cohesion in society. In personality and social psychology, 
volunteering and giving to charity are studied as forms of prosocial behavior with a 
more or less altruistic character. Unfortunately, these shared interests have not led 
to common endeavors. The aim of this paper is to increase our knowledge of civic 
engagement and to foster the mutual understanding between sociology and 
personality and social psychology. Hypotheses are derived from both sociological 
and psychological literature to predict when individual differences are related to 
participation in voluntary associations. Specific attention is paid to individual 
differences in personality, as an alternative or addition to more common 
                                                 
* A quite different version, focusing more strongly on the difference between political and non-
political participation, is scheduled for publication in the August 2005 issue of Political Psychology. 
The accepted manuscript can be downloaded at http://www.fss.uu.nl/soc/homes/bekkers/polpsy.pdf 
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sociological concepts like individual resources and social capital. The main 
argument of the present paper is that studies from either one of these disciplinary 
perspectives are incomplete because they disregard the role of the variables that are 
part of the other discipline. This conclusion is based on two arguments that are 
supported by the data presented below: the relation of participation with social 
conditions such as education or church attendance is partly due to personality 
characteristics; and purely sociological studies of participation can lead to biased 
estimates of the effects of social conditions such as age and education. 
 
 
5.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
5.2.1. Sociological and psychological perspectives on civic engagement 
Sociologists generally assume that good intentions are universal, but that 
some people have a stock of human and social capital that allows them to fulfill 
these intentions while others lack the resources to do so (Brady, Verba & 
Schlozman, 1995; Wilson & Musick, 1999). “The desire to do good is more or less 
evenly distributed, but the resources to fulfill that desire are not” (Wilson & 
Musick, 1999, p. 244). The advantage of this approach is that the measurement 
and causality problems that inhere in preferences and values are avoided. It is also a 
useful perspective for sociologists who seek to investigate the effects of individual 
resources and social capital. However, it does not provide a complete picture of the 
determinants of civic engagement. Measurement problems with values are not a 
good reason to pretend they do not exist and are not related to prosocial behavior. 
Personality and social psychologists, on the other hand, are interested in civic 
engagement, and especially volunteering behaviors, as an expression of prosocial 
dispositions such as extraversion, agreeableness, and empathy (Smith, 1966; Penner 
& Finkelstein, 1998; Carlo, Allen & Buhman, 1999; Elshaug & Metzer, 2001). 
However, the social psychology of volunteering has devoted little attention to the 
way these dispositions are intertwined with social conditions. Using small sizes of 
student samples, some correlates of volunteering such as age and education are kept 
constant, but other important factors, such as religious involvement and gender are    
not controlled. However, there are a few exceptions to this generalization. With an 
internet-survey for readers of an article on altruism in USA Weekend, Penner 
(2002) showed that empathy is related to volunteering when key determinants such 
as age, education and religion are kept constant. However, this internet-survey 
obviously created a self-selection bias. Furthermore, the results do not show how 
the effects of sociodemographic variables change when prosocial dispositions are 
entered. As a result, it is unknown how important individual differences in 
personality are, compared to financial and social resources; and little is known 
about how personality interacts with individual resources and social capital. To get 
a better view of the backgrounds of participation in voluntary associations, it 
makes sense to take a multi-disciplinary perspective, investigating the explanatory 
power of both sociological as well as psychological determinants, and the 
relationship between them.  
The research question of this paper is: What is the relative explanatory power 
of ‘sociological’ characteristics such as education, income, and social capital, as 
opposed to ‘psychological’ characteristics such as individual differences in prosocial 
dispositions? If a sociologist and a psychologist would engage in a discussion about 
the superiority of their explanations, who would be supported by the empirical 
facts? Or would a collaborative effort be more productive? After all, it is also 
possible that organizing a competition between ‘psychological’ and ‘sociological’ 
explanations of civic engagement is unjustified, because individual differences 
interact with individual resources and social capital to jointly produce civic 
engagement. It is unlikely that individual differences are always equally important. 
Both sociologists as well as psychologists have made suggestions about when to 
expect larger or smaller effects of individual differences. Do these hypotheses hold 
up in an empirical test? 
 
5.2.2. Individual resources as determinants of civic engagement 
Focusing on the resources that are required for or that facilitate volunteering, 
sociologists have documented the positive relations of individual resources, such as 
education and income, and social resources, such as social capital, with voluntary 
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association membership, activity and unpaid work for associations (for an 
overview, see Wilson, 2000).  
Education is believed to be an important resource for volunteers because it 
increases civic skills, political efficacy, self-esteem, and empathy (Cohen, Vigoda & 
Samorly, 2001; Wilson, 2000, p. 219-220). As a result, educated people are more 
likely to be asked to volunteer (Brady, Schlozman & Verba, 1999). In the 
Netherlands, the relation of educational level with membership of voluntary 
associations is stronger than with volunteering (Kraaykamp, 1996). 
 Working  hours should be related negatively to volunteering and active 
membership since time spent working cannot be spent on volunteering. People 
working fewer hours should be more likely to volunteer because they have more 
time at their hands. The unavailability of leisure time should be a restriction 
inhibiting volunteer work. The empirical evidence, however, indicates more 
complex patterns, that are sometimes in sharp contrast to the restrictions-
perspective. Among full time workers in the USA, for instance, the relation is 
positive (Wilson, 2000, p. 220-221). In the Netherlands, working hours are related 
negatively to volunteering (Lindeman, 1995, p. 111, 141; Bekkers, 2001a).  
Income should be related negatively to volunteering when it is assumed that 
higher incomes mean higher opportunity costs; on the other hand, for an 
organization seeking new volunteers, people with higher incomes may be more 
attractive because they have more resources to support the organization. Indeed, 
volunteering is more common among higher incomes (Menchik & Weisbrod, 
1987), but among volunteers, wage income is negatively related to hours of 
volunteer work (Freeman, 1997). In the Netherlands, volunteers have slightly 
higher incomes than non-volunteers (Lindeman, 1995 p. 82), but this univariate 
relation did not hold up in a multivariate model (Bekkers, 2001a). 
 
5.2.3. Social capital and civic engagement 
Next to individual resources, resources embedded in social networks, denoted 
as social capital (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000), may also promote civil 
membership and activity. Social networks may increase membership and 
volunteering because they are used for the mobilization of new members and    
volunteers (Knoke, 1990). Most prominently, the number of volunteers in the 
social network is an important predictor of volunteering activity (Snow, Zurcher & 
Ekland-Olson, 1980; Bekkers, 2000). Furthermore, social networks may motivate 
civic engagement and charitable giving when a social norm to give time or money is 
present in the network. Unfortunately, measures of social networks require a lot of 
questionnaire space, which is usually not available (for an exception, see Bekkers, 
Völker, Van der Gaag & Flap, forthcoming). Therefore the focus in this paper is on 
indirect measures of social capital. 
Religious affiliation - In the Netherlands, as in the USA, the most important 
predictor of volunteering is the frequency of church attendance (Bekkers, 2002a; 
Putnam, 2000). It is often argued that church attendance is an indicator of social 
capital (Putnam, 2000, p. 67). Previous research shows that the relation of religious 
involvement with volunteering is indeed a social capital effect. Religious 
participation increases the chance to be asked to volunteer for non-religious 
organizations, because the social networks of religious people contain more 
volunteers (Becker & Dinghra, 2001; Bekkers, 2000, 2003a; Dekker & De Hart, 
2002; Jackson, Bachmeier, Wood & Craft, 1995; Lam, 2002; Wilson & Janoski, 
1995). 
Community size may also be important for membership and volunteering 
(Jackson et al., 1995). In small groups, collective action is easier to achieve than in 
large groups (Olson, 1965). In smaller communities, ‘word gets around’ more 
quickly. Citizens face stronger sanctions for non-participation. In the USA, 
volunteering is not related to community size according to some (Wilson, 2000, p. 
230), while others (Putnam, 2000; Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978) do report a negative 
relationship. In the Netherlands, volunteering is unequivocally more common in 
smaller communities than in urban areas, also after controlling for religious 
participation, which is more common in smaller communities.  
 
5.2.4. Individual differences as determinants of civic engagement 
What kind of personality characteristics may be conducive to civic 
engagement? Personality research on the ‘Big 5’ (John, 1990; McCrae & John, 
1992) suggests that extraversion and agreeableness may be important for voluntary 
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association membership and activity (Watson & Clark, 1994; Graziano & 
Eisenberg, 1994). Research on prosocial behavior in social psychology (Davis, 
1994; Batson, 1998) has pointed to the relevance of cognitive and emotional 
aspects of empathy for various kinds of helping behaviors, including volunteering. 
More specifically, empathy has also been found to be a distinctive characteristic of 
social activists (Hoffman, 1986). We will discuss these measures in more detail 
now. 
 
 The ‘Big Five’  
The ‘Big Five’ are the much appraised result of several decades of factor 
analysis in personality psychology. Numerous factor analyses on tens of thousands 
of adjectives from the dictionary describing personal characteristics showed that 
most of the adjectives were related to five dimensions (John, 1990). The dimensions 
can be remembered easily with the acronym OCEAN: ‘openness to experience’ (O), 
‘conscientiousness’ (C), ‘extraversion’ (E), ‘agreeableness’ (A), and ‘neuroticism’ 
(N). Neurotic persons are described as anxious, nervous, and touchy. Agreeableness 
is described by adjectives such as sympathetic, helpful, and kind. Introverts - who 
have a low score on extraversion - are described as quiet, reserved, and withdrawn. 
Conscientious persons are described as systematic, organized, and neat. Openness is 
described with adjectives like artistic, imaginative, and innovative.  
Psychometric research has shown that the ‘Big 5’ are highly reliable: the 
dimensions have reliability coefficients of more than .90 over a period of six years 
(Costa & McCrae, 1988), declining only a little to about .80 over a period of 25 
years (Costa & McCrae, 1992). These strikingly high coefficients over considerable 
periods of time indicate that the basic dimensions of human personality are very 
stable, and resistant to changes across the life course. Many studies have shown 
that the same five dimensions are present in personality descriptions used in 
everyday language not only in the USA, but also in very different nations, such as 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Croatia, Russia, Finland, 
Estonia, China, Korea and the Philippines (see Kallasmaa, Allik, Realo & McCrae 
(2000) for references). The cross-national validity of the measurement instrument 
has contributed to its popularity among personality psychologists.     
Because of the attractive psychometric properties of the ‘Big 5’, many 
psychologists have started to measure the ‘Big 5’ instead of or next to existing 
measures. For instance, Graziano & Eisenberg (1994) describe agreeableness as a 
basic dimension of personality, encompassing many other more specific personality 
characteristics that are known to be related to prosocial behavior. One of these 
specific measures is empathy, which will be discussed below. Extraversion has been 
described in the personality literature as ‘positive emotionality’, comprising a 
cluster of qualities like energetic, ambitious, socially intelligent and warm (Watson 
& Clark, 1994). In fact, these qualities can be divided into two aspects: activity and 
sociability. These two qualities are useful in any kind of voluntary association. We 
may expect, therefore, that extraversion is related to participation in all kinds of 
voluntary associations, especially to active membership and voluntary work. 
Extraverted people may be engaged in civil associations because they ‘like to do 
and organize things with other people’, it doesn’t matter for what kind of collective 
action. Because extraversion reflects a preference for active stimulation, it should be 
less strongly associated with simply being a member.  
Because this is the first study of the relation between general ‘Big 5’-
dimensions and civic engagement, we must rely on previous empirical research that 
made use of more specific personality measures and other dispositions that are 
known to be related to the Big Five. Lindeman (1995, p. 156) has shown in a study 
of participation in voluntary work that a preference for active stimulation (the 
activity aspect of extraversion) is related positively to the extent of voluntary 
activity in societal and recreative associations. This result confirmed older research 
(Smith, 1966), which also showed that extraversion is more strongly related to 
volunteering than to membership. Research by Knoke (1988), showing that 
sociable goals of members are conducive to organizational participation also 
supports the hypothesis on the effect of extraversion, since extraverted people have 
a stronger preference for social interaction. Finally, previous research supports the 
hypothesis that volunteering is positively related to emotional stability (Allen & 
Rushton, 1983). Members of voluntary associations and volunteers appear to be 
less neurotic and less often depressed than non-members (Lin, 2000). Although 
previous research does not suggest clear hypotheses on the relations of the other 
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two personality dimensions of the Big Five to participation in voluntary 
associations (openness and conscientiousness), they will be included in the analysis 
for exploratory purposes. 
 
Empathy 
Empathy refers to the capacity and tendency to experience the emotions of 
other persons. Empathy has a cognitive as well as an emotional aspect. The 
cognitive aspect of empathy, commonly denoted as perspective taking, is the 
capacity to take the perspective of someone else. The emotional aspect of empathy, 
referred to as sympathy or empathic concern, is the tendency to identify 
spontaneously with the emotions of someone else. The cognitive and emotional 
aspects of empathy are positively related, but form relatively independent 
dimensions (Eisenberg, Miller, Schaller, Fabes, Fultz, Shell, & Shea, 1989; Davis, 
1994). The most recent questionnaire measure of empathy consists of four self-
report scales, each consisting of seven items (Davis, 1994). The scales cover the two 
dimensions of empathy: perspective taking and fantasy for the cognitive dimension, 
and empathic concern and personal distress for the emotional dimension. 
Perspective taking and empathic concern are most likely to be related to 
volunteering and giving to charity. Test-retest associations for these scales vary 
from .50 to .62, uncorrected for measurement error (Davis, 1994). In terms of the 
Five Factor Model, empathy is considered to be an aspect of agreeableness 
(Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997). Empirically, empathy is not only correlated 
positively with agreeableness, but also shows a positive correlation with 
neuroticism (Ashton & Lee, 2001). 
Empathy is one of the most frequently studied individual differences in 
research on prosocial behavior in social psychology and child development studies. 
However, this research is mostly confined to controlled experimental settings. 
There is very little multivariate research on the relation of empathy with 
volunteering, and civic engagement. The potential relevance of empathy for 
volunteering is clear: associations that seek to relieve the needs of specific social 
groups should be more attractive to those who easily empathize with these groups    
and identify with their needs. In fact, many nonprofit organizations base their 
appeals for volunteers on the identification with the needs of the less fortunate.  
The available empirical studies documenting the relation of empathy with 
prosocial behavior have shown that volunteers (e.g., Penner et al., 1995) and social 
activists (Hoffman, 1986) have higher levels of empathy than non-participants. 
Within a group of AIDS service organization volunteers, a positive correlation 
between empathy and length of service was found (Penner & Finkelstein, 1998). 
However, relevant control variables are missing in these studies. Empirical studies 
show that empathy is correlated positively with sex - females scoring higher 
(Eisenberg et al., 1989), and sometimes it is assumed that the positive relation 
between educational level and civic engagement is partly explained by higher levels 
of empathy among the higher educated (Wilson, 2000, p. 219). There is clearly a 
need for more multivariate research on the link between individual differences in 
empathy and civic engagement. 
In addition to the ‘Big Five’ and the two empathy dimensions, this chapter 
also studies potential effects of social value orientation on civic engagement. There 
is some preliminary evidence that people with more prosocial value orientations are 
more likely to volunteer (McClintock & Allison, 1989; Bekkers, 2004b), but these 
studies did not control for confounding variables such as religious affiliation and 
empathy. 
 
5.2.5. Interaction effects: when do individual differences have an influence? 
To investigate the relation between individual differences in values or 
personality and prosocial behaviors such as volunteering may be of interest in itself. 
Simply organizing a competition, however, obscures more interesting questions. If 
there is something like an ‘altruistic personality’, it is unlikely that it is equally 
apparent in all situations (Carlo et al., 1991). It is unlikely that the effect of 
individual differences and resources are not contingent upon each other. This paper 
tests two hypotheses on when individual differences have an influence. The ‘low 
cost-hypothesis’ states that values, attitudes, and other ‘soft incentives’ are more 
strongly related to behaviors that entail smaller costs. The ‘weak situation-
hypothesis’ states that values, attitudes, and other ‘soft incentives’ are more 
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strongly related to behaviors that entail smaller costs. These hypotheses were 
discussed extensively in previous chapters. The low cost-hypothesis predicts that 
individual differences will be related more strongly to the less demanding forms of 
participation like nominal membership, and less strongly with the more demanding 
forms of participation such as active membership and volunteering. Another 
prediction based on the low cost-hypothesis is that the impact of individual 
differences will be stronger for groups of respondents who value the costs of time 
and money more highly. For instance, for respondents with high hourly wages, 
volunteering is a high-cost activity, while for respondents with lower wages, 
volunteering is low-cost. In other words, the low cost-hypothesis would predict that 
individual differences matter more for those with lower wages. The weak situation-
hypothesis predicts that individual differences will be related more strongly to 
behaviors that are surrounded by more strict social norms. Probably, social norms 
on membership of voluntary associations and volunteering are about the same. 
Therefore, the weak situation-hypothesis will be tested by comparing groups of 
respondents who are embedded in social contexts with varying norms on civic 
engagement and with varying opportunities for enforcement. If the weak situation-
hypothesis is correct, the effects of individual differences in prosocial motives 
should be stronger for the non-religious and for persons living in urbanized areas, 
because norms on civic engagement are less strict and the likelihood of sanctioning 
is lower in these groups. 
 
5.3. DATA AND MEASURES 
To test the hypotheses of this article, the third edition of the family survey of 
the Dutch population (De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp & Ultee, 2000) is used. 
The design of this household survey has been discussed in chapter two, as well as 
the measures of participation in voluntary associations and personality 
characteristics. 
The respondents completed a computer assisted personal interview as well as 
a written questionnaire. In the personal interview, data were obtained on the 
highest completed educational level (7 categories, ranging from primary school to 
post-academic degree), yearly household income (sum of all sources of income of    
both partners), working hours per week, the frequency of church attendance 
(number of visits per year), and urbanization level (ranging from 1 - very urban - to 
5 - rural area).  
In the following section, the results are reported of four different logistic 
regression models of civic engagement. In the first model, individual differences in 
empathy and the ‘Big 5’-personality dimensions are included. In the second model, 
individual resources such as education, social capital indicators such as church 
attendance, and political values and attitudes are added. Because personality 
characteristics are stable individual differences, they are causally prior to acquired 
levels of training, income and religious participation. Therefore, they are entered 
before the resource indicators. The third model shows the interaction effects of 
individual differences with hourly wages, church attendance and urbanization, 
testing the low cost-hypothesis and the weak situation-hypothesis. The fourth 
model shows the effects of resources when the personality characteristics are left 
out of the analysis. Comparing the fourth with the second and third model shows 
in which direction and to what extent the effects of sociological characteristics are 
over- or underestimated when personality characteristics are not taken into 
account. 
The regression analyses were based on unweighted data, taking clustering of 
multiple observations within households into account. All non-dichotomous 
independent variables were z-standardized to facilitate the comparison of effect 
sizes in logistic regressions. 
 
 
5.4. RESULTS 
 
5.4.1. Associational membership 
The results of the logistic regression analysis of membership of voluntary 
associations in table 5.1 show that individual differences in personality increase the 
amount of explained variance.  
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Table 5.1.  Logistic regression of membership of voluntary associations (n=1496) 
 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
Female  0.45 *** 0.50 *** 0.50 ***  0.52 *** 
Age  1.17 *  1.31 *** 1.32 ***  1.23 ** 
Agreeableness  (a)  0.92  0.96  0.91       
Conscientiousness  0.82 **  0.83 *  0.82 **    
Extraversion  1.11  1.10  1.10       
Neuroticism  0.91  0.97  0.97       
Openness    1.16 *  1.11   1.10     
Perspective taking (pt)  0.98   0.96   0.99       
Empathic  concern  (ec)  1.27 *** 1.24 **  1.25 ***    
Social value orientation (svo)  0.98   0.98   0.97       
Working  hours  1.07   1.08   1.10  
Household  income  1.09   1.11   1.08  
Education  1.67 *** 1.68 ***  1.70 *** 
Church  attendance  1.18 *  1.21 *  1.21 * 
Urbanization (reverse coded)  1.06   1.05    1.05   
Wages*a    0.70 *    
Wages*pt  1.20 *    
Wages*ec  1.01     
Wages*svo  1.03     
Church attendance*a  0.89     
Church attendance*pt   1.02     
Church attendance*ec  1.08     
Church attendance*svo   0.98     
Urbanization*a 1.08     
Urbanization*pt   1.00     
Urbanization*ec 1.00     
Urbanization*svo   0.99     
Pseudo R
2 .0484  .0870  .0934  .0712 
Relative increase in R
2 32.2  58.1  9.6  -23.8 
Chi Square  82  120  128  102 
Entries are odds ratios for z-standardized variables. All Chi Square tests are significant at the p<.001 
level. *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10. Pseudo R
2 of baseline model: .0270    
Model I shows that agreeableness and social value orientation are not 
significantly related to membership, but empathic concern does show the expected 
positive relation. In addition, members of voluntary associations are less 
conscientious and slightly more open to experience than non-members. Model II 
shows a strongly positive relation of the level of education with membership. The 
higher educated are much more likely to be members of voluntary associations. 
Controlling for education, no relationships of household income or working hours 
with associational membership are found. Of the social capital indicators, only the 
frequency of church attendance was important. No relation of urbanization level 
with associational membership was found.  
In model II, the relationship of openness disappears and the relationship of 
empathic concern with membership becomes weaker. Model III shows a negative 
interaction of hourly wages with agreeableness, which is in line with the low cost-
hypothesis. The positive interaction of perspective taking with hourly wages, 
however, runs counter to the prediction. The other measures of individual 
differences in prosocial motives did not interact with hourly wages. Neither did any 
of the personality measures interact with church attendance or the level of 
urbanization. Therefore, the weak situation-hypothesis is not supported in this 
analysis. Comparing the results of Model IV with those of Model II reveals that a 
purely sociological regression model overestimates the effect of education, and 
underestimates the age effect. Other signs of a complex interrelation of personality 
and individual and social resources are that the introduction of the level of 
education reduced the relation of openness to experience with participation, and 
the introduction of church attendance reduced the effect of empathic concern. In 
terms of relative effects, the results of table 5.1 show that 58% of the increase in 
explained variance over the basic model is accounted for by sociological factors and 
a little more than 30% is accounted for by individual differences in personality. 
About 10% of the increase is accounted for by the interactions.  
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Table 5.2.  Ordered logistic regression of membership of voluntary associations 
(n=1496) 
 
Female  0.58 *** 0.62 *** 0.62 ***  0.67 *** 
Age  1.30 *** 1.44 *** 1.45 ***  1.40 *** 
Agreeableness  (a)  0.96  1.00  0.99       
Conscientiousness  0.86 **  0.88 *  0.88 *    
Extraversion  1.06  1.07  1.08       
Neuroticism  0.87 **  0.93   0.94     
Openness    1.10 *  1.05   1.05     
Perspective taking (pt)  0.99   0.97   0.97       
Empathic  concern  (ec)  1.24 *** 1.21 *** 1.21 ***    
Social value orientation (svo)  1.08   1.02   1.02       
Working  hours  1.04   1.03   1.06  
Household  income  1.04   1.04   1.07  
Education  1.65 *** 1.66 ***  1.68 *** 
Church  attendance  1.18 **  1.15 *  1.19 *** 
Urbanization (reverse coded)  1.14 *  1.13  *  1.14  * 
Wages*a    0.95     
Wages*pt  1.01     
Wages*ec  0.91 *    
Wages*svo  1.08 **    
Church attendance*a  0.96     
Church attendance*pt   0.97     
Church attendance*ec  1.01     
Church attendance*svo   1.09  (*)   
Urbanization*a 1.04     
Urbanization*pt   1.01     
Urbanization*ec 0.98     
Urbanization*svo   0.96     
Pseudo R
2 .0204  .0448  .0472  .0387 
Relative increase in R
2 26.0  67.4  6.6  -18.0 
Chi Square  99  196  218  177 
Entries are odds ratios for z-standardized variables. All Chi Square tests are significant at the p<.001 
level. *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10. Pseudo R
2 of baseline model: .0110   
5.4.2. Memberships of multiple organizations 
  The results in table 5.2 are similar to those of the previous analysis. Model I 
shows that agreeableness and social value orientation are not related to the number 
of memberships, but empathic concern and to a smaller extent also emotional 
stability increase the number of memberships. There is also an unexpected negative 
relation of conscientiousness with the number of memberships in voluntary 
associations. The results of model II show that the number of memberships increase 
with the level of education, the frequency of church attendance, and decrease with 
the level of urbanization. Table 5.1 did not show significant effects of church 
attendance and the level of urbanization, indicating that respondents living in 
urban environments and the non-religious are just as likely to involved in voluntary 
associations, but hold lower numbers of memberships. Working hours and income 
are not related to the number of memberships. Model III shows two positive 
interactions of social value orientation, one with hourly wages and one with the 
frequency of church attendance. Both are not in the predicted direction. The 
negative interaction of empathic concern with hourly wages is in line with the low 
cost-hypothesis, however. The results of model IV indicate that omitting 
personality characteristics from a regression analysis of the number of memberships 
in voluntary associations slightly overestimates the relationships of age and church 
attendance. In addition, the level of education and the frequency of church 
attendance mediate the effects of neuroticism and empathic concern, which were 
stronger in model I than in model II. The relative increase of the proportion of 
explained variance accounted for by sociological characteristics is about 67%. The 
psychological characteristics account for 26% of the increase; the remaining 7% is 
accounted for by the interactions. 
 
5.4.3. Volunteering 
Table 5.3 shows the results of a logistic regression analysis of volunteering. 
The addition of individual differences in model I increases the proportion of 
explained variance over the baseline model, because of the positive effects of 
extraversion, empathic concern and openness. In contrast to expectations, 
agreeableness and social value orientation are not related to volunteering.  
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Table 5.3.  Logistic regression of volunteering (n=1497) 
 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
Female  0.65 *** 0.63 *** 0.62 ***  0.65 *** 
Age  1.20 **  1.19 *  1.19 *  1.15 * 
Agreeableness  (a)  0.97  0.99  0.99       
Conscientiousness  0.94  0.95  0.94       
Extraversion  1.18 ** 1.18 ** 1.19  **     
Neuroticism  0.91  0.93  0.93       
Openness    1.14 * 1.13 * 1.13  (*)     
Perspective taking (pt)  0.95   0.94   0.95       
Empathic  concern  (ec)  1.14 *  1.10   1.09     
Social value orientation (svo)  0.93   0.91 (*)  0.91  (*)     
Working  hours  0.92   0.91   0.96  
Household  income  0.91   0.89   0.95  
Education  1.32 *** 1.32 ***  1.34 *** 
Church  attendance  1.19 **  1.18 *  1.18 ** 
Urbanization (reverse coded)  1.21 **  1.20  **  1.18  ** 
Wages*a    0.92     
Wages*pt  1.09     
Wages*ec  0.87 (*)    
Wages*svo  1.04     
Church attendance*a  0.99     
Church attendance*pt   0.95     
Church attendance*ec  1.00     
Church attendance*svo   1.03     
Urbanization*a 0.98     
Urbanization*pt   1.00     
Urbanization*ec 1.02     
Urbanization*svo   1.01     
Pseudo R
2 .0262  .0486  .0521  .0326 
Relative increase in R
2 36.8  54.6  8.5  -37.4 
Chi Square  52  86  94  57 
Entries are odds ratios for z-standardized variables. All Chi Square tests are significant at the p<.001 
level. *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10. Pseudo R
2 of baseline model: .0111    
Model II shows that volunteering is more common among the higher 
educated, among persons living in less urban areas, and among frequent church 
attendees. Unexpectedly, working hours are not significantly related to 
volunteering, although the relationship is negative. Model III shows a weak, 
marginally significant negative interaction of empathic concern with hourly wages, 
which is in line with the low cost-hypothesis.  
The weak situation-hypothesis is not supported because church attendance 
and the level of urbanization interacted with none of the individual differences in 
prosocial motives. Model IV shows that a purely sociological analysis of 
volunteering, without taking individual differences in personality into account, 
would underestimate the relationship of volunteering with age, but not with the 
other social conditions. Furthermore, comparing model II with model I shows that 
the relationship of empathic concern with volunteering disappears when resource 
indicators are introduced. Additional analyses show that the frequency of church 
attendence mediates the effect of empathic concern. The relative effect of 
personality on volunteering is larger than in previous analyses: 37% of the increase 
in explained variance is due to individual differences in empathic concern, 
extraversion, neuroticism and openness. Resources account for just over 55%. The 
interactions accounted for the remaining 9%.  
 
 
5.5. Evaluation of hypotheses 
 
Social and personality characteristics of active citizens  
The results of the analyses shed light on the social and personality 
characteristics of active citizens in the Netherlands (see table 5.4). The most 
distinctive characteristic of citizens who actively participate in voluntary 
associations is that they have more human and social capital available to them, and 
face lower opportunity costs for participation. A higher level of education is the 
most important resource promoting active citizenship: the level of education is 
positively related to both membership and volunteering. The old observation that 
civic engagement is unequally distributed (Almond & Verba, 1963) still holds. 
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Those with more human capital are more likely to participate in voluntary 
associations. A lack of human capital is a barrier for civic engagement. Hourly 
wages were not related to membership and participation in the activities organized 
by voluntary associations. Higher wages do not increase the opportunity costs of 
membership because this form of civic engagement requires less time - sometimes 
even no time at all. Church attendance also increased voluntary association 
membership and volunteering. In the past, church attendance used to be strongly 
correlated with membership and volunteering (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978, p. 182-
192). Although the effects of church attendance may have declined in the process of 
secularization, religious involvement is still one of the key factors for civic 
engagement (Bekkers, 2003a). Another indicator of social capital, the level of 
urbanization, was also related to civic engagement, with persons living in more 
rural areas being members of a higher number of voluntary associations, and 
volunteering more often. This result shows that the difference between rural and 
urban environments in the Netherlands that was present twenty-five years ago 
(Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978) has persisted. 
The personality characteristics of active citizens are less clear than their 
resources and political values. Personality characteristics often have different effects 
for different forms of civic engagement. Members of voluntary associations are 
more empathic than non-members, less conscientious, and somewhat more open to 
experience. Emotional stability increases the number of memberships and the 
likelihood that people volunteer. Volunteers have a more extraverted personality 
and are more open to experience. In contrast to expectations, members and 
volunteers in the Netherlands are not more agreeable, do not have greater 
perspective taking abilities, and do not have a more prosocial value orientation 
than non-members or non-volunteers. 
    
Table  5.4.  Overview of hypotheses on effects of resources and personality 
characteristics and results 
 
  Expected   Found  
Material and social resources: 
-  Education 
-  Income 
-  Working hours 
-  Church attendance 
-  Urbanization 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
A 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
B 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
- 
C 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
- 
Individual differences in personality: 
-  Agreeableness 
-  Extraversion 
-  Neuroticism 
-  Conscientiousness 
-  Openness 
-  Empathic concern 
-  Perspective taking 
-  Social value orientation  
 
+ 
+ 
- 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
0 
0 
0 
- 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
- 
- 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
 
0 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
 
A: Membership; B: Number of memberships; C: Volunteering 
 
Resources are usually more important than personality 
To summarize, table 5.5 contains the increase in explained variance after the 
introduction of individual differences in empathy, social value orientation and the 
‘Big 5’, resources and interactions between individual differences and hourly wages, 
church attendance and the level of urbanization.  
This table shows that resources are more strongly related to participation in 
voluntary associations than personality characteristics and prosocial motives. The 
increase in explained variance due to the introduction of social characteristics is 
more than 2 times the increase in explained variance due to the introduction of 
personality characteristics. It can be argued, of course, that not all relevant 
personality characteristics have been measured. Self-esteem and locus of control for 
instance, are positively related to civic engagement (Cohen, Vigoda & Samorly, 
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2001). However, the ‘Big 5’ represent the most general traits in human personality, 
and the effects of self-esteem and locus of control are covered by the effects of 
neuroticism and extraversion (Robins, Tracy, Trzesniewski, Potter, & Gosling, 
2001). In contrast, for ‘sociological’ characteristics the same argument can be made 
with considerably more success: the analyses did not include home ownership, 
watching television, religious denomination, and religious socialization, which are 
all related to civic engagement (Bekkers, 2001a; 2003a; Bekkers & Hooghe, 2004, 
see also chapter six). 
 
Table  5.5.  Relative increase in explained variance due to introduction of 
indicators for individual resources, social capital, individual 
differences (empathy, social value orientation and the ‘Big Five’) and 
interactions in regression analyses 
 
  Personality and 
prosocial motives  
Resources Interactions 
Membership 32.2  58.1  9.6 
Number of memberships  26.0  67.4  6.6 
Volunteering 37.0  54.6  8.5 
Mean  31.7 60.0  8.2 
 
 
Personality characteristics are not more strongly related to civic engagement when 
costs are lower 
The low cost-hypothesis predicted that personality indicators would be less 
important for more costly forms of civic engagement. This hypothesis was tested in 
two ways: comparing the effects of personality characteristics for more and less 
demanding forms of civic engagement, and comparing the effects of personality 
characteristics for groups of respondents with varying opportunity costs for 
participation.  
The first type of test provided results that are largely inconsistent with the 
low cost-hypothesis. It was expected that personality characteristics would be more 
strongly related to membership than to volunteering. However, the results do not    
show large differences in the effects of personality characteristics and prosocial 
motives on membership and volunteering. If anything, personality characteristics 
and prosocial motives accounted for a larger increase in explained variance in the 
analysis of volunteering (37%) than in the analysis of membership (32%). The 
number of memberships, in contrast, was related more strongly to social conditions 
(accounting for 67% of the increase in explained variance in table 5.2) than the 
decision to be a member or not (accounting for 58% of the increase in table 5.1). 
The second type of test provided only a few scattered pieces of support for 
the low cost-hypothesis. As hourly wages increased, and the relationship of 
agreeableness with membership was less strongly positive, and the positive relation 
of empathic concern with the number of memberships also declined at higher wage 
levels. On the other hand, however, perspective taking tended to increase the 
likelihood of membership as hourly wages increased, the positive relation of social 
value orientation with the number of memberships was increasing with hourly 
wages. In sum, the low cost-hypothesis is not supported by the results of the 
analyses in this chapter. 
 
Personality characteristics are not more strongly related to civic engagement when 
social pressure to participate is lower 
The weak situation-hypothesis argued that personality characteristics would 
matter less for religious people and persons living in urban areas because they are 
embedded in networks of volunteers and other civil participants, which brings them 
more often in ‘strong’ situations that provide social pressure and opportunities to 
become engaged in voluntary associations. The analyses did not support this 
hypothesis at all. Individual differences in prosocial motives such as agreeableness, 
social value orientation or empathic concern did not have less positive relations 
with participation in voluntary associations as church attendance decreased or the 
level of urbanization increased.  
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5.6. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper, the explanatory force of ‘sociological’ versus ‘psychological’ 
characteristics related to civic engagement was examined. The answer to the 
research question “Which explains most?” is: resources, not personality. On 
average, 60% of the of the increase in explained variance that is covered by the 
regression analyses reported in this paper is accounted for by ‘sociological’ 
characteristics such as time and money restrictions, resources acquired through 
education, and the opportunities to become engaged in voluntary associations that 
are produced by the social networks of people. ‘Psychological’ characteristics such 
as individual differences in empathic concern, social value orientation, 
agreeableness, and the other ‘Big Five’ explain 32%, while the remaining 8% is 
accounted for by interactions between individual differences and hourly wages. 
This conclusion implies that a strictly psychological perspective on prosocial 
behaviors such as volunteering is far from complete because it lacks the most 
important predictors. This is not to say that personality can be ignored because it is 
irrelevant. Taking account of individual differences in personality enables the 
researcher to understand civic engagement more fully. In spite of this result, the 
sceptic sociologist may still doubt the relevance of personality for sociologists with 
the argument that personalities may increase the explained variance, but that they 
are orthogonal to sociological factors, and do not affect the validity of a purely 
sociological analysis. The analyses provide three arguments in response to this 
criticism. The first is that the effects of so-called ‘sociological’ factors like 
educational attainment and church attendance are partly the effects of individual 
differences in personality, such as empathic concern, emotional stability and 
openness to experience. Education and church attendance partly mediated the 
effects of personality characteristics such as emotional stability and openness to 
experience. The second is that a purely sociological analysis ignoring individual 
differences in personality sometimes overestimates the effects of ‘social conditions’. 
In statistical terms, the error terms in a sociological analysis contain pieces of 
personality that are correlated with the independent variables. A third argument is 
theoretical: it is likely that the effects of personality have become stronger since    
World War II. Societal developments such as rationalization and, more specifically, 
individualization, may have increased the ‘space’ for personality effects, such as the 
effect of extraversion on volunteering. This theme will be explored in the next 
chapter.  
A closer cooperation between sociology and psychology is needed to discover 
when and how individual differences in personality are related to prosocial 
behavior. As became clear in this paper, the low cost-hypothesis and the weak 
situation-hypothesis are not suitable for this purpose. Future work should develop 
alternative hypotheses. Perhaps more attention should be paid to the fact that 
different social contexts may activate different personality characteristics, and/or 
that individual differences in personality lead to the selection of situations that 
match these personality characteristics (Buss, 1987). For instance, the finding that 
church attendance intermediated the effect of empathy in several analyses may 
indicate that religious meetings are more attractive to empathic persons. The effect 
of personality characteristics may be more specific to the kind of behavior and the 
kind of personality characteristic in question. Perhaps ‘middle range’ theorizing is 
more suitable here. 
In conclusion, three implications stand out. (1) Sociological characteristics are 
more important for prosocial behaviors in the area of civic engagement than 
personality characteristics. A purely psychological analysis of civic engagement 
lacks the most important predictors and ignores a part of the process through 
which personality has an impact on prosocial behavior. (2) Still, personality 
characteristics have important effects on ‘sociological’ phenomena such as civic 
engagement: they account for one third of the total increase in explained variance. 
(3) The effects of personality and social conditions are by and large additive. 
However, the effects of personality are partly mediated by social conditions such as 
the level of education and the religious networks that people access through church 
attendance. We are only at the start of understanding this complex pattern of 
interrelations between social structure, personality, and social outcomes. 
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Chapter 6 
Shifting backgrounds of participation  
in voluntary associations in the Netherlands
* 
 
Why has the massive decline of religious involvement in the Netherlands 
since World War II not led to a decline of participation in voluntary 
associations? Religious involvement has always been the most important 
predictor of participation in voluntary associations. In the past four decades, 
secular associations (environmental and human rights organizations, sports 
clubs and cultural expression groups) compensated for the decline in 
membership in traditional, pillarized associations (labor unions, political 
parties). This chapter investigates how the nature of participation in 
voluntary associations has changed by comparing characteristics of members 
of pillarized and secular voluntary associations. The analyses in this chapter 
show that some secular organizations have grown because they offer more 
selective incentives to members, while others have grown because of the 
increase in postmaterialistic values among the Dutch population. 
Furthermore, the rise of the average level of education and extraversion has 
ensured a stable supply of members and volunteers.  
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
  Not only among the Dutch population and in the media, but also among 
social scientists the concern has grown about a decline in social cohesion 
(Fukuyama, 1999; Putnam, 2000). For the Netherlands such a concern is not 
warranted: Dutch citizens still have the same level of contact with family members, 
neighbors, friends and acquantances as in 1975 (Scheepers & Janssen, 2001), the 
proportion of volunteers has not declined (SCP, 1998, 2001), donations to 
                                                 
* A slightly different version of this chapter appeared in Dutch in the 2002 December issue of Mens 
& Maatschappij, with Nan Dirk de Graaf as a coauthor (Bekkers & De Graaf, 2002). We thank 
Wout Ultee and Harry Ganzeboom for comments on previous versions of the paper. We also thank 
Harry Ganzeboom for suggesting a conditional logistic regression-analysis. 
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nonprofit organizations and charitable causes have grown enormously (Schuyt, 
2003), and membership rates of voluntary associations have increased (SCP, 1998). 
The Netherlands still have a high rate of participation in voluntary associations. 
This is a remarkable conclusion. Religious involvement has always ba an important 
factor for participation in voluntary associations (De Hart, 1999a; De Hart & 
Dekker, 2000; Dekker & De Hart, 2002; Kraaykamp, 1996). This regularity still 
holds, even though Dutch society witnessed a massive secularisation in the past 
decades (Becker, De Hart & Mens, 1996). 
  Why did the decline of religious involvement in the Netherlands not decrease 
the level of participation in voluntary associations? Our answer to this question is 
that the basis  of participation in voluntary associations in the Netherlands has 
shifted with increasing secularisation. At the peaks of the era of pillarization, 
voluntary associations showed strong religious cleavages (Lijphart, 1975). Those 
who were born in a specific pillar automatically joined voluntary associations from 
that pillar. This norm has lost much of its force in the past decades. Dutch ‘civil 
society’ has changed substantially in the past decades. Traditional voluntary 
associations such as churches, unions and political parties, who were part and 
parcel of the pillarized civil society in the Netherlands, have lost substantial 
numbers of members. The decline in participation in pillarized associations has ba 
compensated by the emergence of new, secular organizations (De Hart, 1999b; 
SCP, 1998). The level of participation in voluntary associations in the past decades 
has not declined with the decline in religious involvement: participation in 
voluntary associations has even increased. Studies by the Social and Cultural 
Planning Office (SCP, 1994; 1998) show that the increase in memberships is due to 
the growth in environmental organizations, organizations focusing on specific 
ethical issues, cultural expression, sports clubs, and interest groups for specific 
categories such as consumers and car drivers. The vast majority of associations that 
have grown in the past decades do not have a religious background. The SCP 
describes the development in participation in voluntary associations as a movement 
in the direction of individualistic participation in clubs defending specific interests 
or satisfying private concerns with specific issues (SCP, 1994).     
Many new voluntary associations, such as consumer interest groups and 
sports clubs, are attractive because of the services they provide or the sociability 
aspect of participation. According to public goods theory (Olson, 1965) services 
and sociability are selective incentives: the individual material and social benefits of 
membership. However, there is an important category of voluntary associations 
that do serve the general public, and that do not offer many selective incentives to 
recruit new members, such as environmental and human rights watch 
organizations. Members of these voluntary associations do not meet each other 
regularly in the association, and do not profit from services offered by the 
organization. These new organizations emerged without using selective incentives, 
and without the availability of a natural group of supporters. Voluntary 
associations such as Amnesty International and Grapeace do not have a religious 
background and were founded relatively recently (in 1968 and 1978, respectively). 
These secular voluntary associations could not use existing networks to recruit 
members. Maloney (1999) has shown that members of organizations defending 
human and animal rights in the United Kingdom became members more often at 
their own initiative than members of ‘traditional’ voluntary associations. It should 
be noted that what appears as ‘own intiative’ is often triggered by exposure to 
media attention for the cause or the organization. A historical account of the 
growth of Amnesty International suggests that the mass media were actively used to 
call the attention of potential members (Bronkhorst, 1998). The case of Amnesty 
International suggests that membership in secular voluntary associations is more 
strongly rooted in personal preferences and attitudes than membership in pillarized 
voluntary associations. A brief summary of the distinctive characteristics of 
pillarized and secular voluntary associations appears in table 6.1. 
This chapter investigates whether participation in secular voluntary 
associations is more often based on selective incentives and personal preferences 
and attitudes than on religious involvement, compared with participation in 
pillarized voluntary associations. Do we observe a trend towards individualization 
in voluntary associations, such that people choose voluntary associations on the 
basis of their personal preferences and attitudes more often than they used to do? 
We try to answer this question by comparing members of pillarized voluntary 
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associations with members of secular voluntary associations. To what extent do 
secular voluntary associations offer more selective incentives and to what to what 
extent are postmaterialistic value orientations and other personal preferences 
related to participation in secular voluntary associations? 
 
Table 6.1.  Distinctive  characteristics of pillarized and secular voluntary 
associations 
 
  Pillarized voluntary associations Secular  voluntary  associations 
Foundation of 
membership  
Pillarized group identity  Selective incentives or personal 
preferences and attitudes 
Purpose voluntary 
association 
Collective welfare, emancipation of 
the own pillar 
Individual interests, specific issues 
Examples  Churches and other religious 
organizations, political parties, 
unions 
Environmental and human rights 
watch organizations, sports clubs, 
consumer interest groups 
 
 
6.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
To answer our research questions, we briefly discuss four theories. Our 
starting point is the theory of social integration of Durkheim (1897), generating the 
prediction that participation in voluntary associations has declined because of 
secularization. However, this decline did not occur. We argue that the theory of 
Durkheim applies only to participation in pillarized voluntary associations. The 
secularization of Dutch society did decrease the level of participation, but only in 
pillarized voluntary associations. After World War II, new voluntary associations 
emerged, which have little or nothing to do with religious involvement. The 
emergence of these secular voluntary associations can not be explained with the 
theory of Durkheim. To explain the emergence of secular voluntary associations we 
offer three other theories. First we discuss public goods theory (Olson, 1965), 
which predicts that voluntary associations will try to recruit new members by 
offering selective incentives. In our view, this theory cannot explain the emergence    
of all secular associations. First of all, a number of voluntary associations emerged 
(environmental and human rights watch organizations for instance) that do not 
offer many selective incentives. Inglehart’s (1977, 1997) theory of the rise of 
postmaterialistic values can offer an explanation for the emergence of these 
associations. Secondly, a number of voluntary associations emerged that reflect 
private preferences, such as sports clubs and cultural expression groups. Research 
in personality psychology (McCrae & John, 1992) suggests that these voluntary 
associations are attractive for persons with specific personality characteristics, such 
as extraversion and openness to experience. These personality characteristics have 
become more widespread in recent decades (Twenge, 2001) – perhaps because of 
secularisation. 
 
6.2.1. Participation in voluntary associations and Durkheim 
Participation in voluntary associations is often regarded as an indicator of 
social cohesion (Putnam, 2000). Membership rates indicate peoples involvement 
with society at large. Membership of voluntary associations is also promoted by 
social norms, which are transmitted from parents to children. Participation in 
voluntary associations, especially in organizations that pursue group interests, is 
encouraged in many social groups. This implies that the theory of social integration 
of Durkheim, reconstructed by Ultee, Arts & Flap (2003), is applicable. According 
to this theory, persons are more likely to conform to norms when their level of 
integration in the group is higher. An important indicator for social integration in 
general and in religious groups in particular is the frequency of church attendance. 
Those who attend religious services more often reveal a higher level of involvement 
in religion. Previous research (Bekkers, 2000; De Hart, 1999a; Dekker & De Hart, 
2002) has shown that the frequency of church attendance is responsible for the 
relationship between religious affiliation and participation in voluntary work. 
There are three explanations for the effect of religious involvement on volunteering. 
First, attending religious services decreases the distance to ‘mobilization networks’ 
(Klandermans, 1984). This is the ‘mobilisation-effect’ of church attendance. Before 
and after religious services people are given opportunities to volunteer for 
voluntary associations that are directly linked to or supported by the church. As a 
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consequence, church attendancees are more likely to be asked to volunteer 
(Bekkers, 2000, 2004a). The second explanation for the effect of church attendance 
is the ‘motivation-effect’: in religious environments, volunteering is evaluated 
positively, creating social pressure to honor requests to become a volunteer and to 
continue volunteering (Bekkers, 2004a). A third explanation for the effect of 
religious involvement argues that religious involvement promotes the 
internalisation of prosocial values. This explanation is called the ‘socialization-
effect’ of church attendance. In this explanation, not just the present religious 
involvement of a person, but also the involvement of his parents in youth is an 
important factor. This explanation is based on the critique of Parsons (1960) on 
Durkheim’s theory of integration (Ultee, 1976; Ultee, Arts & Flap, 2003).  
However, an application of the theory of social integration would lead to the 
incorrect prediction that participation in voluntary associations has declined 
linearly with increasing secularization. If participation in voluntary associations is 
mainly a question of being participation of a religious network or having been 
raised in religieus environment, then the decline of church attendance and religious 
socialization practices would lead to a similar decline in participation in voluntary 
associations. As noted before, this decline did not occur, because secular voluntary 
associations have emerged. In line with integration theory, membership rates in 
pillarized voluntary associations have declined substantially. Therefore, we argue 
that predictions from integration theory are only applicable to participation in 
pillarized voluntary associations: 
 
H1.  The higher the frequency of church attendance and the stronger the religious 
socialization, the higher the likelihood of participation in pillarized 
voluntary associations. 
 
To explain participation in secular voluntary associations, however, a 
different explanation is required. It is likely that new social conditions have 
emerged after World War II, which form the background of the emergence of 
secular voluntary associations. One potential new condition is the rise of 
postmaterialism (Inglehart, 1977, 1996). Other potential conditions are the    
selective incentives offered by voluntary associations, and the personal preferences 
of persons, which are based on what are commonly viewed in psychology as 
personality characteristics. These different conditions do not exclude one another: 
they may be at work simultaneously. First we discuss public goods theory, then the 
rise of postmaterialism, and, finally, research in personality psychology. 
 
6.2.2. Selective incentives 
Selective incentives are the individual material and social benefits of the 
membership of a voluntary association (Olson, 1965). Many voluntary associations 
that emerged after World War II provide services and sociability to members. The 
emergence and growth of these voluntary associations can be explained by public 
goods theory (Olson, 1965). This theory argues that rational individual citizens 
contribute more often to the production of collective goods when they profit 
directly from. Voluntary associations that aim to produce collective goods will have 
to attract new members by offering selective incentives, such as providing services 
to members. In line with this theory, many voluntary associations that provide such 
selective incentives, such as consumers interest groups, sports clubs and cultural 
expressive groups have grown substantially in the past decades (De Hart, 1999b). 
Membership of these voluntary associations is attractive for all kinds of social 
categories: no specific social values or religious involvement is required to derive 
benefits from participation in such associations. Therefore, our second hypothesis 
reads:  
 
H2.  The more selective incentives voluntary associations are offering, the weaker 
the relation of membership with the frequency of church attendance and 
religious socialization. 
 
Voluntary associations that offer selective incentives are often directed at 
young adults. Sports clubs and cultural expressive groups (musical and theatre 
clubs) mainly attract younger people. On the one hand, the negative relationship of 
age with membership in associations offering more selective incentives may be a life 
cycle phenomenon: participation in adult life may take on different shapes. On the 
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other hand, one could argue that there is also a generation gap, because voluntary 
associations offering selective incentives have recruited members mainly from the 
generations born after World War II. The cross-sectional design of the Family 
Survey 2000 does not offer an opportunity to test both explanations. Whatever the 
explanation may be, we expect: 
 
H3. Membership of voluntary associations offering more selective incentives 
declines with age.  
 
6.2.3. Postmaterialistic value orientations 
Not all of the voluntary associations that have grown in the past decades are 
service providing associations or associations with a strong sociability aspect. 
Environmental and human rights watch organizations have also grown in the past 
thirty years (De Hart, 1999b). Membership of these voluntary associations does not 
offer many selective incentives, while they are aimed at the production (or 
protection) of collective goods, and do not have a specific religious background. 
The emergence of these secular voluntary associations has often been related to the 
rise of postmaterialistic value orientations (De Graaf, 1988; Inglehart, 1977, 1997). 
The generations that grew up after World War II did not experience material 
shortages, which would lead them to value material goals in politics less strongly – 
such as social order, a growing economy and a strong army. Freedom of speech, the 
environment and human rights are more important for these generations. These 
secular values can promote membership of voluntary associations and participation 
in voluntary work, also when these actions do not provide personal benefits. 
According to Inglehart (1997) the emergence of secular voluntary associations 
shows a ‘culture shift’ of materialism to postmaterialism. More recent cohorts are 
more postmaterialistic. Because postmaterialistic value orientations are stable over 
time (De Graaf, Hagenaars & Luijkx, 1989), it is possible that the negative effects 
of secularization on participation in voluntary associations has been compensated 
by the rise of postmaterialism. Traditional voluntary associations are based on the 
pillarized system of social order, which is declined by postmaterialists. According to 
Inglehart (1977) postmaterialists have an aversion against autoritarian    
organizations based on religious ideologies and prefer secular voluntary 
associations, which advocate global collective interests such as the environment and 
human rights. Therefore, we expect that: 
 
H4.  Postmaterialists participate more often in secular voluntary associations and 
in voluntary associations offering fewer selective incentives than materialists. 
H5.  Postmaterialists participate less often in pillarized voluntary associations than 
materialists. 
 
6.2.4. Personality characteristics 
According to Inglehart’s theory on postmaterialism the emergence of 
environmental and human rights watch organizations should be explained as the 
result of the rise of postmaterialistic values. Olson’s theory explains the growth of 
interest groups, sports clubs and cultural expression groups by their use of selective 
incentives. However, one could also argue that participation in all these secular 
voluntary associations expresses a certain identity or personality. Perhaps it appears 
unusual to argue that personality characteristics are a new basis of participation in 
voluntary associations. Personality characteristics are assumed to be stable over 
time. Panel studies show that the rank order of personality characteristics of 
individuals is highly stable (Costa & McCrae, 1988). However, these results do not 
exclude the possibility that more recent cohorts score differently on specific 
characteristics than older cohorts. Studies in the US have shown that a number of 
personality characteristics such as Extraversion, intelligence and ‘self-esteem’ are 
highly stable at the individual level, but that recent cohorts score higher on these 
characteristics than older cohorts (Twenge, 2001; Twenge & Campbell, 2001). 
This implies that the proportion of extraverted persons in the population is 
growing. Because extraverted persons are more often active as volunteers 
(Lindeman, 1995; Smith, 1966) it is possible that voluntary associations in the 
Netherlands contain fewer and fewer religious persons, but more and more persons 
with an extraverted personality. 
In the past decade, personality psychologists have reached a consensus on the 
existence of five basic dimensions in human personality, also called the ‘Big Five’ 
157   
(John, 1990; McCrae & John, 1992): openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism (easily remembered by the acronym OCEAN). It 
can be expected that agreeableness, extraversion and openness will be most 
strongly related to participation in voluntary associations. Openness is relevant 
mainly for participation in cultural expressive associations: creative persons will be 
attracted to theatre and musical groups. Agreeableness is assumed to be 
characteristic of persons engaging in altruistic behavior (Graziano & Eisenberg, 
1994), and should therefore be positively related to participation in voluntary 
associations that do not offer many selective incentives. Extraversion is 
characteristic of persons with ambition and social skills (Watson & Clark, 1994). 
In these qualities, two aspects can be distinguished: activity and sociability. These 
traits are useful in all kinds of voluntary association. Extraversion can therefore be 
expected to show positive relations to participation in all types of voluntary 
associations.  
A historical meta-analysis of extraversion among American first year 
psychology students (Twenge, 2001) shows that the mean extraversion-score has 
increased in the period 1966-1993. If this increase has also occurred in the 
Netherlands, and extraversion is indeed positively related to participation in 
voluntary work, the increase in extraversion may have compensated partly for the 
negative consequences of secularization. If young adults today are more extraverted 
than those who were young before World War II, it is likely that the relation of 
extraversion with participation in secular voluntary associations is stronger than 
with pillarized voluntary associations, because the former attract more young 
adults. 
There are only a handful empirical studies available on the relationship of 
general ‘Big Five’-dimensions and participation in voluntary associations, which 
were reviewed in the previous chapter. In the present chapter we test the following 
three hypotheses on personality characteristics explicitly: 
H6.  Agreeableness is positively related to participation in voluntary associations 
offering fewer selective benefits.    
H7.  Extraversion is positively related to participation in all types of voluntary 
associations; this relation will be stronger to participation in secular voluntary 
associations than in pillarized voluntary associations. 
H8. Openness to experience is positively related to participation in secular 
voluntary associations. 
 
The hypothesis on agreeableness is based on the conceptualisation of 
Graziano & Eisenberg (1997), which has been discussed in chapters three, four and 
five. The first part of the hypothesis on extraversion is based on Smith (1966), 
Lindeman (1995) and Watson & Clark (1997). The second part of the hypothesis is 
based on the macro-version of the weak situation-hypothesis, arguing that 
secularisation has given more room for expression of individual preferences. The 
hypothesis on openness is based on the observation that a specific group of secular 
associations, which has grown substantially in the past decades, focuses on cultural 
expression (e.g., theatre and musical groups).  
In addition, three specific measures of prosocial motives (social value 
orientation, empathic concern and perspective taking) are also taken into account 
in the analyses. It can be expected that these measures are positively related to 
participation in voluntary associations offering fewer selective incentives (as in 
hypothesis 6).  
 
 
6.3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
6.3.1. Data 
As in previous chapters, the Family Survey of the Dutch Population 2000 
(FSDP2000) is used to test the hypotheses. Details on the sampling procedure and 
measures of personality characteristics are given in appendix A. In line with 
Twenge (2001), the correlation of extraversion with age is negative. However, it is 
not very strong (r = -.08). Openness is more strongly correlated with age (r = -.19). 
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6.3.2. Measures 
Measures of participation in voluntary associations and religious 
involvement have been discussed in chapter two and chapter five. Among members 
we distinguished two types: members of pillarized voluntary associations and 
secular voluntary associations. The following types of associations were considered 
as pillarized associations because they were part of the pillarized civil society 
(Lijphart, 1975): religious associations, political parties, unions, professional 
associations, and women’s organizations. The following types of associations were 
considered as secular: environmental and human rights watch organizations, 
sportclubs, and cultural and expressive associations (theatre, music, dance), and 
consumers and other interest groups. One could argue that sports clubs are 
misclassified because they also used to belong to specific pillars. However, this 
reasoning ignores that very few sports clubs today are pillarized. In addition, the 
enormous growth in sports clubs took place in ‘new’ sports such as badminton, 
squash and tennis (De Hart, 1999b), which have never belonged to specific pillars.  
The dichotomy of pillarized and secular associations does not cover Dutch 
civil society completely. Engagement in other types of voluntary associations (such 
as social causes, schools, neighborhood associations, hobbyclubs) is not considered 
in this chapter because these organizations have not grown or declined substantially 
in the past decades. By comparing the determinants of participation in pillarized 
and secular voluntary associations we obtain a picture of the shifting backgrounds 
of participation in voluntary associations. 
To test the hypotheses on selective incentives, we scored voluntary 
associations on a range from 1 to 4, reflecting both the extent to which 
membership is directly beneficial to the individual by providing services or 
sociability and the extent to which these voluntary associations contribute to the 
production of collective goods (see table 6.2). The scores are the means for 
evaluations by eleven scholars at the Department of Sociology of Utrecht 
University. The correlation of the scores for ‘individual benefits’ and ‘collective 
benefits’ is strongly negative (r = -.60). In other words, the ‘experts’ assume that 
membership of voluntary associations that serve collective interests provides fewer 
selective incentives and vice versa. It should be noted that the negative relation does    
not mean that individual and collective benefits exclude one another: also the 
associations that are assumed to be most useful for society do provide some 
individual benefits, as shown in table 6.2.  
 
Table  6.2.  Individual and collective benefits of 14 types of voluntary 
associations (‘expert’-evaluation) 
 
 Individual 
benefits
Collective 
benefits 
Difference
Environment and wildlife organizations  2,27 3,73  -1,46
Unions and professional organizations  2,55 3,73  -1,18
Political parties  2,73 3,90  -1,17
Public and social benefit organizations  2,45 3,27  -0,82
Health organizations  2,64 3,18  -0,54
Religious organizations  2,45 2,91  -0,46
Interest groups  3,09 3,55  -0,46
School committees  2,55 2,91  -0,36
Neighborhood associations  2,91 3,27  -0,36
Women’s organizations   2,64 2,55  0,09
Youth clubs  3,09 2,45  0,64
Sports clubs  3,54 2,73  0,81
Cultural-expressive groups  3,27 1,90  1,37
Hobbyclubs 3,38 1,82  1,54
Mean for all voluntary associations  2,82 2,99  -0,17
Mean for pillarized voluntary associations  2,64 3,34  -0,70
Mean for secular voluntary associations  3,04 2,98  0,07
 
In addition, it appears that the ‘experts’ assumed that secular voluntary 
associations offer more individual benefits than pillarized associations, and fewer 
collective benefits. By subtracting the score for collective benefits from the score for 
individual benefits, we obtained a score indicating the extent to which membership 
of a specific voluntary association generates more individual than collective 
benefits. The difference score represents the amount of selective incentives that a 
voluntary association offers. A negative difference score indicates that a voluntary 
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association is more beneficial for collective than for individual well being. We 
computed a selective incentives score by taking the means of all difference scores 
for the voluntary associations of which the respondent was a member. Non-
members received a score of 0 on this variable. Non-participants neither serve 
collective well being, nor profit from membership individually.  
Table 6.2 shows that the experts gave environmental and human rights 
watch organizations the lowest selective incentives score, while hobby clubs and 
cultural-expressive groups received the highest selective incentives score. A 
reliability analysis of the difference scores obtained by expert evaluations indicates 
that there was a high degree of inter-rater reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha of .83). 
 
Religious socialization 
To measure religious socialization, a factorscore was used based on 
questions about religious affiliation of both parents (‘did your [mother/father] 
belong to a specific church or religious community when you grew up?’), the 
frequency of church attendance of the parents (‘how often did your [mother/father] 
attend religious services when you were 15 years of age?’), reading the bible (‘When 
you grew up, did your parents read from the bible?’ with no, sometimes, regularly, 
every day as response categories), prayer at meals (‘Was there a prayer in your 
family at meals when you were 15 years of age?’), and religious volunteerism of 
both parents (‘Was your [mother/father] involved in religious activities beyond 
attending church (in providing care or organizing social activities)?’ with no, yes, 
sometimes, and yes, regularly as response categories). The factoranalysis showed 
one clear factor with eigenvalue 4.38, explaining 54.8% of the variance. Factor 
loadings were: 0.759 for religious affiliation of the father, 0.748 for the mother, 
0.891 for church attendance of the father and 0.889 of the mother, 0.818 for 
prayer at meals; 0.586 for reading the bible, and 0.586 and 0.555 for religious 
activities of the father and the mother, respectively. 
 
Political value orientation: materialism - postmaterialism 
The political value orientation is a classification in five categories, based on 
the tank order provided in two lists of four goals in politics (De Graaf, 1988).    
Respondents who chose two ‘materialistic’ goals from these lists (maintain order in 
the nation, reduce inflation, increasing economic growth, a strong army) as their 
first and second choice were classified as ‘materialists’. Respondents who chose to 
‘postmaterialistic’ goals (give citizens more say in politics, protect the freedom of 
speech, give citizens more say in decisions at work and in their community, 
embellish cities and the countryside) were classified as postmaterialists. Persons 
providing other combinations were classified as ‘mixed’. With this procedure, 
18.7% of the respondents endorsed materialistic political values, 58% had mixed 
preferences, and 23.4% had postmaterialistic values. 
 
Other variables 
The following variables were included in the analyses because they were frelated 
to age, church attendance, religious affiliation, postmaterialism, and the ‘Big Five’: 
·  Gender: male 0, female 1. 
·  Level of education, ranging from primary school school (1) to college/university 
degree (7). 
·  Marital status: single, married or divorced, with widowhood as the reference 
category. 
·  Household income: the sum of net personal incomes of both partners in the 
household. 
 
6.3.3. Analytical strategy 
Below we present several multivariate logistic regression analyses to test the 
hypotheses formulated above. First we report two analyses of membership: one 
analysis of pillarized membership and one of secular membership. This analysis 
allows for a comparison of the characteristics of participants in both types of 
voluntary associations. Secondly, an analysis is reported of the selective incentives 
score. This analysis shows how characteristics of participants vary with the amount 
of selective incentives that voluntary associations are offering. The third analysis 
combines the first two in a conditional logistic regression analysis (McFadden, 
1974). This technique is similar to multinomial logistic regression analysis, but 
allows for testing hypotheses on interactions between independent variables and 
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characteristics of the dependent variables. In our case the relevant characteristics 
are the type of voluntary association (pillarized or secular) and the amount of 
selective incentives the association offers to members (the selective incentives score). 
Conditional logistic regression analysisis requires a specific structure of the data: a 
pooled file with multiple observations per respondent, one for each type of 
voluntary association. The data file was created in two steps. In a first step, a 
separate file was created for each type of voluntary association, including the 
original values of the independent variables; the new variable dummy ‘member’, 
indicating whether the respondents were a member of that particular association or 
not; and two new variables: a dummy-variable indicating whether the particular 
association was secular or pillarized, and the selective incentives score. In the 
second step, the separate files for all types of voluntary associations were merged in 
one file. The resulting data file contained eight observations per respondent (one 
observation for each type of secular or pillarized voluntary association). Because 
the observations are not independent of each other, a cluster-correction was 
applied. 
The conditional logistic regression analysis estimates the likelihood of 
membership in voluntary associations, based on characteristics of the respondent, 
characteristics of the voluntary association, and interactions between characteristics 
of the respondents (church attendance, religious socialization, postmaterialism, 
social value orientation, and personality characteristics) and characteristics of 
voluntary associations (whether they are secular or pillarized, and the amount of 
selective incentives offered).  
 
 
6.4. RESULTS 
 
First we present results of two separate series of logistic regression analyses of 
membership of pillarized and secular voluntary associations (see table 6.3). In line 
with hypotheses 1 and 2, religious involvement is positively related to membership 
of pillarized voluntary associations, but not to membership of secular voluntary 
associations. However, there is no effect of religious socialization when current    
religious involvement is taken into account. This result is in line with the 
integration theory as formulated by Durkheim, but not with the revision by 
Parsons. In line with hypothesis 4, postmaterialists are more often members of 
secular voluntary associations than materialists. There is no relation between 
postmaterialism and membership of pillarized voluntary associations. Extraversion 
is positively related to pillarized membership, but not to secular membership. This 
result is partly in contrast with hypothesis 7, which predicted a positive relation 
with both types of participation, with the relation to secular participation being the 
stronger one. Hypothesis 8 is not suppported: openness is not positively related to 
membership of secular voluntary associations, while the relation with pillarized 
participation is weakly negative. 
Table 6.3 also shows some interesting results for which no explicit hypotheses 
were formulated. First, the level of education is positively related to both types of 
memberships, with the relation to secular participation being much stronger than 
the relation to pillarized participation. A small part of the relation with the level of 
education is mediated by postmaterialism. Second, members of pillarized 
associations have more prosocial value orientations than members of secular 
associations. The effect of social value orientation mediates the weakly positive 
relation of empathic concern. This was not the case for secular participation: the 
relation of empathic concern with membership in secular voluntary associations did 
not weaken due to the introduction of social value orientation. Third, there are 
some weak relations with personality characteristics that were not anticipated. 
Members of both types of voluntary associations are less conscientious than non-
members and members of pillarized associations are somewhat more neurotic, 
while members of secular associations are somewhat less neurotic than non-
members. 
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Table 6.3.  Logistic regression analysis of membership of pillarized and secular voluntary associations  
 
  Pillarized voluntary associations Secular  voluntary  associations 
Female 0.59 *** 0.52 *** 0.48 *** 0.71 **  0.73 *  0.71 ** 
Age   1.56 *** 1.60 *** 1.61 *** 0.89   0.91   0.90  
Level of education  1.27 *** 1.28 *** 1.28 *** 1.82 ***  1.77 *** 1.72 ***
Income (x €1000)  1.00  1.01  1.00  1.16 *  1.15 *  1.14 * 
Working hours  1.45 *** 1.46 *** 1.46 *** 0.92   0.92   0.91  
Single  0.80  0.80  0.82  1.56  1.69  1.56  
Married  0.89  0.88  0.90  1.23  1.33  1.24  
Divorced  0.78  0.70  0.68  1.21  1.50  1.49  
Number of years married  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.34 (*)  1.34 (*)  1.36 * 
Religious  socialization  1.09  1.09  1.08  0.97  0.98  0.98  
Church attendance  1.43 *** 1.43 *** 1.42 *** 1.04   1.02   1.02  
Level of urbanization  1.11 (*)  1.12 (*)  1.12 (*)  1.07   1.08   1.08  
Agreeableness   0.94  0.93    1.02  1.04  
Conscientiousness   0.89 (*)  0.89 (*)   0.86 *  0.87 * 
Extraversion   1.16 *  1.17 *   1.02  1.02  
Neuroticism   1.13 (*)  1.13 (*)   0.89 (*)  0.89 (*) 
Openness   0.89 (*)  0.88 (*)   1.08  1.07  
Perspective  taking   1.05  1.05  0.93  0.92  
Empathic  concern   1.15 (*)  1.10  1.18 *  1.16 *    
Social  value  orientation    1.23 **     0.98  
Postmaterialism     1.02    1.18 ** 
Chi  Square  174 183 185 113 127 135 
Nagelkerke  R  Square .0939 .1068 .1131 .0655 .0753 .0794 
 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10. Entries represent odds ratios for z-standardized independent variables.  
All Chi Square-tests are significant at the p<.001 level. 
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Table 6.4.  Regression analysis of the direct individual benefits of membership of 
voluntary associations (‘selective incentives score’) 
 
Female -2.54   -0.05   2.30   
Age   -15.79 ***  -15.71 ***  -15.27  *** 
Level of education  -17.64 *** -16.67 *** -15.62  *** 
Income (x €1000) -2.41   -2.44   -2.13   
Working hours  -5.12 (*)  -5.20 (*)  -4.83  (*) 
Single 21.04   17.44   20.46   
Married -6.39   -9.87   -7.35   
Divorced 7.90   6.08   7.71   
Number of years married  1.33   1.12   1.44   
Religious socialization  -0.69   -0.27   -0.20   
Church attendance  -2.42   -1.80   -1.41   
Level of urbanization  1.59   1.38   1.36   
Agreeableness   4.05   3.35   
Conscientiousness   4.23 (*)  3.85   
Extraversion   0.62   0.57   
Neuroticism   1.73   1.47   
Openness   2.10   2.58   
Perspective taking    -4.27 (*)  -4.00   
Empathic concern    -8.83 ***  -7.08  ** 
Social value orientation      -5.10  * 
Postmaterialism     -6.95  ** 
Constant -25.02   -23.04   -26.66  (*) 
F-value 10.4 ***  7.6 ***  7.5  *** 
Adj. R Square  .0893   .1061   .1166   
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10.  
Coefficients are multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate the interpretation.  
 
    
Table 6.4 shows the results of a regression analysis of selective incentives 
obtained by membership of voluntary associations (the ‘selective incentives score’) 
to test the hypotheses based on the Logic of collective action (Olson, 1965). In line 
with the expectation in hypothesis 3, age is negatively related to membership in 
voluntary associations offering more selective incentives. In line with hypothesis 2, 
church attendance and religious socialization are not related to the selective 
incentives score. The negative relation of postmaterialism with selective incentives 
is in line with hypothesis 4. Postmaterialists are more likely to join voluntary 
associations that offer fewer selective incentives. The ‘Big Five’ personality 
characteristics are not related to the selective incentives score. In contrast to 
hypothesis 6, agreeableness does not increase the likelihood of membership in 
voluntary associations offering fewer selective incentives. 
The strongest predictor of the selective incentives score is the level of 
education: the higher the level of education of a person, the more likely that this 
person will be a member of voluntary associations offering fewer selective 
incentives. Interestingly, this relation has nothing to do with the better financial 
position of the higher educated. A small part of the relation with the level of 
education is due to perspective taking and postmaterialism. Finally, table 6.4 shows 
negative relations of empathic concern and social value orientation with the 
selective incentives score, indicating that more empathically concerned persons and 
persons with more prosocial value orientations are more likely to be members of 
voluntary associations offering fewer selective incentives. 
In table 6.5 we present a more strict test of the hypotheses about 
differences in the effects of religious involvement, postmaterialism and personality 
characteristics on secular and pillarized voluntary associations using conditional 
logistic regression analysis. To reduce the number of variables in the analysis, 
several personality characteristics that were not of primary interest in this chapter 
were excluded. 
 
169   
Table 6.5.  Conditional logistic regression analysis of membership of voluntary 
associations 
 
Female  0.73 *** 0.73 *** 0.69  *** 
Age   1.12 (*)  1.12 *  1.13  (*) 
Level of education  1.40 ***  1.39 ***  1.36  *** 
Income (x €1000)  0.98  0.98  1.00   
Single  1.11  1.10  1.01   
Married  1.06  1.04  0.91   
Divorced  0.91  0.89  0.75   
Number of years married  1.08   1.07   1.09   
Religious  socialization  1.09  1.10  1.14  (*) 
Church  attendance  1.15 * 1.15 * 1.14  (*) 
Agreeableness   0.92  0.92   
Extraversion   1.09  1.10   
Openness   1.00  1.05   
Social value orientation      1.04   
Postmaterialism     0.93   
Secular voluntary association  2.16 *** 2.17 *** 2.14  *** 
Secular*church  attendance  0.88 (*) 0.88 (*) 0.89   
Secular*religious  socialization  0.90  0.91  0.87   
Secular*agreeableness   1.07  1.10   
Secular*Extraversion   0.98  0.97   
Secular*Openness   1.04  0.97   
Secular*Postmaterialism     1.24  ** 
Secular*social value orientation      0.99   
Incentives*church  attendance  1.11 ** 1.11 ** 1.11  ** 
Incentives*socialization  0.93 * 0.93 * 0.96   
Incentives*agreeableness   1.04  1.07  (*) 
Incentives*Extraversion   0.99  0.99   
Incentives*Openness   1.03  1.10  * 
Incentives*social value orientation     0.92  * 
Incentives*Postmaterialism     0.91  * 
Selective  incentives  0.84 *** 0.84 *** 0.86  *** 
Chi Square  332 340   290   
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10. Entries represent odds ratios for z-standardized 
independent variables. All Chi Square-tests are significant at the p<.001 level.    
  Because all types of voluntary associations are collapsed in one single 
analysis, the coefficients of the independent variables in the table represent a ‘mean 
effect’ of these variables for all voluntary associations. The interactions with the 
dummy-variabele ‘secular’ and the selective incentives score indicate how the effects 
of the independent variables differ for participation in secular and pillarized 
voluntary associations and how their effects vary with the selective incentives 
offered by voluntary associations. Because secular voluntary associations offer 
more individual and fewer collective benefits than pillarized associations, we obtain 
a better estimate of the differences between secular and pillarized voluntary 
associations by taking into account interactions with the selective incentives score.  
The analysis in table 6.5 shows that males, older persons, the higher educated, 
and frequent church attendees are more likely to be members of voluntary 
associations (than females, younger persons, the lower educated and non-religious 
persons). The positive effect of ‘secular voluntary association’ indicates that secular 
associations are more popular than pillarized associations. The negative effect of 
the selective incentives indicates that associations offering more selective incentives 
are less popular than associations offering fewer selective incentives (controlling for 
the pillarized identity of the association). This result runs counter to the prediction 
that selective incentives increase membership.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 receive mixed support in this analysis. In line with 
hypothesis 1, the effect of church attendance on participation in secular 
associations is smaller than on participation in pillarized associations. In contrast to 
hypothesis 1, however, the effect of religious socialization is not significant and 
does not vary between participation in secular and pillarized associations. In line 
with hypothesis 2, the effect of religious socialization decreases with increasing 
selective incentives, but in contrast to hypothesis 2, the effect of church attendance 
increases with the selective incentives score. In line with hypothesis 4, the effect of 
postmaterialism on membership of secular voluntary associations is more strongly 
positive than the effect on pillarized participation. In addition, the results confirm 
hypothesis 4 that postmaterialists are more likely to join voluntary associations 
offering fewer selective incentives, also when the overrepresentation of 
postmaterialists among members of secular associations is taken into account.  
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Once again, hypothesis 6 on agreeableness is rejected. If anything, more 
agreeable persons are more likely to participate in voluntary associations offering 
more selective incentives. In contrast to hypothesis 7, more extraverted persons are 
not more strongly attracted to secular voluntary associations than to pillarized 
associations. In contrast to hypothesis 8, openness is positively related to 
membership of voluntary associations offering more selective incentives, and not 
with specifically secular participation. Apparently, persons who describe themselves 
as innovative and creative are more strongly attracted by voluntary associations 
offering more selective incentives. This result is driven by the high selective 
incentives score for participation in cultural expressive groups. 
Finally, table 6.5 confirms the finding from table 6.4 that persons with a 
more prosocial value orientation are more likely to participate in associations 
offering fewer selective incentives. Apparently, the finding in table 6.3 that the 
effect of social value orientation on pillarized participation was more strongly 
positive than the effect on secular participation is due to the fact that pillarized 
associations offer fewer selective incentives. 
 
 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
 
Why did participation in the voluntary associations not decline in the 
Netherlands, despite the massive secularisation in the twentiest century? The results 
of the analyses in this chapter support predictions from the theory of Olson on the 
Logic of collective action and Inglehart’s theory on postmaterialism. In sum, the 
apparent stability of participation in voluntary associations in the Netherlands in 
the past decades masks profound changes. Pillarized associations have lost 
substantial numbers of members, while a group of secular associations has emerged 
that attracted members by offering more selective incentives and by advocating 
postmaterialistic objectives. Olson’s theory explains the emergence of a specific 
type of secular voluntary associations: those associations offering selective 
incentives for participation, such as sports clubs, interest groups, and cultural 
expressive groups. Inglehart’s theory explains the emergence of those associations    
that do not offer such selective incentives. Postmaterialists are more strongly 
attracted to voluntary associations advocating human rights and defending the 
environment. These voluntary associations do not have religious backgrounds, and 
do not offer many selective incentives for participation. Predictions based on 
research in personality psychology received mixed support. Personality 
characteristics are not very strongly related to membership of secular organizations, 
but do show weak relations with pillarized participation. Based on the ‘weak 
situation-hypothesis’, we had expected the converse: secular associations should 
give more room for the expression of individual differences in personality. In 
addition, studies in the US showed that the level of extraversion is higher in more 
recent cohorts (Twenge, 2001). It appears that there is a slight increase in 
extraversion in the Netherlands. Without this increase, membership rates of 
pillarized voluntary associations would have declined even more strongly than they 
have done.  
The analysis also showed that the level of education is an important factor 
for the stability of participation in voluntary associations in the Netherlands. The 
secular voluntary associations that have compensated for the decline in pillarized 
associations have attracted persons with a higher level of education. A higher level 
of education also promotes membership of voluntary associations offering fewer 
selective incentives. These results suggest that without the increase in the mean level 
of education among the Dutch population participation in voluntary associations 
might have declined.  
Altogether, the results of this chapter indicate that participation in 
voluntary associations in the Netherlands has become less strongly based on 
religious involvement, and has become more strongly related to the level of 
education. While the remnants of the pillarized structure of civil society disappear, 
voluntary associations in the Netherlands are not only characterized by increasing 
social inequality and individualization, but also by an increasing postmaterialistic 
concern with global collective goods. 
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Chapter 7 
The intergenerational transmission of volunteerism
* 
 
This chapter investigates the influence of parents on volunteering activities of their 
children. The analyses provide evidence that there is an intergenerational 
transmission of volunteerism, as predicted by social learning theory. Data from the 
Family Survey of the Dutch Population 2000 show that the transmission of 
volunteerism for religious and quasi-religious (‘pillarized’) associations was due 
largely to the transmission of religion and resources. However, parental 
volunteering for both religious as well as quasi-religious (‘pillarized’) associations 
increased the likelihood of children’s volunteering for secular associations, even 
controlling for parental and children’s religion, education, wealth, and children’s 
personality characteristics. Consistent with a value internalization explanation, this 
effect was not due to direct social pressure of parents. 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Volunteerism runs in the family: parents who volunteer often have children who 
also volunteer (for evidence on the USA, see Hodgkinson & Weitzman 1996; for the 
Netherlands, see Van Daal & Plemper 2003). However, as other researchers (Rosenthal, 
Feiring & Lewis 1998: 478) noted as well, it is unclear how this intergenerational 
transmission works. How can the intergenerational transmission of volunteerism be 
explained? Experimental research on the influence of parents on children’s prosocial 
behavior in developmental psychology (Eisenberg & Fabes 1994; Grusec & Lytton 1988; 
Maccoby & Martin 1983), based on social learning theory (Bandura 1977), suggests that 
parents can enhance their children’s prosocial behavior by modeling prosocial behavior 
themselves. The modeling effect may be explained in two ways: (1) parents reward their 
children’s prosocial behavior with approval; (2) parents instill a set of general prosocial 
values. Successful internalization of prosocial values will lead children to volunteering, 
also later in life, when their parents are not around. Furthermore, internalized prosocial 
values should lead children to volunteering for any type of association, not just the type of 
                                                 
* This chapter is currently under review in a slightly different version. 
175 
   
association that the parents were volunteering for. According to the approval explanation, 
people will be less likely to follow their parent’s example when their parents are not 
around (anymore).  
However, before questions about the explanation of the relation between parental 
and children’s volunteerism can be answered, one has to ascertain that the correlation is 
not spurious. The correlation between parental and children’s volunteerism in cross-
sectional surveys such as ‘Giving USA’ (Hodgkinson & Weitzman 1996) and ‘Giving in 
the Netherlands’ (Van Daal & Plemper 2003) may be due to confounding variables. This 
paper investigates three different versions of this idea. They are all byproduct theories. 
According to these byproduct theories, volunteering by parents does not make their 
children volunteer. Parents pass on conditions that produce volunteering by their children, 
and that is why parental volunteering is correlated with children’s volunteering. Two of 
the byproduct theories involve the transmission of social contexts: religious and higher 
educated environments. The third byproduct theory involves the transmission of 
personality characteristics. Religious involvement as well as the level of education are 
strongly related to volunteering, both in the USA (Hodgkinson & Weitzman 1998; 
Independent Sector 2002; Wilson 2000) and in the Netherlands (Bekkers 2000; Dekker & 
De Hart 2002; Kraaykamp 1996). Finally, individual differences in personality 
characteristics such as empathy and extraversion may also act as confounding variables. 
Previous research has shown that these personality characteristics are related to 
volunteering in the USA (Penner 2002) as well as in the Netherlands (Bekkers 2002; 
Lindeman 1995). Because parents pass on their religion, educational level, and personality 
characteristics to their children, it is no wonder that volunteering activities of parents and 
children are similar. However, this paper shows that the correlation between parental and 
children’s volunteerism is not always due to confounding variables such as parental 
resources, religion and personality characteristics. Instead, parental volunteering has an 
additional effect on children’s volunteering for secular associations, even controlling for 
confounding variables. Such an additional effect could indicate a modeling effect, because 
the effect is equally strong for those who are living within and beyond the reach of 
parental influence.  
  
   
Parent-child similarity in volunteerism 
An important portion of all volunteering in the Netherlands is being done in 
religious denominations or nonprofit organizations with a specific religious identity (De 
Hart 1999). Table 7.1 shows the degree of similarity between parents and children in 
religious volunteering in the Netherlands in the year 2000 (the survey data on which this 
table is based will be discussed in more detail later). Among the adult respondents who 
reported that their parents did not volunteer when they [the respondents] were 15 years of 
age, only 2.2% volunteered for religious associations. Among those who reported 
volunteering activities for religious organizations by their parents when they were 15 
years of age, 9.5% reported currently being active as a volunteer for a religious 
organization. This difference is highly significant (χ
2=36.0, df=1, p<.000). The odds ratio 
for table 7.1 is 4.57. This ratio is quite high, indicating that there is indeed a strong 
transmission of volunteering for religious associations from parents to children.  
 
Table 7.1.  Intergenerational transmission of volunteering for religious associations in 
the Netherlands 
 
 Children’s  current  volunteering  N
Parental religious 
volunteering  
No volunteer Volunteer for religious 
association
No 1092 
97.8%
25 
2.2%
1117 
76.8%
Yes 306 
90.5%
32 
9.5%
338 
23.2%
All 1398 
96.1%
57 
3.9%
1455 
100.0%
 
Before the 1960s, most of the voluntary work in the Netherlands outside the 
Christian churches still had some direct or indirect relation to organized religion: 
Catholics and protestants had their own soccer clubs, worker’s unions, women’s 
organizations, and so on. This religious cleavage was so strong, that even those who did 
not belong to a church were forced to join associations that explicitly rejected a religious 
identity. The associations that took a specifically religious or anti-religious position are 
often called ‘pillarized’ associations (Lijphart 1975; Verba, Nie & Kim 1978) because the 
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social and political structure of Dutch society resembled a temple, with the roof based on 
separate pillars. Social interaction for the majority of the population took place almost 
exclusively within the own religious group. Consequently, there were strong cleavages 
along religious lines: Catholics hardly knew any protestants, and avoided the company of 
the non-religious socialists. However, at the top, the political elites of different groups did 
have contacts with each other and settled political disputes. Before WWII, hardly any 
voluntary associations were able to avoid the forces of pillarization. Table 7.2 shows that 
there is also a transmission of volunteering for pillarized associations (χ
2=9.9, df=1, 
p<.002). The odds ratio for this table is weaker (1.96), but still positive and significant. 
 
Table 7.2.  Intergenerational transmission of volunteering for pillarized associations 
 
 Children’s  current  volunteering  N
Parental pillarized 
volunteering  
No volunteer Volunteering for 
pillarized association
No 727 
95.0%
38 
5.0%
765 
56.0%
Yes 546 
90.7%
56 
9.3%
602 
44.0%
All 1273 
93.1%
94 
6.9%
1367 
100.0%
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, pillarized associations in Dutch civil 
society have suffered large membership losses. The emergence of many secular 
associations, such as environmental organizations and associations defending animal or 
human rights, compensated for the decline among religious and pillarized associations 
(Bekkers & De Graaf 2002; De Hart, 1999). Table 7.3 shows that there is even a 
transmission of volunteering for these secular associations. Parents of volunteers for 
secular associations were more often volunteering for religious (χ
2=7.8, df=1, p<.005; 
odds ratio: 1.35) and pillarized associations (χ
2=7.8, df=1, p<.005; odds ratio: 1.30). 
While the results in table 7.1 and 7.2 could be explained as a byproduct of the 
transmission of other things than volunteering, this is more difficult for the results in table 
7.3 because the respondents are active for different types of organizations than their 
parents.   
   
Table 7.3.  Children’s volunteering for secular associations by parental volunteering for 
religious and pillarized associations 
 
 Children’s  current  volunteering  N
Parental volunteering   No volunteer Volunteering for 
secular association
No volunteering 560 
84.3%
108 
15.7%
668 
48.4%
Religious volunteering 268 
79.3%
70 
20.7%
338 
24.5%
Pillarized volunteering 284 
80.0%
71 
20.0%
355 
25.7%
All 1132 
82.0%
249 
18.0%
1381 
100.0%
 
 
7.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
7.2.1. The modeling effect 
Social learning theory (Bandura 1977) implies that parents do have an influence on 
their children’s propensity to volunteer beyond the transmission of religion, resources, or 
personality. Social learning theory is an influential paradigm in developmental 
psychology, where the transmission of prosocial behavior from parents to children is 
investigated with experiments as an example of modeling. These experiments (for a 
review, see Eisenberg & Fabes 1994:715-17) have focused on the effect of the prosocial 
behavior of parents or other models on their children’s imitation of this behavior. In the 
typical experiment, children in the experimental group observed a person (a parent or 
other confederate) instructed to model generosity towards others. After observing the 
model, children are given the opportunity to display generosity in the absence of the 
model. Most studies have shown that children display more prosocial behavior after 
observing a prosocial model than children in a control group in which modeling did not 
occur. Some studies have shown “lasting effects on helping and donating (…) some weeks 
after the experimental modelling” (Grusec & Lytton 1988: 183). Another striking result 
of these experiments is that modeling one specific type of prosocial behavior (e.g., helping 
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a stranger) can spill over into another type of prosocial behavior (e.g., giving to the poor) 
(Eisenberg & Fabes 1994). 
Several mechanisms may give an explanation for modeling effects. The two most 
important explanations are social approval and value internalization. 
Social approval. Parents often reward their children for prosocial or other socially 
desirable behavior with expressions of approval and may react with disapproval of 
failures to show prosocial behavior. As a consequence, children may imitate the model’s 
prosocial behavior in order to receive approval from the model or from other persons. 
When the dominant motive to conform to social norms remains the need for social 
approval and does not ‘evolve’ to some internalized value, children will not display 
prosocial behavior when the parents are not around and there are no other persons who 
may reward it with approval.  
Value internalization is defined as “the development of children of the ability to 
regulate their own behavior, with little external monitoring or sanctioning, with respect to 
a set of self-accepted prosocial values” (Maccoby & Martin 1983: 51). Parents who 
volunteer teach their children with deeds that volunteerism is doing good for society. 
Volunteering requires giving up some leisure time in order to help an association reach its 
goals. Children who see their parents volunteer become accustomed to the idea that a 
personal sacrifice for some greater good has intrinsic value. To the extent that children 
internalize prosocial values, they will be more likely to engage in volunteering behavior 
when they have grown up. The more general this internalized value, the higher the chance 
that they are active as a volunteer for an association that is different from the specific type 
of association in which their parents participated. For instance, children of parents who 
were active in a political party or the church choir may volunteer for a homeless shelter or 
for an environmental lobby group. When modeling effectively resulted in a general 
willingness to volunteer, there will be a spillover from one type of volunteering to 
another. A successful internalization of prosocial values will not only lead to volunteering 
for the type of associations that parents were active for, but also to volunteering for other 
associations. 
The evidence from experimental developmental psychology that modeling one type 
of prosocial behavior has ‘lasting’ effects on children’s prosocial behavior is limited, 
because the periods investigated cover only a few weeks. Another shortcoming of these 
studies is that the examples of prosocial behavior used as dependent variables typically  
   
involve small sacrifices in particular situations (Clary & Miller 1986:1359; Radke-
Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler & Chapman 1983: 47) such as giving some change to a particular 
orphan’s fund. There are very few studies concerning sustained altruism covering a longer 
timespan. A recent study of the transmission of generosity to charitable causes in the USA 
(Wilhelm, Brown, Rooney & Steinberg 2002) provided evidence that concurrent parental 
and children’s generosity are moderately correlated, but in this study no data were 
available on parental behavior in the past. The transmission of generosity observed may 
be due to social pressure, and not to internalized values. In another study, volunteering 
behaviors of individuals who recalled their parents as generous and warm were compared 
to those who recalled their parents as less warm and who modeled to a lesser degree 
(Clary & Miller 1986). The study showed that people who have internalized prosocial 
values are more strongly engaged in volunteering, also when they can get little approval. 
However, this study focused on volunteers only, and did not show whether or to what 
extent value internalization actually contributes to the likelihood of volunteering. Finally, 
the only available prospective study of volunteerism (Rosenthal, Feiring & Lewis 1998) 
does not give information about parental volunteering in the past.  
This paper is an attempt to test the predictions from social learning theory about 
modeling effects over a long time span: it investigates the relationship between recalled 
parental volunteering behaviors in childhood and current volunteering. Furthermore, the 
paper focuses on an example of prosocial behavior requiring a substantial investment of 
own resources: volunteering for an association on a regular basis.  
 
7.2.2. Byproduct theories: religion, education and personality as confounding variables 
Because key determinants of volunteering such as religion (Need & De Graaf 1996; 
Myers 1996), education and social status (Blau & Duncan 1967; Ganzeboom, Treiman & 
Ultee 1991) and personality characteristics (Plomin, DeFries, McClearn & Rutter 1997) 
are also transmitted from one generation to the next, it is very well possible that the 
intergenerational transmission of prosocial behavior is a side-effect of these transmission 
processes. In other words: there may be confounding variables explaining the correlation 
between parental and children’s volunteerism. If the correlation between parental 
volunteering and children’s volunteering is a modeling effect, as social learning theory 
predicts, it should hold when these confounding variables are taken into account. 
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Religion. In the Netherlands, church attendance is one of the key factors affecting 
volunteering (Bekkers 2000, 2003; Dekker & De Hart 2002; Kraaykamp 1996). 
Volunteering is more common in religious groups, the more highly cohesive, the smaller 
and more orthodox they are. Consequently, the non-religious show the lowest rates of 
volunteering; somewhat higher levels are found among Catholics; Reformed Christians 
have even higher rates of volunteering, while the highest rates of volunteering are found 
among the Calvinists and the very small categories of other denominations. Figure 1 
shows how parental religion could be the underlying variable in parent-child similarity in 
volunteering. Parental volunteering is bound up with their level of religious involvement 
(arrow A). Parents transfer their religion to their children through religious socialization 
(arrow B). Among children, volunteering is also related to religious involvement (arrow 
C). As a result, there is no direct or indirect influence of parental volunteering on 
children’s volunteering. The bivariate correlation between parental volunteering and 
children’s volunteering is spurious. This is indicated with a dotted line for arrow D in 
figure 1. According to this line of reasoning, the relation between parental and children’s 
volunteering should weaken when parental religion is controlled. 
Resources.  Another category of confounding variables that may lie behind the 
correlation between parental and children’s volunteering is found in parental resources. It 
is well known that the level of education and social status are important correlates of 
volunteering (Kraaijkamp 1996; Wilson 2000). One can imagine how parental resources 
may act as confounding variables in parent-child similarity in volunteering, by replacing 
‘religion’ with ‘education’ in figure 1.  
 
Figure 7.1.  Confounding variables in the intergenerational transmission of volunteering 
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Personality. A different version of the byproduct theory follows from personality 
psychology. Parents do not only pass on their religion and resources to their children, but 
also their personality characteristics. Research on volunteering has shown that 
volunteering behavior is indeed dependent on personality characteristics, most notably 
extraversion (Bekkers & De Graaf 2002; Lindeman 1995) and empathy (Penner 2002). 
Because personality characteristics of parents and children are similar - behavioral genetic 
studies report heritability estimates of .30 to .70 for empathy (Davis, Luce & Kraus 1994; 
Zahn-Waxler, Robinson & Emde 1992; Zuckerman 1991:99-100) and .40 to .60 for 
extraversion (Borkenau, Riemann, Angleitner & Spinath 2001; Plomin, DeFries, 
McClearn & Rutter 1997; Zuckerman, 1991) - personality characteristics may also be 
acting as confounding variables.  
Relations among byproduct theories. The two sociological byproduct theories do 
not exclude one another; neither does the psychological byproduct theory rule out the two 
sociological byproduct theories or vice versa. It is possible that the ‘effect’ of parental 
volunteering is partly due to the intergenerational transmission of religion, and partly to 
the transmission of resources or personality characteristics. However, there are good 
reasons to suppose that religion and resources are confounding variables for the transfer 
of volunteering in different types of organizations. Because the availability of resources is 
more strongly related to participation in secular associations, while religious involvement 
is obviously more strongly related to participation in religious and pillarized associations, 
it can be expected that introducing parental education weakens mainly the relation 
between parental and children’s secular volunteering, while introducing parental religion 
weakens the relation between parental and children’s religious and pillarized volunteering 
(Bekkers & De Graaf 2002). It can also be argued that some personality characteristics 
are more strongly related to one type of volunteering than the other. Empathy, for 
instance, should be more strongly related to volunteering for pillarized associations, 
because it is a more desirable characteristic in religious environments. Extraversion, on 
the other hand, is an undesirable characteristic in religious environments. In sum, it can 
be argued that empathy is a confounding variable for religious volunteering, while 
extraversion is a confounding variable for secular volunteering. 
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7.3. DATA & METHODS 
 
7.3.1. Data 
As in the previous chapters, the third edition of the Family Survey of the Dutch 
Population (De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp & Ultee 2000) is used to test the 
hypotheses. Details on sampling procedures and the measures of volunteering are given in 
chapter two. Details on measures of financial, human and social capital are given in 
previous chapters. Measures of personality characteristics and social value orientation are 
discussed in appendix A. 
 
7.3.2. Measures 
A composite measure of parental resources was obtained from a factor analysis of 
father’s occupational status, the mean level of education of both parents, and the number 
of luxury articles in the parental home, all at age fifteen. Father’s and mother’s level of 
education were measured in five categories, ranging from lower education to a university 
degree. Because father’s and mother’s level of education were strongly correlated (r = .58) 
the mean level of education of both parents was used as a measure of parental education. 
Father’s occupational status was measured with the SEI-procedure (Ganzeboom, De 
Graaf & Treiman 1992). Parental wealth was measured with a list of seven luxury articles 
(such as a car, dishwasher, VCR, etc.), of which the respondents recalled whether they 
were present in the parental home when they were fifteen years of age. The simple sum of 
the number of articles present in the parental home proved to be a sufficiently reliable 
scale (Cronbach’s alpha=0.76) and served as an indicator of parental wealth. To reduce 
the number of variables in the analyses, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to 
investigate whether the correlations among parental wealth, the mean level of education 
of parents and father’s occupational status were strong enough to combine them into a 
composite score of parental resources. Indeed, the factor analysis revealed one factor 
(eigen value 1.80, explaining 60% of the variance). Factor scores were saved as a new 
variable, labeled parental resources. 
In a series of questions on religious socialization, respondents recalled whether 
their parents were church members at the time they grew up, and if so, to which 
denomination they belonged, how often they attended church (five categories, ranging 
from ‘never’ to at least once a week), and whether praying at dinner and reading the bible  
   
was customary when they were fifteen years of age. A factor analysis on the responses to 
these questions revealed one strong factor (eigen value 3.90, explaining 65% of the 
variance), which was saved as a ‘religious socialization’ composite score. This score can 
be interpreted as an indicator of the intensity of parental religion. In addition, children 
recalled their parents’ religious denomination. Most respondents had two Catholic 
parents (n=656, 41.3%). This category served as the reference category in the analyses. 
Parents who did not have a religious affiliation or who belonged to different 
denominations were lumped together in one category (n=556, 35.0%). Other categories 
were Reformed parents (n=182, 11.5%), Orthodox Calvinist parents (n=144, 9.1%) and 
parents belonging to other religions (n=49, 3.1%). 
A measure of parental volunteering was constructed from several different 
questions. In the series of questions on their parent’s religion, the respondents recalled 
whether their parents were involved as a volunteer in church activities when the 
respondents were 15 years of age. In a series of questions on parental political 
involvement, respondents recalled whether their parents were involved as a volunteer for 
a political party. Finally, the respondents recalled whether their father and/or mother 
were active as a volunteer for any other association (school, youth organization, etc.). 
First, all volunteering activities reported for mothers and fathers were summed into 
measures of parental volunteering because there were no hypotheses on differences in 
effects of fathers and mothers. Volunteering for the church by either the mother or the 
father was labeled as religious volunteering. All other volunteering activities by parents 
(for a political party, a worker’s union, in school or other organization) were coded as 
parental pillarized volunteering. Almost half of the respondents (n=688, 49.8%) indicated 
that their parents were not engaged in volunteering activities; 24.5% volunteering 
activities by their parents for church (n=338); 25.7% recalled volunteering activities by 
their parents for pillarized associations only (n=355). When parents volunteered for both 
church as well as other organizations, they were considered as religious volunteers. 
The dependent variable of the analysis is the volunteering behavior of the 
respondents. This variable is coded in four nominal categories: no volunteering, 
volunteering for church, volunteering for pillarized associations and volunteering for 
secular associations. As pillarized associations were considered: political parties, women’s 
organizations, worker’s unions, and schools. The other types of associations - hobby 
clubs, sports clubs, environmental organizations, associations defending consumer’s 
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interests, neighborhood community associations, musical and theatre groups, and other 
social groups - were considered as secular associations because these types of associations 
are usually not based on a specific religious identity. When respondents were volunteering 
for both religious and another type of association, they were considered as religious 
volunteers. Respondents volunteering for both pillarized and secular associations were 
considered as pillarized volunteers. 
According to the hypothesis that the effect of parental volunteering is conditional 
upon the possibility that parents give approval, the effect of parental on children’s 
volunteering will be limited to those children who are still in contact with their parents or 
who still reside in a social network with the same social norms as in their childhood. If 
the effect of parental volunteering on children’s volunteering is equally strong for those 
who have limited contact with their parents, who became non-religious, or moved away, 
it is unlikely that social approval is the responsible mechanism. To test this hypothesis an 
index was constructed to measure the distance to parents. Respondents who had lost at 
least one of their parents, who had moved more than once in their lives, and who had left 
the church in which they were raised received the highest score on this index (3; n=156, 
10.0%), while respondents whose parents were both still alive, who did not move more 
than once and still belonged to the same religion as their parents received the lowest score 
(0; n=237, 15.2%). The other respondents differed from their parents in one (n=577, 
37.0%) or two respects (n=590, 37.8%). To facilitate the interpretation of the 
interactions with parental volunteering, the respondents were placed in a low-distance 
group when the distance index was 0 or 1, and in a high-distance group when the index 
had a value of 2 or 3. In order to compare the effects of the independent variables with 
different measurement scales, all variables in the analysis (except dummy variables) were 
z-standardized. 
 
7.3.3. Validity of recall data 
Because so many data in the Family Survey about parents are gathered from their 
children, a word on the reliability and validity of this retrospective information is in place. 
In general, prospective research designs using longitudinal data from different informants 
are to be preferred above retrospective data from one informant. However, there is 
considerable evidence that the retrospective data about parental behavior obtained from 
their children in the Family Survey is quite valid. A study comparing children’s responses  
   
about their parents’ occupations and levels of education and the responses of the parents 
themselves reveals that these responses are very highly correlated, leading to reliability 
coefficients above .90 (De Vries & De Graaf 2003). There are no reasons to suspect that 
questions on parental religion are subject to larger biases. Furthermore, the specific 
responses about parental volunteering behaviors reveal that the respondents carefully 
consulted their memories. All the retrospective questions had a response category ‘I don’t 
remember’. An analysis of these missing values shows that respondents who recalled one 
category of parental behaviors sometimes did not remember another category. For 
instance, of all 176 respondents who reported they did not remember whether their 
parents volunteered for a pillarized association, 64 (almost 40%) did report a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
on their parents’ volunteering activities for church. Ideally, one should have information 
about volunteering behaviors, resources, religious involvement and personality of both 
parents as well as children to test the hypotheses in this article. The Family Survey of the 
Dutch Population contains most of these pieces of information, except measures of 
parental personality characteristics: personality measures are only available for children. 
Because behavioral genetic studies show that the personality characteristics that are most 
likely to be related to volunteering are strongly heritable (Plomin, DeFries, McClearn & 
Rutter 1997; Zuckerman 1991), the lack of parental personality ratings is probably not 
very problematic. This issue will be discussed more elaborately below.  
 
7.3.4. Analytical strategy 
First, results of a multinomial logistic regression of volunteering activities are 
reported. This statistical analysis technique is suited to model choices between several 
categories of mutually exclusive alternatives when the alternatives are qualitatively 
different (Cramer 1991). In our case, the decision is to volunteer or not, and if so, for 
what kind of association(s). Individuals may choose to volunteer for church, for pillarized 
associations, or for secular associations, or may not volunteer at all. The multinomial 
logistic analysis produces results that closely resemble those of an ordinary logistic 
regression analysis. In fact, the analysis can be understood as a series of three 
simultaneous logistic analyses, comparing the three types of volunteering activity with no 
volunteering (which is the reference category). For each independent variable, three odds 
ratios are given: one for the decision to volunteer for a pillarized association (versus no 
volunteering), one for the decision to volunteer for a secular association, and one for the 
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decision to volunteer for both types of associations. The analysis proceeds in seven steps. 
In a first model, age, gender and parental volunteering status are included. This model 
gives a better estimate than tables 1, 2 and 3 of the relationship of parental volunteering 
with children’s volunteering because all types of volunteering activities are included 
simultaneously. Age is included in this model because older persons are more likely to 
participate in religious and pillarized associations and because personality characteristics, 
religious socialization and religious participation are also correlated to age. Gender is 
included because females usually report higher scores for empathy and extraversion but 
lower levels of education and occupational status. In a second model, children’s 
personality characteristics are introduced to test the ‘psychological’ byproduct theory. In a 
third model, parental religion is controlled, introducing parental religious denomination 
and the level of religious involvement, represented by the religious socialization factor 
score. In a fourth model, own religion is controlled (own denomination and church 
attendance). If the religious byproduct theory is correct, the effects of parental 
volunteering should disappear in model 3, while in model 4 the effect of parental religion 
should be mediated by own religious involvement. The same logic underlies the 
introduction of parental resources in model 5 and own resources in model 6. In the final 
model, interactions of parental volunteering with the distance to parents-index are 
included to test the idea that the effects of parental volunteering are modeling effects 
instead of approval effects.  
Introducing personality first may underestimate the effects of parental religiosity 
and parental resources, because common variance will be picked up by the set of variables 
that is introduced first. With this procedure, the model is generous to the psychological 
byproduct theory and provides a more stringent test of the two other byproduct theories.  
 
7.4. RESULTS 
In table 7.4.1, the results of the comparison of religious volunteering versus no 
volunteering are shown. The results of the other two comparisons are shown later in 
separate tables (see tables 4.2 and 4.3 below). Model 1 shows a strong effect of parental 
religious volunteering, controlling for age and gender. There is no spill over from parental 
pillarized volunteering to religious volunteering activities by their children. The results in 
model 2 through 6 can be used to evaluate the byproduct theories, which predicted that  
   
parental religion and the two empathy scales act as confounding variables in the 
relationship between parental volunteering and own volunteering.  
Model 2 shows that compared to non-volunteers, religious volunteers have quite 
distinctive personality characteristics: they are less open to experience, less able to take 
the perspective of others, but more empathic and more extraverted. The negative 
relationship with perspective taking stands in contrast to the expectation. Other 
counterintuitive relationships of perspective taking with other examples of prosocial 
behavior were found in previous chapters. The positive relationship with empathy is in 
line with the prediction. However, controlling for personality characteristics does not 
decrease the effects of parental religious volunteering. Model 3 supports the religious 
byproduct theory, showing that the effect of parental volunteering largely disappears 
controlling for parental religious involvement. Those who were raised in a more intensely 
religious family are more likely to volunteer for church.  
Controlling for parental religious involvement, there are no significant effects of 
parental denomination on religious volunteering. Model 4 shows that the effect of 
parental religious involvement is completely mediated by own religious involvement and 
affiliation. Interestingly, the effects of three out of four personality characteristics that 
were significant predictors in model 2 were also mediated by religious affiliation and 
involvement. This indicates that religion attracts persons with specific personality 
characteristics (i.e., those who are less open to experience, less able to take the perspective 
of others, and more empathically concerned). Model 5 shows that religious volunteering 
is not related to parental resources. Model 6 shows the expected positive effect of 
education, but an opposite effect of occupational status: religious volunteers tend to have 
a lower occupational status but a higher level of education than non-volunteers.  
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Table 7.4.1.  Multinomial logistic regression analysis of volunteering for religious association vs 
no volunteering (n=1245) 
 
 Modeling Child 
personality
Religion 
parents 
Own 
religion 
Resource
s parents 
Own 
resources 
Age respondent  1.29 1.20 1.04 0.98  1.01  1.02
Female respondent  0.94 0.73 0.72 0.73  0.70  0.67
Parental religious volunteering   ***4.26 ***4.31 1.58 1.60  1.64  1.67
Parental pillarized volunteering 1.27 1.21 1.10 1.17  1.10  1.09
Agreeableness 0.88 0.84 0.90  0.90  0.88
Conscientiousness 1.21 1.11 1.10  1.15  1.13
Extraversion *1.42 *1.47 **1.57  **1.63  **1.68
Neuroticism 1.00 1.10 1.22  1.20  1.13
Openness **0.68 *0.74 0.80  0.77  0.79
Perspective taking  *0.72 *0.73 0.78  0.73  (*)0.72
Empathy *1.53 *1.57 1.30  1.31  1.29
Social value orientation 1.09 1.02 0.94  0.89  0.93
Denomination (ref.: Catholic) 
No affiliation/mixed marriage 
Reformed 
Orthodox Calvinist 
Other 
1.00
0.66
1.04
1.53
2.57
1.00 
0.28 
1.58 
0.83 
0.49 
1.00 
0.23 
1.34 
0.42 
0.39 
1.00
0.24
1.67
0.50
0.62
Religious socialization  ***2.93 1.10  1.02  0.95
Denomination (ref.: Catholic) 
No affiliation 
Reformed 
Orthodox Calvinist 
Other 
1.00 
*8.78 
0.54 
3.01 
2.20 
1.00 
*8.64 
0.60 
3.27 
2.64 
1.00
*9.50
0.49
2.94
2.06
Church attendance  ***1.84  ***1.94  ***1.95
Resources parents    1.11  1.19
Education     1.30
Household income      0.64
Occupational status      (*)0.65
Chi Square  ***88.3 ***159.8 ***179.5 ***236.4 ***263.4 ***253.16 
Pseudo R Square  .0355 .0571 .0796 .1129  .1270  .1348
Entries are odds ratios for z-standardized variables; *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10 
  
   
Table 7.4.2.  Volunteering for pillarized association vs no volunteering 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
 Modeling Child 
personality
Religion 
parents 
Own 
religion 
Resources 
parents 
Own 
resources 
Age respondent  0.94 1.00 1.02 1.04  1.24  1.14
Female respondent  1.17 1.09 1.07 1.06  1.00  1.05
Parental religious volunteering   1.12 1.02 0.85 0.82  1.07  0.95
Parental pillarized volunteering **1.94 *1.84 **1.93 **1.99  (*)1.70  1.52
Agreeableness 1.04 1.03 1.06  1.04  1.13
Conscientiousness 1.01 1.02 1.02  1.09  1.13
Extraversion 1.10 1.15 1.15  1.20  1.18
Neuroticism (*)0.77 0.81 0.81  0.85  0.90
Openness (*)1.27 (*)1.29 (*)1.28  1.18  1.14
Perspective taking  0.92 0.93 0.93 0.92  0.85
Empathy *1.40 *1.38 *1.34  (*)1.27  (*)1.34
Social value orientation 1.03 1.01 1.01  1.01  1.04
Denomination (ref.: Catholic) 
No affiliation/mixed marriage 
Reformed 
Orthodox Calvinist 
Other 
1.00
0.93
0.60
*2.12
1.35
1.00 
0.90 
0.50 
(*)2.38 
0.81 
1.00 
0.64 
0.51 
(*)2.34 
0.68 
1.00
0.54
0.44
(*)2.37
0.89
Religious socialization  0.98 1.00  0.87  0.80
Denomination (ref.: Catholic) 
No affiliation 
Reformed 
Orthodox Calvinist 
Other 
1.00 
0.93 
1.71 
0.58 
2.45 
1.00 
1.37 
2.23 
0.80 
*3.78 
1.00
1.38
2.42
0.84
3.28
Church attendance  0.95  0.96  0.99
Resources parents    **1.44  1.20
Education     *1.37
Household income      0.93
Occupational status      (*)1.31
Notes: entries are odds ratios for z-standardized variables; *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10 
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The analysis of pillarized volunteering in table 7.4.2 shows a positive effect of 
pillarized parental volunteering in model 1. The byproduct theories predicted that not 
only parental religion and empathy but also parental resources and extraversion act as 
confounding variables in the relationship between parental volunteering and own 
volunteering. In contrast to these explanations, controlling for personality characteristics 
in model 2, the effect of pillarized volunteering hardly changes, and remains significant. 
Compared to non-volunteers, volunteers for pillarized associations are somewhat less 
neurotic and considerably more empathically concerned. In model 3, where parental 
religion is controlled, the effect of pillarized volunteering does not decline. Volunteers for 
pillarized associations are more likely to be born in an Orthodox Calvinist than in a 
Catholic family. Religious socialization is not related to pillarized volunteering. Model 4 
shows that own religious involvement is not related to pillarized volunteering. The effect 
of parental volunteering for pillarized associations remains significantly positive. In sum, 
model 3 and 4 give some support for the religious byproduct theory. In model 5, parental 
resources show a highly significant and positive effect on pillarized volunteering. In this 
model, the effect of parental pillarized volunteering declines. In model 6, the effect of 
parental pillarized volunteering declines further, due to the introduction of occupational 
status and the level of education. Both of these variables show the expected positive 
relationship with pillarized volunteering. In sum, model 5 and 6 clearly support the 
byproduct theory focusing on resources.  
The analysis of secular volunteering in table 7.4.3 shows a positive effect of 
pillarized volunteering in model 1, controlling for the positive relationship with age. 
Women are less often volunteering for secular associations than men. For this analysis, 
the byproduct theories give rise to the expectation that parental resources and 
extraversion act as confounding variables. However, model 2 shows that the effects of 
parental volunteering cannot be explained as a byproduct of the transmission of 
personality characteristics. Despite the fact that openness and extraversion are related to 
secular volunteering, the effect of parental pillarized volunteering remains unchanged. 
Model 3 shows that volunteers for secular associations more often come from a Catholic 
than a Reformed or Orthodox Calvinist family. The intensity of parental religious 
involvement is not related to secular volunteering. Model 4 shows that own religious 
involvement and affiliation are not related to secular volunteering. In sum, the results in 
model 3 and 4 do not support the religious byproduct theory.   
   
Table 7.4.3.  Volunteering for secular associations vs no volunteering 
 
Age respondent  **1.24 **1.29 **1.30 **1.30  **1.29  *1.29
Female respondent  ***0.48 ***0.50 ***0.51 ***0.50  ***0.47  ***0.49
Parental religious volunteering   1.14 1.13 1.20 1.24  **1.93  **1.88
Parental pillarized volunteering *1.53 *1.51 *1.52 *1.54  **1.70  **1.69
Agreeableness 0.95 0.97 0.96  1.00  1.02
Conscientiousness 1.03 1.02 1.02  1.00  1.01
Extraversion (*)1.15 (*)1.14 1.13  1.14  1.10
Neuroticism 0.91 0.93 0.92  0.93  0.94
Openness (*)1.15 1.14 (*)1.15  1.12  1.09
Perspective taking  1.02 0.99 1.00 1.01  1.00
Empathy 0.99 1.00 1.01  1.00  1.02
Social value orientation 0.93 0.95 0.95  0.93  0.93
Denomination (ref.: Catholic) 
No affiliation/mixed marriage 
Reformed 
Orthodox Calvinist 
Other 
1.00
0.90
**0.43
*0.49
0.60
1.00 
0.94 
*0.51 
0.57 
0.98 
1.00 
0.68 
*0.44 
*0.40 
0.59 
1.00
0.64
**0.42
*0.40
0.68
Religious socialization  1.14 1.08  0.93  0.92
Denomination (ref.: Catholic) 
No affiliation 
Reformed 
Orthodox Calvinist 
Other 
1.00 
1.27 
0.68 
0.97 
0.42 
1.00 
0.86 
0.96 
1.43 
0.59 
1.00
0.85
0.98
1.41
0.57
Church attendance  0.91  0.93  1.00
Resources parents    0.97  0.90
Education     1.05
Household income      0.93
Occupational status      1.16
Notes: entries are odds ratios for z-standardized variables; *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10 
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Model 5 shows that parental resources are not related to secular volunteering, and 
model 6 shows that own resources are not related to secular volunteering either. 
Controlling for parental resources even increases the effect of parental pillarized 
volunteering. In model 6, the effects of parental religious and pillarized volunteering are 
still significant. In sum, both parental religious as well as pillarized volunteering spill over 
into secular volunteering in the next generation. These effects of parental volunteering 
cannot be explained as a byproduct of the transmission of religion, resources, or 
personality characteristics. 
Together the analysis in tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 showed that the effect of parental 
volunteering on religious volunteering is almost exclusively due to the transmission of 
religion; that the effect on pillarized volunteering is mainly due to the transmission of 
resources (and to a smaller extent also to the transmission of religion); but that the effect 
on secular volunteering cannot be explained as the result of confounding variables. It 
seems that parental volunteering, whether for religious or pillarized associations, does 
have an additional effect on secular volunteering. Therefore, the question is justified 
whether the effect of parental volunteering is a true modeling effect, or whether it is due 
to the immediate social influence of parents. 
 
Table 7.5.  Multinomial logistic regression analysis of volunteering including an 
interaction of parental volunteering with distance to parents (n=1219) 
 
 Religious Pillarized  Secular
Parental religious volunteering   1.23 0.61  1.16
Parental pillarized volunteering 1.38 (*)1.55  *1.55
Distance 1.71 1.14  1.16
Parental religious volunteering * distance  *0.33 1.37  1.00
Parental pillarized volunteering * distance  (*)2.70 1.02  0.89
Chi Square  ***316.8 
Pseudo R Square  .1416 
Entries represent odds ratios for z-standardized variables; *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10  
All variables included in the analyses reported in table 7.4 were also included in this analysis, but their 
effects are omitted in this table. The complete table is shown in table 4 in appendix D.  
  
   
In table 7.5, the two competing explanations are tested as explanations for the 
effects of parental volunteering by including an interaction of parental volunteering with 
an index measuring the distance between parents and children. Respondents who moved 
away, relinquished the religion in which they were raised, or whose parents have died are 
no longer directly affected by parental social influence. If the effect of parental 
volunteering also holds for this group of respondents, it can hardly be accounted for by a 
social approval explanation.  
The results in table 7.5 give some support for the social approval explanation for 
religious volunteering; however, the results for secular volunteering are consistent with a 
value internalization explanation. In the analysis of religious volunteering, a significantly 
negative interaction of distance appears with parental religious volunteering, and a 
positive interaction with parental pillarized volunteering. These results indicate that the 
transmission of religious volunteering weakens when the distance between parents and 
children increases, but that parental pillarized volunteering increases the likelihood of 
religious volunteering when the distance to parents increases. For pillarized volunteering, 
table 7.5 does not give additional information, but this is not surprising since there was 
no effect of parental volunteering left in the final model of table 7.4.2. For secular 
volunteering, there are no substantial interaction effects with distance to parents. 
Although the spillover-effect of parental religious volunteering into pillarized volunteering 
weakens somewhat, neither the main effect of the distance-index, nor the interactions of 
parental volunteering with distance are significant. These results indicate that parental 
volunteering for either religious or pillarized associations both increase the likelihood of 
volunteering, even among those respondents who live beyond the direct social influence of 
their parents. For secular volunteering, the influence of parental volunteering seems to be 
an enduring modeling effect. 
 
 
7.5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
This paper provides evidence that there is an intergenerational transmission of 
volunteering, and that the effects of parental volunteering can still be found when 
confounding variables such as religion, resources, and personality are controlled, as 
predicted by social learning theory. First, it was shown that there actually is an 
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intergenerational transmission of volunteering. Children of parents who volunteered are 
more likely to volunteer than children of parents who do not volunteer. More specifically, 
it was shown that the intergenerational transmission was strongest for religious 
volunteering. Volunteering for associations that are not directly linked to church but do 
have a specific religious identity (‘pillarized associations’ as they are called in the 
Netherlands) is also transmitted from one generation to the next. Moreover, pillarized 
volunteering is not only related to parental volunteering for such associations, but also to 
parental religious volunteering. This is called a spill-over effect: parental volunteering for 
one type of association spills over into volunteering for a different type in the next 
generation. Such spill over effects are predicted by social learning theory. Spill-over effects 
of both religious as well as pillarized volunteering by parents were also found for secular 
associations. When parents were active for religious or pillarized associations, their 
children were more likely to volunteer for secular associations. Finally, it was investigated 
to what extent the transmission of volunteering may be due to the transmission of 
religion, resources and personality. In table 7.6, a summary of the results is given.  
 
Table 7.6.  Summary of consequences of results for hypotheses 
 
Byproduct theories   
- Religion  Supported for religious volunteering and pillarized volunteering 
- Resources  Supported for pillarized volunteering only 
- Personality  Not supported 
Social learning theory   
- Modeling  Supported for secular volunteering 
- Social approval  Supported for religious volunteering 
 
The results clearly support the byproduct theory focusing on religion for 
volunteering in church. Children of parents who volunteered for church are more likely to 
become engaged as a volunteer in church as well, because they adopt the religious 
involvement of their parents, not because volunteering has an additional modeling-effect 
as predicted by social learning theory. Religion also confounds the relationship of 
parental religious volunteering with pillarized volunteering, but to a smaller extent. The 
byproduct theory on resources holds only for pillarized volunteering. The effect of 
parental volunteering for pillarized associations is due to the transmission of resources  
   
inherent in a higher level of education and a higher occupational status. Personality 
characteristics such as empathy and extraversion did not act as confounding variables for 
the transmission of volunteering. The prediction from social learning theory that parental 
volunteering in one specific type of association spills over into volunteering for different 
types of associations was supported for secular volunteering. Controlling for parental 
religion, resources, and children’s personality, an additional effect remains of parental 
volunteering on the volunteering activities of their children for secular associations.  
Two different explanations that could be responsible for this modeling effect were 
specified: social approval and value internalization. The approval explanation claims that 
children imitate their parents to earn their approval. The value internalization explanation 
claims that upon observing their parents’ behavior, children learn the value of 
volunteering for society, and internalize this value. Later on in their lives, they will be 
more likely to volunteer, also when their parents are not around anymore. A comparison 
of the effects of parental volunteering for respondents who remained close to their parents 
with respondents who moved into a very different life, relinquishing the religion in which 
they were raised and moving to another place of residence did not support the social 
approval explanation for secular volunteering. The effects of parental volunteering on 
secular volunteering persist beyond the direct social pressure of parents. Evidence for the 
conditioning of the influence of parental volunteering by social approval was found for 
religious volunteering, however. The influence of parental volunteering was significantly 
stronger for respondents whose lives closely resembled those of their parents than for 
respondents who moved away to a different place of residence, relinquished the religion in 
which they were raised and whose parents had died. 
The similarity of the results reported here with experimental research in 
developmental psychology is striking, for several reasons. Firstly, the experimental results 
were obtained with children, while this paper shows that the influence of parental 
modeling persists into adulthood, even when children have a life on their own, in a very 
different social context than the one in which they were raised. Secondly, this paper 
showed that parental modeling does not only affect the type of superficial helping 
behaviors that are usually studied in psychological experiments, but has also ramifications 
for examples of prosocial behavior that require substantial investments of time. 
Of course, this study also has its limitations. A prospective research design would 
be better suited to test the hypotheses from social learning theory. However, there is 
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strong evidence suggesting that the retrospective reports of children about their parent’s 
behaviors are highly reliable (De Vries & De Graaf 2003). Given the high costs and other 
practical difficulties of longitudinal studies, relying on retrospective information is a good 
alternative. Another limitation is that measures of parental personality were not available 
in the present data. This may be problematic first and foremost to the extent that 
children’s personality is not a good proxy of parental personality. In other words, when 
arrow B in figure 1 is in fact only a weak relationship, the strength of the observed 
relationship represented by arrow D says little about the strength of the relationship 
represented by arrow A. However, if we are to believe the results of behavioral geneticists, 
this danger is not very large, because personality characteristics are to a large extent 
heritable. Extraversion, which is most strongly related to volunteering behavior, is one of 
the traits that have shown the highest heritability estimates (Plomin, DeFries, McClearn, 
& Rutter 1997: 198). A recent study relying on observational instead of self-report 
assessments produced an estimate of .62 (Borkenau, Riemann, Angleitner & Spinath 
2001). If only for genetic reasons, the extraversion level of children will be strongly 
related to the level of extraversion of their parents. A second possible bias could arise 
when parental personality would have a direct effect on children’s volunteering, 
independent of the indirect effect through children’s personality. This would be the case 
for instance if strongly extraverted or sympathetic parents would force their not so 
extraverted and sympathetic children to volunteer. Because the personality characteristics 
of parents and children are strongly correlated this is an unlikely situation. However, if 
such a situation occurs it is not unlikely that parents will try to get their children into 
volunteering, because parents usually want their children to be like themselves. A third 
possible bias could arise when parental volunteering has a direct effect on children’s 
personality, beyond the effect of parental personality. This is unlikely to occur because the 
bulk of the variance in extraversion and empathy explained by non-genetic factors is 
accounted for by non-shared environmental factors (Plomin, DeFries, McClearn & Rutter 
1997), while parental volunteering is an environmental factor that siblings share with 
each other. 
Other limitations of this study concern the measurement of social approval and the 
internalized values on which volunteering activities are supposed to be based. The data 
provide indicators of the distance to parents, but parents may not be the only significant 
others in the networks of respondents who approve of volunteering. Furthermore, the  
   
allegedly internalized values were not measured directly. Future research on the 
intergenerational transmission of volunteering should include measurements of the 
‘volunteering ethic’ that is passed on from one generation to the next. This ‘volunteering 
ethic’ should mediate the effects of parental volunteering. The failure of the psychological 
byproduct theory shows that this ‘volunteering ethic’ is a truly social phenomenon, a 
social value that is orthogonal to personality characteristics. Further research could 
investigate the value internalization hypothesis more thoroughly by looking at spillover-
effects. Experimental studies in developmental psychology suggest that the effects of 
parental modeling of one type of prosocial behavior may generalize to other types of 
prosocial behavior when children internalize prosocial values (Eisenberg et al. 1994). For 
instance, parental volunteering should also promote children’s generosity towards 
charitable causes. Future research should also study differential effects of fathers and 
mothers. It could be that fathers have a more dominant effect on the volunteering 
activities of their children because volunteering used to be a predominantly male social 
activity. One could also imagine that father’s volunteering mainly influences sons while 
mother’s volunteering affects daughters. These possibilities can be evaluated comparing a 
model as in the analyses above with constrained linear regression models (CLR) as in 
research on stratification (Korupp, Ganzeboom & Van der Lippe, 2002). 
A recent study based on the first wave of the ‘Giving in the Netherlands’ Panel 
Survey gives some answers to some of the limitations identified above (Bekkers, Hooghe 
& Stolle, forthcoming). The study shows that parental volunteerism increases the amount 
of money donated to charitable causes. It appears that some of the effects of parental 
volunteering are mediated by participation in youth. Altruistic values, generalized social 
trust, feelings of social responsibility and interest in politics are examples of social values 
that are higher among children of volunteers. These social values mediate the influence of 
parental volunteering on their children’s generosity to charity, but not the influence of 
parental volunteering on children’s volunteering. 
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Conclusions and discussion 
 
This chapter describes the characteristics of citizens who give and volunteer in the 
Netherlands. The results of chapters three to seven indicate that giving and 
volunteering are clearly related to social conditions, but show limited relations to 
individual differences in psychological characteristics and prosocial motives. In 
contrast to the low cost-hypothesis and the weak situation-hypothesis, the effects 
of personality characteristics were not stronger when prosocial behavior required 
lower material costs or when social norms were less clear. Implications of these 
findings for researchers and practitioners are discussed. 
 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter gives answers to the research questions of this dissertation (8.1), 
discusses limitations of the present research (8.2), possible explanations for anomalies to 
the hypotheses (8.3) and implications for rational choice models of prosocial behavior 
(8.4). Then, a number of relevant results for practitioners and policy makers are discussed 
(8.5). Finally, some directions for future research are recommended (8.6). 
 
Answers to research questions 
What do the results of chapters three to seven teach us about the main research 
questions put forward in the introduction? The first research question of this dissertation 
was:  
 
P1.   To what extent can giving and volunteering behavior be explained by prosocial 
motives and other psychological characteristics of people and the social conditions 
in which they live? 
 
In chapter one I argued that social conditions can motivate people to engage in 
prosocial behavior. Classical theories of social exchange and social cohesion predict that 
people observe social norms when their behavior is monitored by others and future 
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interaction with these others is likely. From a sociological perspective, it was expected in 
hypothesis 1:  
 
H1.    The likelihood of prosocial behavior increases with the frequency of church 
attendance, religious socialization, the level of education, and decreases with 
community size. 
 
However, in many cases there is no prospect of future interaction, and there hardly 
seem to be any social incentives. In these cases, internalised prosocial values or prosocial 
personality characteristics could be the reason why there is still prosocial behavior in the 
absence of material or social incentives. Previous research in social and personality 
psychology suggests that agreeableness, empathic concern and prosocial value 
orientations are characteristic of persons who engage in prosocial behavior. From the 
perspective of personality and social psychology, it was expected in hypothesis 2:  
 
H2.    The likelihood of prosocial behavior increases with the level of agreeableness, 
extraversion, emotional stability, prosocial value orientation, empathic concern 
and perspective taking. 
 
Looking at the results of chapter three to seven summarized in table 8.1, we find 
strong support for hypothesis 1, but only limited support for hypothesis 2. Contributions 
of time, money and body parts for the public good are more often found among the 
higher educated, frequent church attendees, among persons living in more rural 
communities, among persons working more hours for pay, earning higher incomes, and 
among persons who show a higher level of empathic concern. The most distinctive 
characteristics of Dutch citizens who are actively giving and volunteering are not 
psychological characteristics, but social conditions. Psychological characteristics are 
related to prosocial behavior, and explain a significant part of the variance, but this part 
is not very large, and usually smaller than the participation explained by social 
conditions.   
   
Table 8.1.  Effects of psychological characteristics and social conditions in chapters three to seven 
 
  Chapter 3  Chapter 4  Chapter 5  Chapter 6  Chapter 7 
Money Blood  Membership  Volunteering Membership  Volunteering   
Psychological 
characteristics: 
Time Money
Yes/no Amount
Organs
Yes/no Years Yes/no #   Pillarized  Secular  Religious  Secular 
Agreeableness  +  0  0  0  0  + (+) 0 0  0  +  0  0  0 
Extraversion  0 0 (+) (+) (+) 0 0 0  0  +  0  0  +  (+) 
Neuroticism 0  0  0  0  0  (-)  (+)  0  -  0  (+)  (-)  0  0 
Empathic concern   +  +  +  +  0  0  0  +  +  (+)  (+)  +   +  0 
Perspective taking   -  -  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  -  0 
Social value orientation   0  0  0  (+)  (+)  0  0  0  0  0  +  0  0  0 
Relative increase in R
2 NA  25%  16%  35%  18%  67% 37%  25% 36%  29%  14%  NA 
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Social conditions:                          
Income/Hourly wages  0  +  +  +  0  0  -  0  0  0  0  +  NA  NA 
Working  hours  NA  NA  (+) +  0  0 0 0  0  0  +  0  NA NA 
Community  size  -  0 - (-) 0 0  0  0  -  -  -  0  NA  NA 
Church  attendance  0 + (+) +  -  0 0 +  +  +  +  0  +  0 
Level  of  education  + +  +  +  +  + 0 +  +  +  +  +  0  0 
Relative increase in R
2 NA  75%  84%  65%  82%  33% 63%  75% 64%  71%  86%  NA 
 
+ positive relationship; - negative relationship; 0 non significant; (+) marginally significant positive relation; (-) marginally significant negative relation; NA not 
applicable. Relative increase is computed as: (increase in R
2 in model to be evaluated) / (R
2 in final model – R
2 in baseline model including constant, gender and age)   
   
The upper part of table 8.1 shows that agreeableness, neuroticism, perspective 
taking, and social value orientation are often not related to examples of prosocial 
behavior in the predicted positive direction. In some cases, there were even 
counterintuitive effects. For instance, perspective taking was negatively related to 
intentions to give time and money. Explanations for null-findings and counterintuitive 
effects will be discussed below (see 8.2).
* The evidence for effects of individual differences 
in prosocial motives on prosocial behavior is strongest for empathic concern. People with 
a greater tendency to feel empathic emotions show a greater willingness to give money as 
well as time, they are more likely to report monetary donations to charitable causes in the 
past year, report a higher amount donated, are more likely to be a member of a voluntary 
association, especially secular associations, are more likely to volunteer, especially for 
religious and pillarized associations. In addition, people with more empathic concern for 
others respond differently to material, social and psychological incentives for giving and 
volunteering than a rational choice theory would predict (see the discussion below). 
However, empathic concern was not related to post mortem organ donation and blood 
donation.  
In contrast to the results for the hypothesis on prosocial motives and other 
psychological characteristics, social conditions are clearly related to prosocial behavior, 
and usually in the expected direction. With the exception of the number of years served as 
a blood donor, prosocial behavior is more strongly related to the social conditions that 
come along with living in a smaller community, more frequent church attendance, and 
having attained a higher level of education. This conclusion even holds for examples of 
prosocial behavior that are unlikely to generate some form of delayed or generalized 
exchange because there is little or no contact between giver and receiver, such as 
charitable giving, blood donation, and organ donation. The availability of a larger budget 
of money or leisure time, which lowers the price of giving and volunteering, was not 
always facilitating prosocial behavior, or had counterintuitive effects. For instance, hourly 
wages were not related to volunteering, and the number of working hours was positively 
related to blood donation. 
                                                 
* Because effects of religious socialization were not included in all chapters they are not shown in table 8.1. 
In chapter 6, religious socialization did not have significant effects on membership of voluntary associations 
when present religious involvement was included. In chapter 7, Protestant parental denomination decreased 
volunteering for secular associations, even controlling for present religious denomination and church 
attendance. 
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To illustrate the magnitude of the effects of social conditions and psychological 
characteristics, I repeat some of the findings on charitable giving from chapter four. While 
the difference in annual donations between the lowest and the highest percentile on the 
empathy concern-scale was €85, the difference between those who never attend religious 
services (55% of the respondents) and those who attend church more than once a month 
is  €220. The difference between respondents with primary education only and those 
holding a college or university degree is €120 (net of all other variables, including 
household income). The difference in annual donations between the bottom and top 
percentiles of the income distribution in the sample was only €70 (net of all other 
variables). 
In sum: anomalies to rational choice models assuming ‘utility is own money’ can 
mainly be understood as the effects of social conditions, and, to a limited extent, as the 
effects of personality characteristics and prosocial motives.  
An evaluation of the low cost-hypothesis and the weak situation-hypothesis 
The second research question of this dissertation was:  
 
P2.   In which conditions are individual differences in prosocial motives more strongly 
related to giving and volunteering?  
 
This research question was based on the desire to arrive at conditional 
explanations. Two specific conditions were investigated that are often thought to 
moderate the effects of personal attributes. When a specific behavior requires a smaller 
sacrifice of resources, and in ‘weak’, ambiguous situations, psychological characteristics 
are assumed to be more predictive of behavior as in hypothesis 3 and 4:  
 
H3.   Low cost-hypothesis: The stronger the material incentives for prosocial behavior, 
the smaller the effects of psychological characteristics on prosocial behavior. 
 
H4.    Weak situation-hypothesis: The stronger the social incentives for prosocial 
behavior, the weaker the effects of psychological characteristics. 
 
Little support for the low cost-hypothesis 
The low cost-hypothesis argues that when the material costs for a specific behavior 
are lower, this behavior is more likely to be related to personal attributes. This hypothesis  
   
has been offered as a reason why rational choice models often fail to account for a variety 
of non-self interested behaviors, such as voting (Mensch, 2000) or environmental 
behavior (Diekmann, 1996; Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 1998, 2003). Applying the low 
cost-hypothesis to prosocial behavior, it reads: the smaller the material incentives for 
prosocial behavior, the stronger the effects of specific prosocial motives and other 
psychological characteristics on prosocial behavior.  
In this dissertation, the low cost-hypothesis was tested in four ways: (1) by 
comparing effects of prosocial motives among groups that can be assumed to have 
varying opportunity costs for prosocial behavior, (2) by comparing effects of prosocial 
motives on examples of prosocial behavior with material costs that are manipulated to 
vary, (3) by comparing effects of prosocial motives on examples of prosocial behavior 
with material costs that can be assumed to vary, and (4) by comparing effects of prosocial 
motives on the decision to contribute versus the decision how much to contribute.  
The first strategy is based on the argument that persons with higher hourly wages 
face higher opportunity costs for donations of time, and persons with a lower income face 
higher opportunity costs for donations of money. The greater availability of resources 
makes the donation of a unit of time or money a smaller sacrifice for these groups. 
However, very few tests of the low cost-hypothesis using this strategy supported the low 
cost-hypothesis. In the analysis of charitable giving (chapter four), household income did 
not interact at all with empathy, agreeableness or social value orientation. The analyses of 
organ and blood donation produced some positive interaction effects of prosocial motives 
with income (e.g., the effect of social value orientation on post mortem organ donation 
was more strongly positive among higher incomes, and the effects of agreeableness and 
empathic concern on blood donation were more positive among higher incomes), but 
these were not expected because medical donations do not cost money. In the analyses of 
volunteering and membership of voluntary associations in chapter five, the effects of 
prosocial motives and other psychological characteristics did vary with hourly wages, but 
equally often in unexpected and expected directions.  
The second strategy was used explicitly in the analysis of intentions to give money 
or time in the scenario experiment reported in chapter three. Effects of psychological 
incentives, psychological characteristics and prosocial motives were compared in 
hypothetical situations where requests were made for contributions with varying material 
costs. In this study, support for the low cost-hypothesis was limited to the observation 
that contributions of time to collective goods were less likely when they were global 
207 
   
instead of local collective goods, and that this difference became even more pronounced 
when the amount of time requested increased. The efficacy of a contribution did not 
interact with costs, and most of the psychological characteristics did not lose predictive 
power for high cost contributions. In fact, empathic concern was even more predictive of 
intentions to volunteer in high cost- situations than in low cost-situations. 
The third strategy to test the low cost-hypothesis requires a comparison of the 
effects of prosocial motives and other psychological characteristics in chapter four with 
the effects in chapters five, six and seven. Chapter four focused on examples of prosocial 
behavior that are very unlikely to be motivated by self-interest through the expectation of 
some form of delayed or generalized exchange. Donations to charity, blood donation, and 
post mortem organ donation are unilateral gifts, for which no compensation is given. 
Blood donation and post mortem organ donation are anonymous in the sense that the 
recipients cannot be identified. Chapters five, six and seven focused on membership and 
volunteering in nonprofit organizations. These examples of prosocial behavior are not 
anonymous, and may more easily generate some form of delayed or generalized exchange. 
In contrast to the low cost-hypothesis, however, table 8.1 shows that the effects of 
prosocial motives on unilateral, anonymous gifts are not stronger than on civic 
engagement. 
The fourth strategy to test the low cost-hypothesis involves a comparison of 
proportions of variance explained by psychological characteristics (see table 8.1). The low 
cost-hypothesis predicts that decisions whether or not to contribute are more strongly 
related to prosocial motives and other psychological characteristics than decisions on how 
much to contribute. However, only charitable donations and membership of voluntary 
associations show the expected pattern, but not blood donation. The number of years 
served as a blood donor is more strongly related to personality characteristics than to 
indicators of material costs and social conditions. 
In sum, the results with regard to the low cost-hypothesis do not support the 
notion that altruistic behavior is a luxury good (Bekkers & Weesie, 2003; Jencks, 1987; 
Mansbridge, 1990). If altruism were a luxury good, effects of prosocial motives on 
contributions to collective goods should increase as household income rises or hourly 
wages decrease. This was not the case. These results are consistent with results obtained 
in experimental economics, showing that stakes do not affect prosocial behavior in 
ultimatum and dictator games (Camerer, 2003; Cameron, 1999; Bekkers, 2004c). 
  
   
Little support for the weak situation-hypothesis 
The weak situation-hypothesis argues that a specific behavior is less likely to be 
related to psychological characteristics when the social context for this behavior provides 
stronger cues on how to behave. Applied to prosocial behavior, the hypothesis reads: the 
smaller the social incentives for prosocial behavior, the stronger the effects of specific 
prosocial motives and other psychological characteristics on prosocial behavior.  
The weak situation-hypothesis was tested in three ways: (1) by comparing effects 
of prosocial motives among different social groups that can be assumed to have varying 
social incentives for prosocial behavior, (2) by comparing effects of prosocial motives on 
examples of prosocial behavior with social incentives that are manipulated to vary, and 
(3) by comparing effects of prosocial motives on examples of prosocial behavior for 
which the social incentives can be assumed to vary.  
The first strategy involved a comparison of effects of prosocial motives and other 
psychological characteristics among groups with varying degrees of church attendance 
and living in areas varying in degree of urbanization. It is assumed that more frequent 
church attendees and persons living in smaller communities have stronger social incentives 
to contribute to collective goods. Monitoring social behavior is easier in these groups, 
people are more likely to be disapproved of for failures to contribute, and people share a 
longer future together in which a prosocial reputation may pay off in the long run. The 
weak situation-hypothesis predicts that prosocial motives and psychological 
characteristics are less predictive of prosocial behavior among frequent church attendees 
and among persons living in more rural areas. However, the effects of prosocial motives 
and personality characteristics on charitable giving, blood donation, post mortem organ 
donation, membership of voluntary associations and volunteering were not smaller 
among frequent church attendees or persons living in rural environments. These results 
contradict the weak situation-hypothesis.  
A second strategy was used in the scenario experiment that varied the likelihood of 
future interaction with an intermediary person asking for a contribution on behalf of a 
nonprofit organization. However, the analyses mainly produced non-significant 
interactions of social distance with psychological characteristics, one interaction 
supporting the weak situation-hypothesis, and several rejections. In line with the weak 
situation-hypothesis, the positive effect of the likelihood of future interaction with an 
intermediary person asking for a contribution was smaller for persons with a more 
prosocial value orientation. In contrast to the weak situation-hypothesis, however, the 
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satisfaction of a contribution to a local organization increased the willingness to give time 
more strongly when the request was made by a person with whom future interaction was 
more likely. The weak situation-hypothesis predicted that the social rewards obtained by 
fulfilling a request by a more familiar person would make the effect of psychological 
rewards obsolete. Another anomaly was that empathic concern was more predictive of 
intentions to volunteer when requests were made by more familiar persons. 
The third strategy involves a comparison of the effects of prosocial motives on 
examples of prosocial behavior with varying degrees of social incentives. Although none 
of the examples studied in this dissertation is entirely anonymous in the sense that they 
cannot be observed by others at all, it can be assumed that some examples of prosocial 
behavior are harder to observe than others. Likewise, some examples of prosocial 
behavior are less strongly guided by social norms, and are decisions in ‘weak situations’. 
Such situations should give way for the expression of personality characteristics and 
prosocial motives. The weak situation-hypothesis predicts that less observable and less 
normative behaviors should be more strongly related to personality characteristics. 
Charitable giving, blood donation and membership of voluntary associations are 
examples of prosocial behavior that are harder to observe than volunteering. The social 
pressure to engage in charitable giving, blood donation, and membership of voluntary 
associations can be assumed to be less strong than choices with regard to post mortem 
organ donation and volunteering. Once again, table 8.1 provides the data to test the 
predictions. In contrast to the weak situation-hypothesis, the relative increase in the 
proportion of variance explained due to personality characteristics is not lower for 
volunteering and post mortem organ donation than for charitable giving, blood donation 
and membership of voluntary associations. Quite the contrary: the relative increase due to 
personality characteristics is similar for volunteering, membership and post mortem organ 
donation (about 35%), but substantially lower for charitable giving (25%) and blood 
donation (18%). 
 
  
   
8.2. LIMITATIONS 
 
The conclusions drawn above can be challenged on several grounds. 
First, it can be argued that the effects of personality characteristics are 
underestimated because the analyses focused on ‘single act criteria’. Trait descriptions of 
persons are intended as descriptions of general tendencies in behavior across a variety of 
situations (Krahé, 1992; Mischel, 1968). In single instances, however, the correlation of 
trait descriptions with behavior is low because every single criterion for a given trait 
measures the underlying dimension with some degree of unreliability (Epstein 1979; Ajzen 
& Fishbein 1980, 86-7; Amelang & Borkenau 1986). Trait descriptions are probably 
more strongly related to aggregate indices of behavior than to single act criteria (Epstein, 
1979; Epstein & O’Brien, 1985). To address this criticism, table 8.2 shows the results of 
an analysis of an index of prosocial behavior. The index combines the number of 
prosocial responses to the scenarios analyzed in chapter five, the number of memberships 
in voluntary associations, the number of volunteer jobs, the amount given to charitable 
causes, blood donation, and organ donation. For each of these behaviors, the respondents 
received a score of 1 if they displayed the behavior (in case of dichotomous variables) or 
scored above average, and a score of 0 if they scored below average (in case of ordinal 
variables). Then, the number of times that the respondents belonged to the more prosocial 
group was counted. Scores on the altruism index ranged from 0 to 6. About one in ten 
respondents did not display any of the six prosocial behaviors and received an altruism 
score of 0 (n=201, 12.9%). About a quarter of the respondents displayed one behavior 
(27.6%), and about the same proportion displayed two (26.5%). The proportions for the 
other altruism scores are 19.1% (3 behaviors), 10.3% (4), 2.90% (5) and 0.6% (6). 
Because this distribution is not normal, an ordinal logistic regression analysis was 
conducted. In addition, clustering of multiple observations within households were taken 
into account, the Huber/White sandwich estimator was used to obtain robust standard 
errors. Respondents with missing values (n=30) were excluded from the analysis. The 
mean altruism score was 2.00. The altruism score was analyzed with the same regression 
models that were used in chapters six and seven (see table 8.2).  
The results give further support to the conclusions drawn above. We see that 
people with higher levels of empathic concern engage in a greater number of prosocial 
behaviors. In addition, social value orientation has a small positive relation with the 
number of prosocial behaviors. However, we see no effects of agreeableness and 
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perspective taking. Neuroticism decreases the number of prosocial behaviors. The level of 
education is the strongest predictor of the altruism index: the higher educated engage in a 
higher number of prosocial behaviors. A lower level of urbanization is also associated 
with a higher number of prosocial behaviors. Income and working hours are not 
substantially related to the altruism index. A comparison of model III and IV shows that 
social conditions sometimes mediate effects of psychological characteristics. Additional 
analyses showed that the level of education mediates parts of the relationships of 
empathic concern and neuroticism with the altruism index, while church attendance and 
the level of urbanization mediated a part of the relationship of social value orientation 
with the altruism index. Model V shows a positive interaction of hourly wages with social 
value orientation, which is in contrast to the low cost-hypothesis. The interactions of 
personality characteristics with wages are not substantial. The weak situation-hypothesis 
also did not receive support in this analysis. Church attendance did not interact 
substantially with personality characteristics and prosocial motives, while the level of 
urbanization interacted with agreeableness and perspective taking in opposite directions. 
The relative increase of the proportion of explained variance in table 8.2 
strengthens the conclusion drawn above that individual differences in personality 
characteristics and prosocial motives are not very predictive of prosocial behavior; not 
even when ‘a multiple act criterion’ is used. Individual differences in prosocial motives are 
of minor importance for many types of prosocial behavior. More than two thirds of the 
increase in explained variance is due to social characteristics. In contrast to the weak and 
inconsistent effects of prosocial motives, a positive effect of the level of education on 
prosocial behavior was found in almost all of the analyses. These relationships indicate 
that social incentives are crucial for all types of giving and volunteering, even for more 
anonymous examples of prosocial behavior.  
   
Table 8.2.  Ordered logistic regression analysis of altruism index (n=1494) 
 
Female  -.09 (.10) -.04 (.11)   -.16 (.11)  -.11 (.13)   -.12 (.13)
Age  .07 (.06) .10 (.06)   .11 (.06)  .19 (.07) **  .19 (.07) ** 
Agreeableness  -.03 (.07)   -.08 (.07)  -.06 (.07)   -.07 (.07)  
Conscientiousness  -.07 (.06)   -.08 (.06)  -.07 (.06)   -.07 (.05)  
Extraversion  .11 (.06) (*)  .12 (.06)  (*)  .12 (.06) (*)  .12 (.06) * 
Neuroticism  -.15 (.06) *  -.16 (.06)  **  -.12 (.06) (*)  -.12 (.06) (*) 
Openness   .02 (.06)   .01 (06)  -.02 (06)   -.02 (06)
Perspective taking   .01 (.06)  -.05 (.06)   -.05 (.06)
Empathic concern  .18 (.07)  *  .16 (.07) *  .16 (.07) * 
Prosocial value orientation (0-1)  .31 (.12)  *  .25 (.12) *  .24 (.12) (*) 
Working hours  .07 (.08)   .07 (.08)
Household income  -.13 (.07) (*)  -.10 (.07) (*) 
Education  .50 (.07) *** .50 (.07) *** 
Church attendance  .13 (.08) (*)  .11 (.08) (*) 
Urbanization  -.15 (.06) *  -.15 (.06) * 
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Wages*agreeableness  -.08 (.04)
Wages*perspective taking  .08 (.08)
Wages*empathic concern   -.04 (.08)
Wages*social value orientation  .16 (.05) *** 
Attendance*agreeableness  .03 (.08)
Attendance*perspective taking   .08 (.07)
Attendance*empathic concern  -.06 (.07)
Attendance*social value orientation  .08 (.07)
Urbanization*agreeableness  -.12 (.07) (*) 
Urbanization*perspective taking   .12 (.07) (*) 
Urbanization*empathic concern  -.05 (.08)
Urbanization*social value orientation   -.01 (.06)
Wald Chi Square (df)  2.51 (2)  19.6 (7)  40.72 (10)  124.12 (15)  151.39 (27) 
Pseudo R
2 .0007  .0059  .0121  .0362  .0429 
Relative increase R
2 ----  14.6%  17.5%  67.9%  ----- 
Relative increase R
2 ----  12.3%  14.7%  57.1%  15.9% 
 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10.   
   
Second, it can be argued that not all relevant psychological characteristics 
potentially related to prosocial behavior have been measured in the FSDP2000. For 
instance, previous research suggests that self-esteem (Cohen, Vigoda & Samorly, 2000; 
Janoski, Musick & Wilson, 1998), locus of control (Allen & Rushton, 1983; Lefcourt, 
1976), and other indicators of personality strength (Dekker, 2003; Scheufele & Shah, 
2000) are positively related to volunteering. Given the effect of generalized social trust on 
charitable giving (Bekkers, 2003c) the same probably holds for donors. However, these 
characteristics have not been measured in the FSDP2000, which may have led to an 
underestimation of the effects of psychological characteristics on prosocial behavior. To 
some extent this argument is valid. However, to some extent the potential effects of 
indicators of personality strength have been accounted for by including all dimensions of 
the Big Five in the analyses, even those that were not expected to be related to prosocial 
behavior. Personality strength is negatively related to neuroticism (Robins, Tracy, 
Trzesniewski, Potter & Gosling, 2001). In the absence of indicators for personality 
strength, neuroticism picks up the unmeasured effects of these indicators. Similar lines of 
reasoning can be made for other personality characteristics that were not measured. To 
the extent that the Five Factor Model is a truly comprehensive description of the general 
dimensions of personality, unmeasured personality characteristics can be considered as 
subfacets of these dimensions. Although the effects of these specific subfacets of the ‘Big 
Five’ on behavioural criteria may be underestimated using global scores (Paunonen & 
Ashton, 2001), a substantial part of their effects will be represented by global ‘Big Five’-
scores. In addition, it is unlikely that this argument has much force for an aggregate 
altruism index. Finally, the argument that some independent variables have not been 
measured can be made much more forcefully for social conditions. For instance, the 
analyses reported in chapter three to five did not contain measures of occupational 
prestige and marital status, only chapter six contained measures of religious 
denomination, and none of the chapters contained measures of length of residence, house 
ownership, civic engagement in youth, or the number of children in the household. All of 
these characteristics are known to be related to charitable giving and volunteering 
(Gouwenberg et al., 2003; Bekkers, 2003a). 
Third, it is unknown which mechanisms are responsible for the effects of socio-
demographic characteristics on prosocial behavior. Church attendance, the level of 
urbanization, and especially the level of education are ‘bags of all sorts’: variables that 
may indicate a variety of mechanisms, not only of a social nature. Because the FSDP2000 
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did not contain measures of social networks, expected sanctions for violation of social 
norms, and so on, I have no direct evidence showing that the effects of what I have called 
‘social conditions’ are actually due to social incentives, as I have argued in the 
introduction. However, other research has shown that the effect of church attendance on 
giving and volunteering is mainly due to the size and composition of social networks, and 
the greater exposure to mobilization attempts through these networks (Bekkers, 2000, 
2003a; Jackson et al., 1995; Lam, 2002; Park & Smith, 2000; Regnerus, Smith & 
Sikkink, 1989; Smidt, 1999; Wilson & Janoski, 1995). The argument for the level of 
urbanization is that people in smaller communities probably have more dense networks, 
in which prosocial behavior pays off in the long run and is enforced by social obligations 
(Coleman, 1990). Although other mechanisms may be at work in the effects of religion 
(Bekkers, 2003a) and community size (Oliver, 2001), social incentives are probably the 
most active ingredient. The effect of the level of education, however, could be due to a 
variety of mechanisms. For this variable, I would agree with the criticism that there may 
be non-social mechanisms at work, although I still think that social incentives are the 
major factor (see 8.3 below). 
Fourth, it can be argued that the measures of psychological characteristics were not 
valid and reliable enough. Previous research has shown that assessments of social value 
orientation are very sensitive to priming effects (Bekkers, 2004b) threatening the validity 
of the measure. In addition, the adjective checklist used to measure the ‘Big Five’ 
contained only 30 items, while more comprehensive personality inventories are available 
which probably provide more reliable measures. To some extent, I would agree with the 
first point about the validity of the measure of social value orientation, but I disagree with 
the argument about the reliability of the ‘Big Five’. The validity of the assessment of social 
value orientation is probably decreased because the respondents completed other 
questions of the write-in questionnaire first. However, the questions on prosocial 
behavior were placed after the assessment of social value orientation. If the responses in 
the social value orientation measure were distorted, they cannot be affected by the 
criterion variables. The reliability coefficients of the ‘Big Five’ measures are all in the .80s. 
Increasing the number of items would not substantially increase the reliabilities (Gosling, 
Rentfrow & Swann, 2003). In addition, the socio-demographic variables are also 
measured with a degree of unreliability.  
 
  
   
8.3. EXPLANATIONS FOR ANOMALIES 
 
Why were the hypotheses on the effects of psychological characteristics such as 
agreeableness, perspective taking and social value orientation not supported? Research on 
agreeableness has focused largely on prosocial behavior in interpersonal contexts (Jensen-
Campbell & Graziano, 2001; Branje, Van Lieshout & Van Aken, 2004). It is not unlikely 
that people who are more strongly engaged in informal helping behavior view themselves 
as more helpful and sympathetic. Helping a neighbor is not the same as volunteering for 
an association with some collective goal, although both are examples of prosocial 
behavior. The scenario experiment in chapter three showed that the predictive power of 
agreeableness for intended prosocial behavior is limited to cases where the request is made 
on behalf of local nonprofit organizations. The negative effect of perspective taking in 
some analyses also calls for an explanation. Why would people who are more able to take 
the perspective of others be less likely to give money to charitable causes? Looking again 
at the items that were used to measure perspective taking, the possibility rises that they 
reflect the world view of the actor as conceived in a rational choice perspective on 
collective action: fully conscious of the negligible effects of his contributions for the 
provision of public goods. The lack of significant or substantial effects of social value 
orientation is probably due to the fact that the measurement instrument is very sensitive, 
and has a low degree of longitudinal stability (Bekkers, 2004b). 
The null findings and the anomalies to the low cost-hypothesis discussed above 
raise the question what is wrong with the low cost-hypothesis. It not very likely that the 
low cost-hypothesis was rejected because of a faulty test, because the test was conducted 
in four different ways. I think that the arguments on which the low cost-hypothesis was 
based were too general and simplistic. The argument that psychological rewards must be 
the reason why people still display prosocial behavior even in very unfavorable 
circumstances is probably valid. When prosocial behavior conflicts with self-interest, 
those who are motivated by empathic concern or an altruistic self-identity display 
prosocial behavior (see chapter four). However, there is no evidence that the effect of 
psychological rewards is larger when material incentives also guide people towards 
prosocial behavior. It seems that material and psychological rewards simply add up. 
When prosocial behavior coincides with self-interest, or deviates less from self-interest, it 
is ‘overdetermined’. Altruism in general is not a luxury good. Empathic concern is a basic 
phenomenon in our lives: we observe altruistic behavior in good times and in bad times, 
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among the wealthy as well as the poor. The wealthy give more to charity than the poor 
simply because they have more money to give, not because they have more ‘noble’ 
motives or because it is cheaper to translate these motives in prosocial behavior. In sum, 
the low cost-hypothesis must be rejected in its general form. The low cost-hypothesis may 
be true for a limited set of behaviors, such as environmental behavior (Diekmann, 1996) 
and specific types of donations such as monetary gifts to health related charities (Bekkers 
& Weesie, 2003), but as a general rule it does not hold.  
The question is not why the low cost-hypothesis was not supported, but rather 
why the idea is so appealing - although it is not true. Perhaps it has something to do with 
the ‘norm of self-interest’. People generally believe that self-interest is the rule, and 
altruistic behavior the exception (Bekkers, 2002c; Miller & Ratner, 1998; Smith, 2003), 
even when their own behavior is not in their self-interest (Bekkers, 2002c). The dominant 
theories on prosocial behavior in the social sciences (e.g., Lenski, 1966, p. 30) reinforce 
this belief (Kohn, 1990). This belief undermines prosocial behavior: those who hold more 
cynical beliefs about their fellow citizens are less likely to engage in prosocial behavior 
(Smith, 2003; Bekkers, 2003c). In many situations, it is more legitimate to engage in 
prosocial behavior when there is some aspect of self-interest involved. Altruistic behavior 
raises suspicion. People do not want to be known as a ‘do-gooder’ (“Ik ben gekke Henkie 
niet”). When people engage in prosocial behavior, the argument that it did not take much 
effort is a socially acceptable excuse (Holmes, Miller & Lerner, 2002; Miller, 1999). This 
‘self-interest’ motive talk, however, does not reflect a truly declining effect of prosocial 
motives on prosocial behavior as the costs get higher.  
The mixed findings with regard to the weak situation-hypothesis also call attention 
to the need for a more specific perspective. I still think that the strength of social norms in 
specific contexts can influence the effects of personality characteristics. However, social 
norms need not always suppress the effects of personality characteristics, as suggested in 
the example of the suppressed effect of extraversion at a funeral. For instance, consider 
the example of condolences after the funeral. In this situation, social norms prescribe 
empathy, and those with a disposition to feel empathic concern are more likely conform 
to this norm than those without this disposition. This issue will be discussed more 
elaborately in the recommendations for future research below. 
 
  
   
8.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
 
Economists have tried to deal with the puzzle of prosocial behavior in two ways: 
with models of pure altruism - also called the public goods models - and impure altruism - 
also called the ‘joy of giving’ or ‘warm glow’-models (Halfpenny, 1999; Ribar & 
Wilhelm, 2002). Both models assume some type of psychic income. In the pure altruism 
or public goods model (Becker 1974), people are interested in the fortune of others: they 
try to maximize the welfare of others with a donation of own resources. According to this 
model, contributions to charitable causes increase as the receiving organizations are more 
efficient in improving the welfare of the needy. In contrast, the impure altruism or warm 
glow model (Andreoni 1989, 1990) relies on the intuition that people are often more 
strongly interested in the act of giving itself than in the exact consequences of their gift for 
the welfare of others. In the warm glow model, the act of giving is valued in itself, because 
it makes the giver feel good about him- or herself. The warm glow of giving can be seen 
as a selective incentive that makes it worthwhile for an individual to contribute private 
resources to the benefit of others. To date, most of the evidence gathered in economics 
cannot be reconciled with the public goods model and supports the warm glow model 
(Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002). 
The results of this dissertation show that conventional models of altruistic behavior 
lack a very important – if not the most important – factor: the social incentives for a 
contribution. Prosocial behavior is more consistently and more strongly related to the 
social conditions in which people live than to measures of prosocial motives or other 
preferences. Being a part of a network in which prosocial behavior is prescribed, 
applauded and monitored increases the likelihood that people will engage in prosocial 
behavior. Even intentions to give and volunteer and prosocial behaviors that are hard to 
observe are related to church attendance, the level of urbanization, and the level of 
education. Recently, economists have started to pay attention to the social incentives for 
giving (Harbaugh, 1998; Soetevent, 2003; Van de Ven, 2003). These models are based on 
the desire for prestige, as in the classic idea of noblesse oblige (Homans, 1974). In the 
Netherlands, however, charitable giving is not a common strategy to signal wealth. In 
addition, the prestige motive cannot explain the effects of social conditions on gifts of 
time. Social incentives for prosocial behavior are probably better understood as effects of 
integration in cohesive social groups (Akerlof, 1997, p. 1007; Coleman, 1990; Durkheim, 
1897).  
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Furthermore, the effects of empathic concern also point to the role of altruistic 
motivations in giving and volunteering. The items in this scale do not refer to the positive 
effects of giving on relieving a negative mood, but to the emotional responsiveness to 
other people’s misfortune. Chapter three showed that the greater willingness of more 
empathic persons to give and volunteer is even more pronounced when the costs increase. 
This is not to say that there is no joy of giving; experiments in social psychology have 
convincingly shown that people may engage in helping behavior to relieve a negative 
mood state (Schroeder et al., 1995). Future research should try to identify what 
constitutes the ‘joy of giving’, and its relation to social incentives and psychological 
motives for altruistic behavior such as empathic concern and altruistic social values 
(Smith, 2003). 
Finally, the results of this dissertation show that decisions to contribute to 
collective goods are not simply the outcome of subtracting all types of costs from all types 
of benefits (cf. Stroebe & Frey, 1982). The weights of material, social, and psychological 
costs and benefits in this decision depend on each other, but in a complex manner that is 
not captured by the low cost-hypothesis or the weak situation-hypothesis. In addition, the 
weights of material, social, and psychological incentives vary systematically between 
individuals with specific characteristics. A striking result was that more empathic 
individuals are less strongly discouraged by increasing costs of volunteering. This finding 
supports the argument that empathic emotions are an important ingredient of altruistic 
motivation for prosocial behavior (Batson, 1991, 1998). 
 
8.5. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS 
 
What do the results of chapters four to nine imply for practitioners, who are 
seeking new members, volunteers or donors for their nonprofit organization? Many 
organizations relying on volunteers have recently expressed their concern about a general 
decline in the number of volunteers, and especially about the declining willingness among 
younger people and new or potential volunteers to commit themselves for a longer period 
of time. The results of chapters three to seven shed some light upon these issues.  
  
   
A declining willingness to volunteer? 
Chapter three shows that the willingness to volunteer is fairly high: about 50% of 
the Dutch population says to be willing to help out someone asking for volunteers for a 
nonprofit organization. Although this figure may be overestimated, it suggests that there 
is still a reservoir of potential volunteers, that can be called upon for specific tasks. Even 
when these people are episodic volunteers, who do not wish to be involved deeply in an 
organization, they can be very useful. Although the volunteer labor force in the 
Netherlands is becoming older (Bekkers, 2002b; Knulst & Van Eijck, 2003), and 
practitioners say it is harder to find young volunteers, the willingness to volunteer was not 
lower among younger people. Older persons even expressed a lower willingness to 
volunteer. The result in chapter seven that volunteerism is passed from one generation to 
the next implies that volunteers do not disappear from one moment to the next. About 
half of the Dutch population remembers their parents as volunteers. These people will 
probably volunteer some time during their life. Nevertheless, results of chapter six and 
seven show that there is a kernel of truth in the complaints about a declining willingness 
to volunteer. The complaints mainly come from pillarized associations, who have to rely 
upon a generation of volunteers that is becoming older and older (Knulst & Van Eijck, 
2003). Younger people are less likely to be socialized in a religious environment and to go 
to church, and therefore, pillarized associations are less attractive to them. These 
organizations will probably have even more problems finding young volunteers in the 
future (Bekkers, 2002b). 
 
Effective recruitment strategies 
The results of the empirical chapters give some insights in how organizations can 
attract new members, donors, and volunteers. Which recruitment strategies are more 
likely to work? The finding in the scenario experiment chapter three that the efficacy of 
the requested activity for promoting collective welfare increases the willingness to 
volunteer implies that organizations seeking volunteers should think about how they can 
make the work more efficient and give their volunteers the idea that the work they are 
doing is useful. The main finding in chapter three was that the relationship of the person 
asking for volunteers to the potential volunteer is crucial: requests for volunteers are more 
effective when they are made by a person who is more likely to be encountered in the 
future and who is important for the ‘target’. This means that organizations seeking 
volunteers should try to recruit volunteers with a large and dense network of friends and 
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relatives, and have them recruit new volunteers. A recent study (Bekkers, 2004a) based on 
the ‘Giving in the Netherlands’-Panel Survey draws similar conclusions, and shows that 
persons recruited through strong ties also tend to stay longer. Chapter six showed that 
younger people can be attracted by offering selective incentives. Organizations that do not 
wish to offer selective incentives but are seeking new members should advertise their 
activities as a part of a postmaterialistic lifestyle, focusing on the intrinsic rewards of 
participation. 
 
The role of education  
The results of this dissertation also have broader implications for policy makers. 
The repeated observation that the level of education is positively related to prosocial 
behavior suggests that an investment in a higher level of education of the population will 
produce a stronger civil society. Higher educated people are more likely to give blood, to 
donate their organs after death, they are more often members of voluntary associations, 
volunteer more often, and give more money to charitable causes. Chapter six showed that 
the negative effects of secularization on voluntary association membership have been 
compensated (among other things) by the increase in the level of education that took 
place in the previous decades. Because the process of secularization is expected to 
continue, a further increase in the level of education is needed to keep our civil society in 
good shape. When the religious factor in civil society gradually diminishes, and the level 
of education becomes the main factor, a new problem arises: a growing inequality in 
participation. Because religion was so important for civic engagement in the pillarized 
social system, and religious participation was hardly correlated with social status, 
participation in voluntary associations in the Netherlands used to be distributed fairly 
equally over the population, compared to other countries (Verba, Nie & Kim, 1978; 
Ellemers, 1968). To make participation in voluntary associations more attractive for the 
lower educated, and to make the lower educated more valuable as volunteers, 
opportunities can be provided to gain knowledge and skills through training programs 
within voluntary organizations. Recent cutbacks in government subsidies for nonprofit 
organizations will make it harder to offer such programs, and will increase membership 
fees. These developments will probably increase social inequality in civic engagement and 
reduce the potential for social integration of civil society (Bekkers, 2003d). 
 
  
   
8.6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
8.6.1. Substantial issues 
The altruistic personality - “In which contexts does the altruistic personality 
become apparent?” one article asked more than a decade ago (Carlo et al., 1991). This 
dissertation shows there is no easy answer to this question. The effects of prosocial 
personality characteristics on prosocial behavior are subtle. They differ strongly between 
types of prosocial behavior. However, the logic behind these differential effects is not 
specified correctly by the low cost-hypothesis or the weak situation-hypothesis. To 
understand this complexity, we need a more specific perspective on the effects of 
personality characteristics on prosocial behavior. Buss (1986) argues that people with 
specific personality characteristics may select themselves or are selected by others in 
specific types of situations. The principle of selection can be used to gain insight in how 
personality characteristics are related to prosocial behavior and in some of the findings in 
this dissertation. For example, consider the differential effects of personality 
characteristics on the incidence of blood donation and volunteering versus the intensity of 
these behaviors in table 8.1. Whether or not people donate blood or volunteer for a 
nonprofit organization is not very strongly related to personality characteristics. In 
contrast, how many years people serve as a blood donor, or how many hours they 
volunteer, is more strongly related to personality characteristics than to social conditions. 
Previous research has shown that the selection of volunteers is essentially a social process. 
Greater proximity to volunteers in a social network enhances the likelihood of being 
asked, and the likelihood of compliance with the request to give time. However, when 
people have become active as a volunteer or blood donor, the decision how much time to 
spend volunteering or how long to continue serving as a blood donor is affected by 
prosocial motives. Another example of selection processes is that church attendance 
mediated effects of empathic concern on volunteering in chapter five. Probably, more 
empathic individuals are more strongly attracted to religion and church meetings. A final 
example of selection could be the finding that extraversion was found to be very 
characteristic of volunteers in chapters five and seven, but not of intentions to volunteer 
in chapter three. It is quite possible that extraverted behavior signals capacities that are 
useful for voluntary associations, and attract the attention of people who are prospecting 
for volunteers, although extraversion itself is not related to a greater willingness to give 
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time. To map these selection processes, future research should take the degree of exposure 
to requests for contributions into account, using longitudinal data collections. 
The virtues of higher education - The largest puzzle that remains is why education 
promotes prosocial behavior. In almost every analysis a positive effect of education on 
prosocial behavior was found. However, we do not have a clear idea of why this should 
be the case. We have seen that greater perspective taking abilities and the availability of a 
greater financial budget cannot explain why the higher educated are more likely to give 
money, blood, organs, and time, because these variables were taken into account in the 
analyses. But there are numerous other possibilities: the higher educated have more 
cognitive capacities to understand the needs of others and the consequences of defection 
in social dilemma situations; these capacities make them more attractive as volunteers; 
they have larger networks, which makes them more likely to be asked for a contribution; 
they have higher levels of self-esteem and self-efficacy, which increase psychological 
rewards of prosocial behavior; they may have higher levels of moral reasoning, they may 
experience a greater personal and social responsibility for public welfare; a greater 
concern for fairness and social justice; a more internal locus of control; a higher level of 
trust in fellow citizens; and a longer time horizon, indicating a greater concern for the 
future and higher abilities to delay gratification, to name just a few. I consider this the 
major task for research on prosocial behavior in the future: explaining the effect of 
education.  
Exposure - Requests for donations of time and money are not randomly 
distributed among the population. Fundraising campaigns target previous donors and the 
wealthy; voluntary associations are prospecting for participants among those categories 
that can easily be reached and who have more human capital because their labor is more 
valuable. However, it is largely unknown how the exposure to requests for contributions 
to collective goods intermediates and/or moderates the effects of social and psychological 
characteristics on prosocial behavior. There is some preliminary evidence that higher 
contributions to secular charities (Bekkers, 2003a, p. 161) and a higher likelihood of 
volunteering for both religious (Bekkers, 2003a, p. 163) as well as secular associations 
(Bekkers, 2003a, p. 164) are correlated to a more extensive exposure to fundraising 
attempts. Future research should tease out the exposure effect in the analysis of giving and 
volunteering.  
The dynamics of volunteering - Civic engagement has been treated in the analyses 
as a static phenomenon. This is a strong simplification. A less simplified - but still  
   
schematic - account of volunteering scheme version distinguishes between three stages (see 
table 8.3). Not all persons are equally likely to make a decision about volunteering or 
donations to charitable causes. Decisions about donations and volunteering occur only 
after people have become acquainted with an opportunity to donate or volunteer. Chapter 
two showed that two thirds of the volunteers have not taken this decision themselves, but 
were recruited by someone else. Comparable statistics for charitable donations are 
lacking, but it is likely that the proportion of spontaneous donations is even lower. In the 
first stage, therefore, the relevant decision maker is the voluntary associations seeking new 
volunteers or donors. Because voluntary associations will try to recruit donors and 
volunteers who are more valuable as a source of support and more willing to give, they 
will selectively target specific populations (Brady, Schlozman & Verba, 1999). Whether 
people are exposed to recruitment attempts depends not only on their attractiveness as a 
donor or volunteer (financial and human capital), but also on the size and composition of 
their social network (social capital). 
In the second stage, people may or may not start volunteering. In this stage, 
whether people get involved as a volunteer depends on the costs and benefits of giving 
and volunteering. Costs and benefits may be of a material, social, and psychological 
nature. The costs of participation again depend on the stock of resources: for those with 
higher amounts of financial, human, and social capital, the costs of participation will be 
lower. The benefits of participation may depend on social values (e.g., social value 
orientation, postmaterialism) and personality characteristics (extraverted people may 
receive more intrinsic rewards for volunteering; empathically concerned persons derive 
utility from benefiting others).  
In the third stage, volunteers decide about their level of engagement. Do they 
continue volunteering, and if so, how much time do they spend volunteering? Whether 
people continue participation probably depends on personality characteristics, specific 
aspects of the volunteer work, and the interaction between them. Do volunteers find their 
work interesting, are they supported by the organization, do they receive support from 
fellow volunteers? Does their work match their expectations, and their personality? The 
effect of organizational characteristics on attachment to volunteering is often ignored in 
ordinary survey research (for an exception, see Pearce, 1993). Volunteers think that 
extrinsic rewards can attract new volunteers, but that continuation of volunteering 
depends on intrinsic rewards (Clary & Snyder, 1991). When the costs of volunteering 
outweigh the benefits, people may end their volunteer work. The same probably holds for 
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the intensity of engagement. How many hours people volunteer depends more strongly on 
personality characteristics than on socio-demographic characteristics. Future research 
should investigate the dynamics of volunteering, taking organizational and personality 
characteristics into account.  
 
Table 8.3.  A three step model of the volunteering career 
 
Stage 1: Being asked  Stage 2: Being able  Stage 3: Being motivated 
Non-participation 
↓ 
Non-participation 
↑ 
Discontinue participation 
↑ 
Considering participation  → Start participation → Continue  participation 
Exposure (social capital)  Social pressure  Motives and personality 
Resources (financial and 
human capital) 
Resources (financial, human 
and social capital) 
Organizational characteristics
 
Social networks - The Family Survey of the Dutch Population did not contain a 
questionnaire on social networks. Elsewhere, I have investigated the role of social 
networks for membership of voluntary associations, volunteering, and charitable giving, 
together with colleagues from the ICS (Bekkers, Völker, Van der Gaag & Flap, 
forthcoming). We found that the characteristics of social networks are strongly related to 
civic engagement. Omitting social networks, the relative effects of personality 
characteristics - as opposed to social characteristics - are likely to be overestimated. In 
future research with my colleagues, I hope to uncover how social networks are promoting 
civic engagement over the life course. 
Socialization - Chapter seven showed that parental volunteering increases the 
likelihood that their children volunteer, and that this transmission of volunteerism cannot 
easily be explained by a mechanism of direct social influence. It was assumed that 
internalized values are the explaining mechanism. Future research should try to establish 
which values parents promote when they volunteer, and how these values affect the 
volunteering career of their children. Research by Janoski, Musick & Wilson (1998) gives 
some ideas about which values could be important. They show that civic duty, tolerance, 
and feelings of self-efficacy are driving volunteerism throughout the life course. However, 
the other characteristics that were mentioned above in the discussion about the education-
effect could also be important.  
   
 
8.6.2. Methodological issues 
Experimental methods - The majority of papers in this dissertation used survey 
data. Chapter three showed how the benefits of the experimental method can be 
combined with the advantages of a large random sampling survey in the study of 
intentions to give. Future research would benefit strongly from a combination of the 
survey method with experimental methods and observations of actual prosocial behavior. 
The scenario method is also an excellent way to measure social norms (e.g., Horne, 2003) 
and preferences for social situations based on personality characteristics (e.g., Bem & 
Lord, 1979). Observation of actual prosocial behavior in a survey context (Bekkers, 
2004b) reduces concerns for a social desirability bias. Such data provide a unique 
opportunity to check the validity of self-reports on giving and volunteering. Future 
research would also benefit from field studies of charitable giving (e.g., List & Lucking-
Riley, 2002). This requires a closer cooperation of scholars with practitioners. Together 
with economists and fundraisers, I hope to do some work in this area in the future. 
Longitudinal studies of civic engagement - Finally, I would like to stress again the 
utility of conducting panel studies of civic engagement. The evidence on the ‘effects’ of 
personality characteristics, prosocial motives, and social conditions presented in the 
previous chapters relies on classical theories and cross-sectional data. Although the idea 
that persons with specific personality characteristics select themselves or are selected into 
specific types of voluntary associations is probably more true than the idea that people’s 
personalities change due to participation in voluntary associations, cross-sectional data 
cannot show which is the stronger effect. This issue, and many others, can be addressed 
by panel studies of civic engagement. For instance, the claim from the literature on social 
capital that civic engagement breeds trust and a host of other social values and attitudes 
(Hooghe, 2001) can only be verified or rejected adequately with longitudinal data. As 
long as these data are not available, retrospective data on participation in youth are the 
best alternative (Bekkers, 2001b; Hooghe, 2003; Hooghe & Bekkers, 2004). The idea that 
specific types of social networks are conducive to civic engagement can only be tested 
adequately when the effects that civic engagement has on social networks can be 
eliminated (Bekkers, Völker, Van der Gaag & Flap, forthcoming). We know a lot about 
how volunteering changes over the life course, but hardly anything about how charitable 
giving changes in response to life-cycle experiences and economic hardship or prosperity. 
The ‘Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey’ (Schuyt, 2003), with the second wave 
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planned for May 2004 and a third for 2006, provides an excellent opportunity to study 
these issues more adequately with longitudinal data. I am glad to be involved in this 
project - although, technically speaking, my current involvement would qualify as 
‘volunteer work’ - and I hope to remain involved in this project in the future. Appendix A 
Family Survey of the Dutch Population 2000 
 
Introduction 
This appendix discusses the third edition of the Family Survey of the Dutch 
Population, the dataset that will be used in the chapters to follow (‘Familie enquete 
Nederlandse Bevolking 2000’, abbreviated as FSDP2000). Previous editions of the Family 
Survey of the Dutch Population took place in 1992-1993 and 1998. The survey was 
designed by collegues of the ICS-Nijmegen (De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp & Ultee, 
2000), based on the previous editions. The actual field work was carried out by an 
external organization, the ‘Institute for applied sociology’, (ITS), Nijmegen. The data 
were collected from March to August 2000. The field work consisted of a written 
questionnaire and a computer assisted personal interview (CAPI). For reasons of 
efficiency, the CAPI-procedure contained as many questions as possible. These questions 
were about membership in voluntary organizations, participation in voluntary work, 
donation of blood and organs. Interviewers who were especially trained for this survey 
conducted the CAPI. Upon completion, the interviewer gave the write-in questionnaire to 
be completed later. The write-in questionnaire contained questions that were deemed to 
be more vulnerable to social desirability concerns: these were the questions about 
parenting, religious socialization, prosocial dispositions, monetary donations to charity, 
and the scenarios. 
 
Sampling procedure and data collection 
The Family Survey of the Dutch Population used a two stage stratified sample of 
individuals in households. In the first stage, a random sample of municipalities in the 
Netherlands, stratified according to urbanization level, was drawn. In the second stage, a 
sample of persons aged 18-70 years was drawn from the population registers of these 
municipalities. In total, 864 persons agreed to participate. Of these primary respondents, 
723 partners also participated in the study. 164 primary respondents formed single person 
households. The net response rate was 40,6 percent, which is not unusual for personal 
interviews in the Netherlands. Later, additional data were collected among parents, 
siblings and children of the primary respondents. These questionnaires did not contain 
information about prosocial behavior, and were not used. 
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The use of multiple respondents from the same family implies that observations are 
dependent, which violates an assumption that is often made in statistical models. In 
general, clustering of individual characteristics in larger units affects the standard errors 
of parameter estimates, not the size of estimates (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). When 
clustered observations are treated as independent observations, the standard errors are 
minimized artificially. This will lead to a larger number of significant effects. To obtain 
correct estimates of the standard errors, the Huber/White Sandwich estimator of variance 
was used (Huber, 1967) in all multivariate analyses.  
The dataset was representative of the Dutch population aged 18 - 70 on some 
demographic characteristics (e.g., urbanization and gender), but not on others (age and 
region). To correct for under- and overrepresentation in specific categories, a weight 
variable was created (De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp & Ultee, 2000). In this 
dissertation, sampling weights are used only when generalizations are being made about 
the Dutch population (e.g., in chapter two). 
 
Measures 
  In this section, the background and the measurement instruments for prosocial 
motives are discussed because many readers will not be familiar with them. The 
measurements for socio-demographic characteristics are discussed briefly in the empirical 
papers. 
 
The ‘Big Five’ adjective checklist 
The ‘Big 5’ are the much appraised result of several decades of factor analysis in 
personality psychology. Numerous factor analyses on tens of thousands of adjectives from 
the dictionary describing personal characteristics showed that most of the adjectives were 
related to five dimensions (John, 1990; Digman, 1990). The dimensions can be 
remembered easily with the acronym OCEAN: ‘openness to experience’ (O), 
‘conscientiousness’ (C), ‘extraversion’ (E), ‘agreeableness’ (A), and ‘neuroticism’ (N). 
Neurotic persons are described as anxious, nervous, and touchy. Agreeableness is 
described by adjectives such as sympathetic, helpful, and kind. Introverts - who have a 
low score on extraversion - are described as quiet, reserved, and withdrawn. 
Conscientious persons are described as systematic, organized, and neat. Openness is 
described with adjectives like artistic, imaginative, and innovative.   
 
Psychometric research has shown that the ‘Big 5’ are highly reliable: the dimensions 
have stability coefficients of more than .90 over a period of six years (Costa & McCrae, 
1988), declining only a little to about .80 over a period of 25 years (Costa & McCrae, 
1992). These strikingly high coefficients over considerable periods of time seem to 
indicate that the basic dimensions of human personality are very stable, and resistant to 
changes across the life course.  
However, the types of samples that are commonly used in these psychometric 
studies, such as the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging (BLSA), are likely to lead to an 
overestimation of the stability coefficients (Ardelt, 2000). In these panel studies, people 
who are likely to move or experience other major changes in their life are less likely to be 
included in the sample. They may be difficult to reach in the future, and, as a 
consequence, be unattractive as participants. Therefore, the stability of the social 
environment for the participants of these panel studies is larger than for the population at 
large. Changes in the life course and the social environment are often associated with 
changes in personality (Branje, Van Lieshout & Van Aken, 2004). However, the relatively 
short history of the ‘Big 5’ and the composition of the groups of respondents that are used 
to estimate the reliability of the ‘Big 5’ make it impossible to estimate the precise influence 
of the effects of life course events. 
Many studies have shown that the same five dimensions are present in personality 
descriptions used in everyday language not only in the USA, but also in very different 
nations, such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Croatia, 
Russia, Finland, Estonia, China, Korea and the Philippines (see Kallasmaa, Allik, Realo & 
McCrae (2000) for references). The cross-national validity of the measurement instrument 
has contributed to its popularity among personality psychologists.  
Because of the attractive psychometric properties of the ‘Big 5’, many psychologists 
have started to measure the ‘Big 5’ instead of or next to existing measures. For instance, 
Graziano & Eisenberg (1994) describe agreeableness as a basic dimension of personality, 
encompassing many other more specific personality characteristics that are known to be 
related to prosocial behavior. One of these specific measures is empathy, which will be 
discussed below.  
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Table A.1.  ‘Big Five’ Markers in English and in Dutch 
 
I. Extraversion 
Spraakzaam Talkative 
*Gesloten *Introverted 
*Stil *Quiet 
*Terughoudend *Reserved 
*Teruggetrokken *Withdrawn 
*Schuchter *Bashful 
II. Agreeableness 
Vriendelijk Kind 
Behulpzaam Cooperative 
Sympathiek Sympathetic 
Aangenaam Pleasant 
Prettig Agreeable 
Hulpvaardig Helpful 
III. Neuroticism (emotional stability) 
Ongerust Anxious 
Prikkelbaar Irritable 
Snel geraakt  Touchy 
Zenuwachtig Nervous 
Angstig Fearful 
Nerveus High-strung 
IV. Conscientiousness 
Ordelijk Organized 
Systematisch Systematic 
Nauwkeurig Thorough 
Netjes Neat 
Zorgvuldig Careful 
*Slordig *Sloppy 
V. Openness 
Creatief Creative 
Veelzijdig Complex 
Fantasierijk Imaginative 
Artistiek Artistic 
Onderzoekend Deep 
Vernieuwend Innovative 
* indicates reversed item 
  
 
The set of items used in the Family Survey to measure the Big 5-traits of 
personality was an adjective checklist developed by Gerris et al. (1998), who translated 
the set of 100 markers developed by Goldberg (1992) into Dutch and selected 6 items for 
each factor (see table A.1) based on a factor analysis. Respondents were asked to what 
degree these adjectives apply to themselves on a scale of 1 (‘Does not fit me at all’) to 7 
(‘Fits me completely’).  
Factor analysis clearly showed a five-factor structure. For all dimensions, mean 
scores were computed, and a reliability analysis was conducted. Table A.2 shows the 
intercorrelations and reliability estimates of the ‘Big Five’-scales. All scales have 
sufficiently high reliabilities, ranging from .77 for neuroticism to .87 for 
conscientiousness. The table clearly shows that the five dimensions are not orthogonal. 
Agreeableness is correlated positively with conscientiousness (.22), extraversion (.24) and 
openness (.31). Extraversion is negatively correlated with neuroticism (-.33). In the 
analyses reported in chapters two to seven, mean scores for all five dimensions are 
included. This procedure results in estimates of the ‘true’ effects of each of the dimensions 
controlled for each other.  
 
Table A.2.   Correlations among the ‘Big Five’ 
 
  1  234  5
1. Extraversion  .82   
2. Agreeableness  ***.240  .83  
3. Conscientiousness  *-.058  ***.222 .87  
4. Neuroticism  ***-.330  ***-.088 **.076 .77 
5. Openness  ***.167  ***.306 .044 .029  .80
Cronbach alphas appear on the diagonals. *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05 
 
 
Empathy 
With the Interpersonal Reacitivity Index (IRI), Davis (1994) presents validated 
measurements of four dimensions of empathy: empathic concern (abbreviated as ‘EC’: the 
tendency to get emotionally involved with the fortunes and misfortunes of others); 
perspective taking (abbreviated as ‘PT’: the cognitive ability to take the perspective of 
others when in conflict with others); fantasy (abbreviated as ‘FS’: the tendency to put 
oneself in the shoes of a fictional character, e.g. in a movie picture or novel) and personal 
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distress (abbreviated as ‘PD’: the tendency to feel distressed when observing that others 
are in need). The four IRI-subscales are based on previous measurement instruments of 
empathy. Psychometric research has shown the scales have adequate test-retest reliability 
(Davis, 1994). Because previous research and theory on empathy suggested that the 
Fantasy-scale and the Personal Distress-scale were less valuable for predictions of the 
occurrence and intensity of prosocial behavior, only the items from the empathic concern 
and perspective taking subscales were considered in the present research. The original 
items appear in table A.3. 
 
Table A.3.  IRI: Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1994, pp. 56-57) 
 
 
Respondents are asked to indicate the degree to which the items describe them by choosing the appropriate 
point on a five-point scale running from 0 (does not describe me well) to 4 (describes me very well). Items 
indicated with an [r] are reversed (0=4, 1=3, 3=1, 4=0). 
 
Empathic Concern 
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
4. [r] Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.   
14. [r] Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a gread deal. 
18. [r] When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for them. 
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
 
Perspective Taking 
3. [r] I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view. 
8. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
11. I Sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.   
15. [r] If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other people’s arguments. 
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
25. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while. 
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
 
The reliability of the two scales was tested in a series of laboratory experiments at 
the University of Leiden.
* A group of 140 students participated in a study of volunteer 
                                                 
* I thank Wim Bernasco for conducting this pilot study.   
 
dilemmas (Diekmann, 1986). Before the dilemmas were played, the participants 
completed the Empathic Concern (EC) and Perspective Taking (PT) scales. An 
exploratory factor analysis revealed four factors with Eigenvalues >1. However, the third 
and fourth factor had Eigenvalues of 1,2 and 1,0, respectively, and the scree plot showed 
a clear bend after factor 2. These results supported a two-factor solution. A confirmatory 
factor analysis with a criterion of two factors showed two factors, clearly interpretable as 
the Empathic Concern (EC) and Perspective Taking (PT) dimensions (see table A.3). 
However, two items revealed low loadings: item 3 of the EC-scale (.266) and item 4 of the 
PT-scale (.332). Reliability analysis revealed that item 3 of the EC-scale and item 4 of the 
PT decreased the reliability of the total scale. Without these items, Cronbach’s alphas 
were .70 for the perspective taking scale and .71 for the empathic concern scale. The 
findings from this pilot study supported the use of the two 6-item translations of the EC 
and PT-subscales in the Family Survey of the Dutch Population. 
 
Table A.4.  Dutch translation of IRI-subscales Empathic Concern (EC) and Perspective Taking 
(PT) 
 
EC1. Ik voel vaak bezorgdheid voor mensen die het minder goed hebben dan ikzelf. 
EC2. De problemen van anderen kunnen me meestal niets schelen. 
EC3. Als ik zie dat iemand benadeeld wordt, krijg ik een vervelend gevoel. 
EC4. Het ongeluk van andere mensen doet me meestal niet zoveel. 
EC5. Als ik zie dat iemand oneerlijk behandeld wordt, heb ik weinig medelijden. 
EC6. Ik wordt vaak geraakt door wat andere mensen meemaken. 
EC7. Ik ben nogal een zachtaardig iemand. 
PT1. Ik vind het moeilijk om de dingen vanuit andermans gezichtspunt te bekijken. 
PT2. Ik probeer een probleem altijd van alle kanten te bekijken voor ik een beslissing neem. 
PT3. Ik probeer mijn vrienden beter te begrijpen door me voor te stellen hoe zij er tegenaan kijken. 
PT4. Als ik ergens zeker van ben, verspil ik niet veel tijd met het luisteren naar de argumenten van 
andere mensen. 
PT5. Ik hou er rekening mee dat anderen op een andere manier tegen de dingen aankijken. 
PT6. Als ik boos op iemand ben, probeer ik het meestal een tijdje van zijn kant te bekijken. 
PT7. Voordat ik kritiek heb op anderen, probeer ik me voor te stellen hoe ik me zou voelen als ik in 
hun schoenen stond. 
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Table A.5.  Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis of EC and PT-items in pilot study 
 
EC1. Ik voel vaak bezorgdheid voor mensen die het minder goed hebben dan ikzelf  .688  .076
EC2*. De problemen van anderen kunnen me meestal niets schelen  .699  .022
EC3*. Als ik zie dat iemand benadeeld wordt. krijg ik een vervelend gevoel  .266  .046
EC4*. Het ongeluk van andere mensen doet me meestal niet zoveel  .731  .136
EC5*. Als ik zie dat iemand oneerlijk behandeld wordt, heb ik weinig medelijden  .560  .100
EC6. Ik wordt vaak geraakt door wat andere mensen meemaken  .670  .064
EC7. Ik ben nogal een zachtaardig iemand  .407  .368
PT1*. Ik vind het moeilijk om dingen vanuit andermans gezichtspunt te bekijken  .165  .661
PT2. Ik probeer een probleem altijd van alle kanten te bekijken […]  -.144  .663
PT3. Ik probeer mijn vrienden beter te begrijpen […]  .157  .646
PT4. Als ik ergens zeker van ben, verspil ik niet veel tijd met luisteren […]   .175  .332
PT5. Ik hou er rekening mee dat anderen […]  .036  .609
PT6. Als ik boos op iemand ben, probeer ik het […] van zijn kant te bekijken.  .061  .585
PT7. Voordat ik kritiek heb op anderen, probeer ik me voor te stellen [...]  .130  .559
Cronbach’s Alpha  .714  .698
Communalities >.300 in bold; * indicates reversed item 
 
Table A.6.  Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis of EC and PT-items in FSDP2000 
 
EC1. Ik voel bezorgdheid voor mensen die het minder goed hebben dan ikzelf .243  .513
EC2*. De problemen van anderen kunnen me meestal niets schelen  .102  .813
EC3*. Als ik zie dat iemand benadeeld wordt. krijg ik een vervelend gevoel  .084  .802
EC4*. Het ongeluk van andere mensen doet me meestal niet zoveel  -.023  .681
PT2. Ik probeer een probleem altijd van alle kanten te bekijken […]  .674  .053
PT3. Ik probeer mijn vrienden beter te begrijpen […]  .764  .159
PT5. Ik hou er rekening mee dat anderen […]  .745  .150
PT6. Als ik boos op iemand ben, probeer ik het […] van zijn kant te bekijken. .705  .067
PT7. Voordat ik kritiek heb op anderen, probeer ik me voor te stellen [...]  .720  .078
Cronbach’s Alpha  .681  .777
Label  Empathic 
Concern 
Perspective 
Taking
Communalities >.300 in bold; * indicates reversed item 
 
The empathy scales in the FSDP2000 were part of a written questionnaire that the 
interviewers left at the respondents’ home after the CAPI-survey was completed. The 
questionnaire was completed by 1508 of the 1568 respondents. A factor analysis of the 
responses revealed three items with low communalities (EC1, EC5, PT1) of which one  
 
had with high loadings on both the PT as EC-dimension (EC5). Excluding these items, 
three factors were found with Eigenvalues >1. However, the third factor had an 
Eigenvalue of only 1,2 while the scree plot indicated a two factor solution. A 
confirmatory factor analysis with the criterion of two factors indicated two dimensions 
clearly interpretable as Empathic Concern (EC) and Perspective Taking (PT) (see table 4). 
The initial Cronbach’s Alpha for EC of .676 increased to .681 after deletion of item 5 and 
6 (with item 5 it was even higher, .690, but this item correlated substantially with the 
perspective taking scale). The initial Cronbach’s Alpha for PT of .558 increased to .777 
after deletion of item 1. Correlated .275 (p<.000) (with EC including item 5, this would 
be .321). 
 
Measuring social value orientation 
Social value orientations were not measured with a series of ‘decomposed games’ 
(e.g., Van Lange et al., 1997a) but in a somewhat different manner for two reasons. The 
first reason is practical. Questionnaire space did not allow for us to use the traditional 
measures of social value orientations consisting of nine decomposed games. To obtain a 
maximum amount of information with a more limited amount of questionnaire space, 
respondents were asked to provide a rank order to four self-other allocations of 
hypothetical points in two tables (see below). This measurement procedure is based on the 
instrument used in the Households in the Netherlands Survey from 1995 (Kalmijn, 
Bernasco & Weesie, 1996; for a discussion of the measurement procedure for social value 
orientation, see Snijders & Weesie, 1999). Although it would have been possible to create 
combinations of self-other allocations that closely resemble the original idea of three 
‘types’ of social value orientations inherent in the decomposed games technique 
(cooperative, individualist, and competitive, see Van Lange et al., 1997a), the 
combinations offered to the respondents did not do so for a theoretical reason. Our 
theoretical interest was in the altruism-egoism dimension inherent in social value 
orientations, and not so much in the equality - competition dimension. Therefore, the 
numbers of points for self and other for the various alternatives in the new measure all 
summed to the same amounts (300 in task A, and 500 in task B, see table 7).
† This means 
                                                 
† Unfortunately, a typing error was made in the construction of the final questionnaire. The second 
alternative in task A should read '255-45' instead of 225-45. As can be seen in the distribution of the 
altruism parameter, this error did not make a difference. 
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that the difference between competitors and individualists cannot be made with the 
ranking task. 
 
Table A.7.  Measure of social value orientation in FSDP2000 
 
Task A  Task B 
Self  Other  Own share Self  Other  Own share
1. 120  180  .40 1. 375 125  .75
2. 225  45  .83 2. 200 300  .40
3. 195  105  .65 3. 325 175  .65
4. 150  150  .50 4. 250 250  .50
 
Instead, the rank orders reflect the degree to which respondents have the tendency to 
give away points to the unknown other (or to keep them for themselves). Assume a 
continuum ranging from 0 (keeping nothing for oneself, completely altruistic) to 1 
(keeping everything for oneself, completely egoistic). If respondents make consistent 
choices, they will rank order the alternatives as if they compute the difference between 
their ‘true’ degree of altruism and the alternatives in the table. The alternative that is 
closest to the true degree of altruism of the respondent should receive the highest 
preference (1). The alternative that is furthest from the degree of altruism receives the 
lowest preference (4). Then the other two alternatives are ranked. Here are two examples 
to clarify how the egoism parameters are computed from the rank orders: 
(1) Suppose you are a completely selfish actor. The most attractive option for you is 
the 225-45 split, because 225 is the highest possible pay-off for you in the game. 
The least attractive option for the selfish actor is 120-180. The second most 
preferable option is 195-105, and 150-150 is third. From top to bottom, a 
completely selfish actor would have a rank order of 4123 in task A. (Likewise, in 
task B this would be 1423). Although in theory a completely selfish actor would 
have an egoism parameter of 1, all respondents with parameters >.74 would give 
the rank order that you as a completely selfish actor would give. For an actor with 
an egoism parameter of .73, the .65 share of option 3 (195-105) is more attractive 
than the .83 share.  
(2) To give another example, suppose you want to keep half and give away the other 
half. In this case, you would choose 2431 in task A. The equal split of 150-150  
 
exactly reflects your degree of altruism (.50). Then the 120-180 option (keeping a 
.40 share) is closer to .50 (difference of .10) than the 195-105 split (a share of .65 - 
difference of .15). Of course, the 224-45 division would be the least attractive 
option. Respondents with an egoism parameter of .50 fall into the .45-.52 
category. 
 
Table  A.8.  Altruism parameters of respondents based on preference orderings in 
measurements of social value orientation 
 
Task A  Task B 
Range Preference 
Order 
n % Range Preference   
Order 
n % 
<.45 1432  13 1.0 <.45 4132,  2131  12  1.0
.45-.52 2431  404 33.8 .45-.52 4231  422 35.3
.52-.57 3421,  3431  256 21.4 .52-.57 4321,  4221, 
4312, 4331, 
4412 
190 15.9
.57-.61 3412  43 3.6 .58-.60 3412  55  4.6
.61-.66 4312  61 5.1 .60-.70 2413  43  3.6
.66-.74 4213,  4112  45 3.7    
>.74 4123  188 15.7 >.70 1423,  1314  211  17.7
Indiff. 1111,  2222, 
4444 
4 0.3 Indiff. 1111,  4444  4 0.3
Apparently inconsistent  (277) (21.5) Apparently inconsistent  (350)  (27.2)
Eq, .66-.74  4321  146 12.2 Eq, .65-.69 3421  204  17.1
Eq, >.74  4231  36 3.0 Eq, >.69  2431  54  4.5
Consistent 1192 100 Consistent 1119  100
Inconsistent 95 (7.4) Inconsistent  114  (8.9)
N 1291 N 1287 
 
 
Following this ‘proximity’-logic, all consistent preference orderings fall into a range of 
possible degrees of egoism/altruism. Inconsistent rank orders (e.g., 1234) are considered 
as missing values. A first inspection of the preference orderings reveals that only about 15 
to 20% of the respondents fall into the most selfish category. While the opposite is rare - 
only 1% prefers having less than the unknown other - the largest category is the second, 
centering around the equal split (.50). Furthermore, markedly high numbers of 
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inconsistent choices can be seen: 21,9% in task A, and an even higher 28,9% in task B. 
Upon closer examination, however, it turned out that a sizable portion of the apparently 
inconsistent preference orderings were actually consistent in a two-dimensional preference 
space, assuming that respondents do not only have preference for more or less points for 
self, but may also have a separate preference for equality. In task A, 65,5% of the 
apparently inconsistent rank orders expressed a first preference for the 50-50 division, 
and subsequently chose a consistent order. In task B, 69.4% of the apparently 
inconsistent respondents expressed such preferences.  
Assuming the occurrence of equality preferences, we were able to classify 92.6% of 
the respondents in task A, and 91.1% in task B. This figure is much higher than obtained 
with the usual measures of social value orientations. The results from our new rank order 
measurement instrument of social value orientations shed a new light on what 
measurements of social value orientations are actually measuring. The rank orders are in 
line with the ‘integrative model’ of social value orientations proposed by Van Lange 
(1999). The integrative model argues that choices in measurements of social value 
orientations reflect positions on two dimensions: an equality dimension - how strongly the 
respondent is motivated by a concern for equality - and an altruism motive - how strongly 
the respondent is motivated by a concern for other’s welfare. The integrative model of 
social value orientation simply argues that the two dimensions come together in the 
allocation choices that people make in decomposed games, but it does not hypothesize 
how the two motives are related. The ranking task that was used in the Family Survey 
shows that the equality motive is probably more powerful than the altruism motive. 
Almost one third of the respondents belong to the category covering the parameter of .50, 
while only 1% conformed to an altruistic pattern. The equality motive is not only more 
powerful than the altruism motive, the former may ‘crowd out’ the latter. The choices in 
the ranking task suggest that a sizeable minority of respondents prefer equality above 
inequality, but also prefer egoism to altruism (in task A, 15.2%, and in task B, 21.6%). It 
seems that these respondents reason ‘I have already chosen the ‘right’ thing - the 50-50 
split - so now I am allowed to be egoistic’. Even in the choices among combinations that 
were designed to exclude it, the equality motive rears its head. Social value orientations 
measure two motives, not one. Further research should investigate whether the altruism 
motive stands in a conditional relationship with the equality motive.  
  
 
Dealing with social desirability 
Self-reports about prosocial behavior may be biased by social desirability. The 
potential bias is probably larger for prosocial behavior than for other types of behavior, 
which are evaluated less positively. Respondents may be motivated by a need for social 
approval from the interviewer to exaggerate their donations to charitable causes or the 
number of hours they volunteer. Respondents may even lie to the interviewer, saying they 
volunteer when they are not or saying they donate when they are not. This danger is 
especially large when people are asked to rate the likelihood that they will engage in some 
form of prosocial behavior in the future. Intentions are usually more positive than actual 
behavior. We tried to deal with social desirability effects in three ways: (1) by 
questionnaire design; (2) by including a social desirability scale; (3) by comparing 
responses to hypothetical questions to self-reports on actual behavior.  
Questionnaire design - By using a write-in questionnaire for those behaviors that 
are more likely to affected by social desirability, the potential effect of social desirability 
was minimized. The write-in questionnaires were left at the respondent’s home after the 
personal interview to be completed later. Because there was no interviewer present when 
the write-in questionnaire was completed, respondents can hardly be motivated by a need 
for social approval from the interviewer. Questions on charitable giving, intentions to give 
and volunteer, personality characteristics, and social value orientation were part of the 
write-in questionnaire. The questions on membership of voluntary associations and 
volunteering, organ donation and blood donation were part of the CAPI. These questions 
were phrased in a very matter-of-fact manner (see section 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 below). 
Furthermore, we used the questions on membership as a filter for the questions on 
volunteering (see 3.3.2 below). 
Social desirability scale - It is often assumed that socially desirable answers in 
surveys is the result of a general need for social approval (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). It 
has become common practice in (social) psychological research to include a measure of 
social desirability to control for this response set. The crucial point here is not whether 
the respondents overestimate their prosocial behaviors when they are asked to indicate 
their intentions. When all respondents overestimate their prosocial behavior to the same 
degree, there is no problem: only the absolute proportions would be wrong, but the 
correlations with the independent variables are unaffected. The problem of a tendency to 
give socially desirable responses in surveys is serious only when some types of respondents 
are more likely to give socially desirable responses than others. To measure these 
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individual differences in the tendency to give socially desirable responses, the Crowne & 
Marlowe social desirability scale (1964) has been developed. The logic of this instrument 
is that respondents state their intentions in a large number of very different situations 
with a clearly socially desirable option. It is assumed that some respondents are more 
likely to state socially desirable intentions across different types of situations. 
Psychometric reviews of these instruments, however, have concluded that they are both 
invalid and unreliable (Costa & McCrae, 1983; Barger, 2002). Socially desirable 
responses about eating habits do not correlate with socially desirable responses about 
cheating and jealousy, for instance. A study in the Netherlands using data from 2,010 
respondents who completed the 33 original items from the Crowne & Marlowe scale 
(Centerdata, 1997) confirms this conclusion: in a factor analysis, more than 10 factors 
emerged (own computation). In chapter four, intentions to give time and money in 
hypothetical situations were not significantly related to two subscales measuring the two 
strongest factors in ‘social desirability’, and including these scales did not affect the 
correlations with the independent variables. Therefore, they are left out of the analysis. 
Individual differences in the tendency to give socially desirable responses in the scenarios 
are not rooted in a general tendency to give socially desirable responses in any kind of 
situation (if such a general tendency exists at all). 
Comparisons of intentions and behavior - Responses to hypothetical requests for 
donations of time and money will be compared to reports on actual donations. 
Discrepancies between intentions and behavior may reflect socially desirable responding, 
because it is easier to say that one would comply with a request in a hypothetical situation 
than to lie about actual volunteering behaviors and donations to charitable causes in the 
past year. It is rather unlikely that the reports on actual behavior are also exaggerated due 
to demand characteristics in the interview situation, because these reports (see the next 
section) are very modest compared to reports in other survey research. We find about 
10% fewer volunteers and donations of money that are more than 50% lower than in 
other research, using more extensive questionnaires.  
When individual differences in prosocial motives are strongly related to intentions 
to give, but not to reports on actual giving and volunteering, they probably reflect a social 
desirability effect. However, discrepancies between effects of independent variables on 
intentions and behavior may also have a substantive interpretation. In the hypothetical 
scenarios, all respondents are asked for contributions. In the real world, fundraisers target 
the wealthy for charitable donations, and voluntary associations try to recruit people with  
 
specific qualities that are needed for the job, such as supervising skills (Brady, Schlozman 
& Verba, 1999). 
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Appendix B 
Testing hypotheses on charitable giving in FSDP2000 and GINPS01 
 
To investigate the possibility that hypotheses tests on charitable giving are biased 
by the underreporting of donations in the FSDP2000, data from the first wave of the 
Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey, collected in May 2002 (GINPS01), were made 
comparable to the FSDP2000-data used in chapter four. All independent variables in both 
datasets were recoded in the same categories and z-standardized. Table 1 shows the 
results of the same regression analyses in both datasets. The dummy-variable for ‘other 
religion’ created estimation problems in the FSDP2000-regression, and was excluded. 
Comparing the results of the first stage of the analyses indicates that females as 
well as higher educated persons were more likely to report having made donations in the 
FSDP2000, while this was not the case in GINPS01. In the GINPS01, on the other hand, 
stronger selection effects were observed for age, Roman Catholic denomination, and 
church attendance. These findings suggest that the incidence of donations was 
underreported in the FSDP2000 by males, the lower educated, elderly persons, frequent 
church attendees and Catholics. The differences with regard to education and age are in 
line with the idea that using more cues helps the lower educated and the elderly to 
remember their donations.  
The results of the second stage indicate that the FSDP2000 revealed weaker effects 
of income and rereformed denomination on the amount donated than the GINPS01, but 
stronger effects of age, the level of education, home ownership, political interest, and 
postmaterialism. The differences with regard to age, education and home ownership are 
in line with the idea that the more extensive questionnaire used in the GINPS01 mainly 
uncovers more small donations. Large donations are more often made by older persons, 
higher educated persons and home owners. However, the differences with regard to 
income, rereformed denomination, political interest and postmaterialism cannot be 
explained in this way. The rereformed and persons with higher incomes are also more 
likely to give large amounts, while hyotheses on the influence of political interest and 
postmaterialism can be formulated in opposite directions.  
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Table  B.1.  Heckman Two stage-regression analysis of natural log of donations to 
charitable causes  
 
 GINPS01  FSDP2000 
Selection (stage 1)     
  Age .390 .211 (*) .119 .433 
  Age2 -.469 .207 * -.111 .462 
  Female -.029 .073 .371 .101  ***
  Roman Catholic  .345 .127 ** .041 .113 
  Reformed .272 .148 (*) .090 .208 
  Rereformed .183 .177 .419 .229  (*)
  Other religion  .158 .217 ---- ---- 
  Church attendance  .220 .068 *** .116 .058  *
  Town size  -.082 .037 * -.101 .050  *
  Level of education  .022 .044 .212 .051  ***
  Income(ln) .106 .070 .010 .006 
  Wealth(ln) .010 .012 .023 .009  *
  Home owner  .230 .083 ** .402 .111  *
  Household size  -.066 .050 .106 .065 
  Shares household  .100 .119 -.229 .171 
  Political interest  .070 .040 .082 .059 
  Left-right self placement  .016 .038 -.097 .050 
  Postmaterialism .033 .038 -.018 .046 
  Constant .518 .232 * .616 .182  *
(continued on next page…) 
 
Table B.1. (continued) 
 
Amount donated (stage 2)     
  Age .465 .265 (*) 1.193 .446  **
  Age2 -.044 .272 -.855 .474  (*)
  Female .018 .068 .075 .092 
  Roman Catholic  .087 .102 .095 .112 
  Reformed .094 .113 *** .316 .213 
  Rereformed 1.271 .129 *** .608 .220  **
  Other religion  1.364 .225 *** ---- ---- 
  Church attendance  .395 .050 *** .316 .060  ***
  Town size  -.032 .037 -.074 .054 
  Level of education  .219 .039 *** .328 .058  ***
  Income(ln) .316 .068 *** .001 .006 
  Wealth(ln) .022 .009 * .023 .009  **
  Home owner  .183 .081 * .415 .126  ***
  Household size  .006 .049 .035 .063 
  Shares household  .050 .126 -.093 .177 
  Political interest  .074 .040 (*) .167 .055  **
  Left-right self placement  -.062 .036 (*) -.033 .052 
  Postmaterialism .029 .036 .146 .048  **
  Constant 3.314 .209 *** 3.326 .202  ***
Log likelihood  -2998.602 -2248.659
Wald test for Chi Square (df)  ***11358.80 (18) ***235.08 (17)
Athrho  .026 (.047) ***.785 (.237)
Lnsigma  ***.215 (.022) ***.232 (.060)
N (uncensored, censored)  (1608, 333) (1019, 315)
Wald test for ind. equations  0.31 ***10.95
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Table C.1.  Mean contribution rates in experimental conditions of the scenario study  
 
Type of request  Time Money
 51.9% 69.3%
N 6360 3315
Material costs 
Fl 2.50  79.7%
Fl 5.00  75.1%
Fl 10.00  62.1%
Fl 25.00  51.1%
One hour  53.2%
One evening  52.2%
Several evenings  49.3%
Social incentives: Repeated interaction 
Letter  45.0%
Stranger 21.0% 48.5%
Vaguely familiar  38.7% 53.8%
Neighbor 45.9% 80.4%
Family member  60.0% 74.5%
Friend 64.4% 72.2%
Sibling 67.8% 83.3%
Partner 73.0% 80.9%
Psychological rewards: Efficacy 
Distributing flyers  52.1%
Collecting money  49.1%
Building 59.3%
Donation of money  69.3%
Psychological rewards: Distance 
Local soccer club  41.8% 70.1%
Red Cross  65.6% 83.0%
Third world people  63.0% 74.2%
Political prisoners  38.9% 51.7%
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Table C.2.  Results of Heckman two-stage regression analysis of donations to charity 
(untransformed amounts, N=1471, 1098 uncensored) 
 
Female  -.06  -.06  -.12   .23  ** 
Age .04   .07 (*)  .02   -.04   
Agreeableness  -.02  -.06  -.04   
Conscientiousness  -.03  -.02  -.01   
Extraversion  .04  .04  .05  (*) 
Neuroticism .01   -.01   .00   
Openness  .02  -.01  -.04   
Prosocial value orientation (svo)
a .08   -.21   
Perspective taking (pt)  -.03   -.10   
Empathic concern (ec)  .17 (*)  .19  ** 
Education   .13  ***
Working hours    .01  * 
Income (x€1000)   .0014  * 
Church attendance (times per year)    .00   
Urbanization     .10  * 
Female  -24.0  -25.8  -49.3 **  -18.9   
Age  17.2  29.1  16.2  50.1  ***
Agreeableness  -9.5  -21.4  -14.9   
Conscientiousness  -9.5  -7.8  -4.8   
Extraversion  16.8 * 8.2  12.2   
Neuroticism 4.1   -4.4   13.8   
Openness  5.8  -2.0  -8.3   
Prosocial value orientation (svo)  40.2 (*)  47.4  * 
Perspective taking (pt)  -2.2   -5.6   
Empathic concern (ec)  64.3 **  73.5  ** 
Education   49.3  ***
Working hours    1.5  (*) 
Income (x€1000)   0.300  * 
Church attendance (times per year)    3.7  ***
Urbanization     4.7   
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05.  
a Social value orientation above average  
 
Table C.3.  Logistic regression analysis of current blood donation (N=1495) 
 
Female 0.77 (*)  0.77   0.77   0.97    1.03  
Age 1.01   1.04   1.07   1.22  *  1.22 * 
Agreeableness 1.20 *  1.21 (*)  1.24  *  1.26 * 
Conscientiousness 0.84 *  0.84 *  0.84  *  0.82 * 
Extraversion 0.96   0.95   0.94    0.96  
Neuroticism 0.88   0.87   0.90    0.92  
Openness 0.90   0.90   0.87    0.87  
Social value orientation (svo)  0.95   0.95    0.96  
Perspective taking (pt)  0.96   0.94    0.90  
Empathic concern (ec)  1.06   1.06    1.09  
Education 1.24  **  1.25 ** 
Working hours  1.26  *  1.26 * 
Income (ln)  0.87  *  0.86 * 
Church attendance  0.97    0.80 (*)
Urbanization   1.06    1.07  
Income * agreeableness      1.00  
Income * svo      1.14 * 
Income * pt       0.88 * 
Income * ec      1.20 * 
Attendance * agreeableness      1.03  
Attendance * svo      0.97  
Attendance * pt       0.81 * 
Attendance * ec      1.33 ** 
Urbanization * agreeableness      0.93  
Urbanization * svo      1.01  
Urbanization * pt       1.02  
Urbanization * ec      1.03  
Chi-Square 3  14  16  28  45 
Pseudo R
2 .0025  .0120  .0137  .0236  .0413 
All Chi Square tests are significant at the p<.001 level. *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; (*) p<.10 
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Table C.4.  Multinomial logistic regression analysis of volunteering including an 
interaction of parental volunteering with distance to parents (n=1219) 
 
 Religious Pillarized  Secular
Age respondent  0.77 1.03  (*)1.23
Female respondent  0.66 1.01  ***0.52
Parental religious volunteering   1.23 0.61  1.16
Parental pillarized volunteering 1.37 (*)1.55  *1.55
Agreeableness 0.90 1.12  1.00
Conscientiousness 1.14 1.11  1.00
Extraversion **1.72 1.17  (*)1.16
Neuroticism 1.18 0.89  0.92
Openness 0.75 1.15  1.10
Perspective taking  0.73 0.87  1.00
Empathy 1.40 (*)1.32  1.01
Social value orientation   0.91 1.04  0.94
Parental denomination (ref.: Catholic) 
No affiliation/mixed marriage 
Reformed 
Orthodox Calvinist 
Other 
1.00
0.21
1.98
0.44
0.46
1.00 
0.78 
0.43 
(*)2.44 
0.91 
1.00
0.95
*0.41
*0.43
0.80
Religious socialization  0.98 0.97  1.08
Own denomination (ref.: Catholic) 
No affiliation 
Reformed 
Orthodox Calvinist 
Other 
1.00
***16.7
0.431
(*)3.34
1.93
1.00 
0.96 
2.44 
0.75 
(*)3.56 
1.00
1.31
0.88
1.18
0.53
Church attendance  ***2.06 1.00  0.95
Resources parents  1.16 1.20  0.92
Education 1.31 (*)1.32  1.04
Household income  0.55 1.10  0.90
Occupational status  (*)0.65 1.30  (*)1.18
Distance 1.70 1.14  1.16
Distance*parental religious volunteering *0.33 1.37  1.00
Distance*parental pillarized volunteering (*)2.69 1.02  0.89
Chi Square (Pseudo R Square)  ***316.8 (.1416)  
 
Summary 
More than eighty percent of Dutch households donate money to charitable causes. 
About one in three Dutch citizens are engaged as unpaid volunteer workers in voluntary 
associations. One out of six has registered as a post mortem organ donor, and about one 
out of twenty-five donates blood at least once a year. Giving to charity, blood donation, 
post mortem organ donation and volunteering are examples of prosocial behavior and 
contributions to collective goods: they require a personal sacrifice, and benefit a group of 
individuals or society at large. Why do people give time, money, blood, and organs to the 
benefit of others? Who are the people who give time, money, blood, and organs anyway? 
In this dissertation, I investigate these questions from two different perspectives in the 
social sciences: from the perspective of sociology and the perspective of social and 
personality psychology.  
In chapter one - ‘Introduction’ - I present these two perspectives on prosocial 
behavior. The sociologist argues that the social conditions in which people live are the 
main determinants of giving and volunteering. People often receive requests for 
contributions to voluntary associations from friends, family members and others in their 
social networks. People tell each other that it is a good thing to contribute, putting social 
pressure on contributing. The psychologist, on the other hand, argues that across a variety 
of social conditions, some people are more likely to contribute because they have an 
‘altruistic personality’: they are more helpful, empathic, or more able to take the 
perspective of people in need, while others are more likely to refuse, evade, or forget their 
duties. This psychological perspective is attractive because it suggests that people base 
their prosocial behavior on their personal preferences and values, giving them an 
individual responsibility for their actions, while the sociological perspective points to the 
role of the social environment. However, we know very little about the relative effects of 
personality characteristics and social conditions on prosocial behavior. Sociologists and 
psychologists have studied prosocial behavior in relative isolation. We know even less 
about the interactive effects of personality characteristics and social conditions. When do 
people base their prosocial behavior on their personal preferences and values? 
Throughout this dissertation, two hypothetical answers to this question are tested over 
and over again. The first hypothesis is the low cost-hypothesis, which predicts that people 
are more likely to act upon their good intentions when it is less costly to do so. The 
second hypothesis is the weak situation-hypothesis, which predicts that people are more 
likely to act upon their good intentions when the decision situation is ‘weak’ – when 
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social norms are not very clear, and when people do not explicitly influence each other 
because their contributions cannot be observed by others. In ‘low cost’ and ‘weak’ 
situations, people will rely on their personality characteristics and social values to decide 
about contributions.  
To test these hypotheses, an integration of research methods used in sociology and 
psychology is proposed. Sociologists have mainly studied prosocial behavior with large 
random sample surveys, showing differences between social groups. Psychologists have 
mainly studied prosocial behavior in laboratory and field experiments, as a criterion 
variable for prosocial motives and personality characteristics. While the internal validity 
of these studies is often high, the external validity of these studies is often limited by the 
use of student samples and abstract decision making situations such as in the social 
dilemma research paradigm. In addition, sociological studies rarely include personality 
characteristics, and psychological studies rarely include social characteristics. In this 
dissertation, I combine the strength of sociological and psychological research methods. I 
report five studies investigating effects of social conditions and personality simultaneously 
on examples of prosocial behavior in the ‘real life’ among a large sample of the Dutch 
population.  
In chapter two – ‘Giving and volunteering in the Netherlands’ – I present the data 
that are used in chapters three to seven. The data are part of the Family Survey of the 
Dutch Population 2000 (FSDP2000), a nationwide household survey conducted by 
colleagues of ICS Nijmegen (De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp & Ultee, 2000) among a 
sample of 1,587 Dutch citizens. Chapter two gives a description of the magnitude of 
charitable giving, blood donation, post mortem organ donation, voluntary association 
membership and volunteering among the respondents in this sample, and compares these 
estimates to other survey data sources such as the ‘Giving in the Netherlands Panel 
Survey’ (GINPS). These examples of prosocial behavior are the dependent variables in 
chapters four to seven. Appendix A gives more detailed information on the design and 
sampling procedure of the FSDP2000, as well as the measures of personality 
characteristics and social conditions – the independent variables. To study effects of 
personality, I used the ‘Big Five’ Model, which has become the standard in personality 
psychology in the past two decades. In addition, I studied effects of individual differences 
in cognitive and emotional empathy and social value orientation.  
In chapter three – ‘Who gives what and why? A quasi-experimental study of the 
power of social and psychological incentives in social dilemmas’ – I investigate how  
 
aspects of the situation in which people decide about contributions to collective goods as 
well as social conditions and personality characteristics affect the willingness to volunteer 
and to donate money. This chapter is based on a scenario experiment incorporated in the 
FSDP2000. In the experiment, the respondents indicated their willingness to give money 
or time in eight situations with systematically varying combinations of four aspects of the 
situation in which people decide about contributions to collective goods: (1) material 
costs, (2) social distance to an intermediary person asking for a contribution, (3) efficacy 
of contributing, and (4) psychological distance to the recipients. The results of the 
scenario experiment show that the social distance to the intermediary person is the key 
factor determining the willingness to give time and money: people are more likely to 
honor requests by persons at a smaller social distance. This result indicates that social 
incentives have powerful effects on contributions to collective goods. Among the 
characteristics of the respondents, the level of education is the strongest predictor of 
giving and volunteering intentions, while personality characteristics typically had smaller 
effects. Among personality characteristics, empathic concern for others had the strongest 
effects on giving and volunteering intentions.  
In chapter four – ‘Anonymous gifts: personal decisions, social backgrounds’ – I 
investigate donations to unknown strangers. Charitable giving, blood donation and post 
mortem organ donation benefit unknown others who cannot reciprocate. The effects of 
personality characteristics should be largest for this category of prosocial behavior. 
However, the three examples of anonymous giving turned out to be most strongly related 
to social conditions. A higher level of education increases donations of money and body 
parts. Church attendance increases charitable donations, but decreases post mortem organ 
donation. Personality characteristics showed inconsistent and rather weak effects. 
Empathic concern only promoted charitable giving, but not blood and organ donation.  
In chapters five, six, and seven, I investigated various forms of civic engagement in 
voluntary associations. The results of these chapters reinforce the conclusions drawn for 
anonymous giving: participation in voluntary associations is mainly a matter of being in 
the right social conditions (again: higher education and stronger religious involvement, 
but also living in a smaller community) rather than being a specific ‘type’ of person. In 
chapter five – ‘Participation in voluntary associations: resources, personality, or both?’ – I 
investigate membership and volunteering in voluntary associations. Because membership 
and volunteering are more observable examples of prosocial behavior and may generate 
generalized reciprocity, I expected that the availability of resources through social capital 
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and human capital would be more strongly related to participation than to giving money, 
blood and organs. However, the results indicate that all types of participation in 
voluntary associations are strongly related to social conditions, especially the level of 
education and religiosity. The personality characteristics of active citizens are less clear 
than their resources. Personality characteristics often have different effects for different 
forms of civic engagement. Members of voluntary associations are more empathic than 
non-members, less conscientious, and somewhat more open to experience. Emotional 
stability increases the number of memberships and the likelihood that people volunteer. 
Volunteers have a more extraverted personality and are more open to experience. 
In chapter six – ‘Shifting backgrounds of participation in voluntary associations in 
the Netherlands’ – the question is raised why the massive decline of religious involvement 
in the Netherlands since World War II did not lead to a decline of participation in 
voluntary associations. Religious involvement has always been the most important 
predictor of participation in voluntary associations. In the past four decades, secular 
associations (environmental and human rights organizations, sports clubs and cultural 
expression groups) compensated for the decline in membership in traditional, pillarized 
associations (labor unions, political parties). This chapter investigates how the nature of 
participation in voluntary associations has changed by comparing characteristics of 
members of pillarized and secular voluntary associations. Three complementary theories 
are considered to answer the research problem: (1) collective action theory, (2) Inglehart’s 
theory on postmaterialism, (3) the Five Factor Model in personality psychology. 
According to the ‘Logic of collective action’, secular associations have used selective 
incentives to attract members, especially younger people. However, many secular 
associations that grew in recent decades offered little incentives, but appealed to 
postmaterialistic values instead. The rise of postmaterialistic values may have 
compensated for the decline in pillarized participation. Finally, the argument is made that 
secular associations have grown because they are more attractive to persons who are more 
extraverted and open to experience, and that these personality characteristics have 
become more widespread among the Dutch population. The analyses in this chapter 
support the latter argument, but not the former. Little support is found for the argument 
that participation in secular voluntary associations is more strongly based on personality 
characteristics than participation in pillarized associations. Instead, some secular 
organizations have grown because they offer more selective incentives to members, while 
others have grown because of the increase in postmaterialistic values among the Dutch  
 
population. Furthermore, the rise of the average level of education and extraversion has 
ensured a stable supply of members and volunteers. 
In chapter seven – ‘The intergenerational transmission of volunteerism’ – I 
investigate to what extent parents increase volunteering among their children by setting 
the right example. If parents volunteer when their children are young, do their children 
follow this example later on in their lives, when they have become adults? If so, how can 
this intergenerational transmission of volunteerism be explained? Is it really the result of 
modeling, or is it some byproduct of other types of intergenerational transmission, such as 
the transmission of religion, resources, or personality characteristics? I find evidence that 
there is an intergenerational transmission of volunteerism, but that the transmission of 
volunteerism for religious and quasi-religious (‘pillarized’) associations was due largely to 
the transmission of religion and resources. Parental volunteering for both religious as well 
as quasi-religious (‘pillarized’) associations increased the likelihood of children’s 
volunteering for secular associations, even controlling for parental and children’s religion, 
education, wealth, and children’s personality characteristics. Consistent with a value 
internalization explanation, this effect was not due to direct social pressure of parents. In 
addition, I find evidence that personality characteristics of volunteers differ strongly 
between the three types of voluntary associations. Compared to non-volunteers, 
volunteers for religious organizations are more extraverted, less open to experience, less 
able to take the perspective of others and more empathically concerned; volunteers for 
pillarized associations are less neurotic, more open to experience, and also more 
empathic; and volunteers for secular associations tend to be more extraverted and open to 
experience. These specific patterns were obscured in chapter five because all types of 
associations were collapsed. 
Chapter eight – ‘Conclusion and discussion’ – summarizes the results of chapters 
three to seven, and provides answers to the research questions. The first research question 
was: 
P1.   To what extent can giving and volunteering behavior be explained by prosocial 
motives and other psychological characteristics of people and the social conditions 
in which they live? 
The answer to this question is that giving and volunteering behaviors are primarily social 
behaviors, determined by social conditions. On average, about 30% of all the variance in 
the examples of prosocial behavior that was explained by the most extensive regression 
models was due to personality characteristics and social value orientations. The 
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hypotheses that prosocial behavior would be more likely among persons with higher 
levels of agreeableness, perspective taking and a more prosocial value orientation was 
rejected most of the time. Empathic concern emerged most often as a typical characteristic 
of people who contribute money to charities and time to religious and pillarized 
associations. In contrast, the hypotheses on the effects of social conditions were supported 
in most of the analyses. The most distinctive characteristic of people who give time, 
money, blood and organs is their higher than average level of education. In addition, 
people who are more religious, live in smaller communities, work more hours for pay and 
earn higher incomes also tend to contribute more. 
The second research question of this dissertation was: 
P2.   In which conditions are individual differences in prosocial motives more strongly 
related to giving and volunteering?  
In all chapters, the hypotheses on how effects of personality characteristics would 
vary with material costs and social rewards are rejected. The low cost-hypothesis, 
predicting that personality characteristics would be more strongly related to prosocial 
behavior when it is less costly, was usually not supported. Neither did the analyses 
support the weak situation hypothesis that personality characteristics would be more 
strongly related when social incentives were weaker. It is hard to reject these rejections for 
methodological reasons, because the low cost-hypothesis and the weak situation-
hypothesis were tested in several different ways. It seems that both hypotheses are invalid 
as general rules for how the effects of personality characteristics vary with aspects of the 
situation in which people decide about contributions to collective goods. 
However, I found evidence in several chapters that specific social conditions such 
as a higher level of education and religious involvement mediated effects of specific 
personality characteristics such as emotional stability and empathic concern. It appears 
that more emotionally stable persons achieve a higher level of education and more 
empathic persons are more strongly involved in religion and are therefore more likely to 
give and volunteer. These hypotheses should be considered in future research. A second 
issue for future research is the effect of the level of education. In the present dissertation, I 
was unable to explain why the higher educated are more likely to give time, money, blood 
and organs – although the Family Survey of the Dutch Population contains enough data 
to test several candidate hypotheses. In the future, I hope to take full advantage of these 
possibilities. A final issue for future research is that cross-sectional surveys offer only a 
limited view on the dynamic nature of participation in voluntary associations. It is likely  
 
that the effects of social conditions and personality characteristics differ in magnitude in 
different stages of the participation career. Longitudinal datasets such as the ‘Giving in 
the Netherlands Panel Survey’ enable a detailed study the dynamics of participation in the 
future. 
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands 
Meer dan tachtig procent van de Nederlandse huishoudens geeft geld aan ‘goede 
doelen’. Ongeveer één derde van de Nederlanders is regelmatig actief als onbetaald 
vrijwilliger voor een vereniging. Eén op de zes Nederlanders heeft besloten zijn of haar 
organen voor transplantatie of de wetenschap ter beschikking te stellen na de dood. En 
ongeveer één op de twintig Nederlanders geeft minstens één keer per jaar bloed bij de 
bloedbank. Geefgedrag – het geven van geld aan goede doelen, het geven van bloed, van 
organen, en het geven van tijd door vrijwilligerswerk –  heet ook wel prosociaal gedrag. 
Het gaat om bijdragen aan collectieve goederen: zij vragen een persoonlijk offer van de 
gever, waarvan de baten ten goede komen aan groepen burgers of de samenleving als 
geheel. 
Wie geeft er eigenlijk tijd, geld, bloed en organen? En waarom geven deze mensen 
überhaupt tijd, geld, bloed en organen ten bate van anderen, als dat ten koste van henzelf 
gaat? Dit proefschrift bestudeert deze vragen vanuit twee verschillende disciplines in de 
sociale wetenschappen: vanuit de sociologie, en vanuit de sociale en 
persoonlijkheidspsychologie. 
In hoofdstuk 1 van dit proefschrift – de inleiding – presenteer ik de twee 
verschillende benaderingen van geefgedrag. De socioloog beargumenteert dat in de sociale 
omstandigheden waarin mensen leven de belangrijkste factoren te vinden zijn die hun 
geefgedrag beïnvloeden. Mensen worden immers vaak gevraagd om een bijdrage te 
leveren aan een vereniging of aan de samenleving als geheel door hun vrienden, 
familieleden, of door anderen in hun omgeving. Mensen houden elkaar voor dat het een 
goede zaak is om bij te dragen, wat sociale druk oplevert. Wie in een omgeving leeft 
waarin die druk sterker is, zal vaker een bijdrage leveren. De psycholoog echter 
beargumenteert dat in allerlei soorten sociale situaties sommige mensen nu eenmaal 
sneller geneigd zijn om een bijdrage te leveren omdat zij meer sociaal zijn ingesteld of een 
‘altruïstische persoonlijkheid’ hebben. Zij zijn meer hulpvaardig, meelevend, en beter in 
staat om zich te verplaatsen in mensen die het moeilijk hebben, terwijl anderen eerder hun 
plichten ontwijken, negeren, of vergeten. De psychologische verklaring is aantrekkelijk 
omdat zij suggereert dat mensen hun geefgedrag baseren op hun persoonlijke voorkeuren 
en waarden, wat hen een individuele verantwoordelijkheid geeft. De sociologische 
verklaring is minder populair omdat niemand een slaaf wil zijn van zijn of haar sociale 
omgeving. We weten echter heel weinig van de relatieve sterkte van de invloed van 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken en sociale omstandigheden op geefgedrag. En we weten nog 
261 
 
minder over de combinatie van persoonlijkheidskenmerken en sociale omstandigheden. 
Wanneer baseren mensen hun geefgedrag op hun persoonlijke voorkeuren en waarden? In 
dit proefschrift worden keer op keer twee mogelijke antwoorden getoetst op deze vraag. 
Het eerste antwoord is de ‘lage kosten-hypothese’, die voorspelt dat mensen hun 
geefgedrag sterker baseren op hun persoonlijke voorkeuren wanneer de kosten daarvan 
lager zijn. Het tweede antwoord is de ‘zwakke situatie-hypothese’, die voorspelt dat 
mensen hun geefgedrag sterker baseren op hun persoonlijke voorkeuren wanneer hun 
sociale omgeving daar meer ruimte voor geeft, bijvoorbeeld wanneer de sociale normen 
niet zo duidelijk zijn en wanneer het geefgedrag moeilijker waargenomen kan worden 
door anderen. Zulke situaties worden in de psychologie zwakke situaties genoemd. Om de 
lage kosten-hypothese en de zwakke situatie-hypothese te toetsen, heb ik een combinatie 
van verschillende onderzoeksmethoden gebruikt. Sociologen hebben geefgedrag 
voornamelijk bestudeerd met grootschalige enquêtes onder willekeurige 
bevolkingssteekproeven, en hebben laten zien dat er grote verschillen zijn in geefgedrag 
tussen sociale groepen. Psychologen hebben geefgedrag vooral in experimenten 
bestudeerd, in het laboratorium en op straat. Hoewel de interne validiteit van deze 
experimenten hoog is, wordt de externe validiteit ervan vaak beperkt door het gebruik 
van specifieke groepen als proefpersonen zoals studenten of voorbijgangers en door het 
gebruik van wereldvreemde, abstracte keuzesituaties, zoals in het onderzoek naar 
samenwerking in sociale dilemma’s. Terwijl sociologische studies gewoonlijk geen vragen 
over persoonlijkheidskenmerken bevatten, wordt in psychologische studies gewoonlijk 
geen rekening gehouden met de sociale omstandigheden waarin proefpersonen leven en 
zijn opgegroeid. In dit proefschrift doe ik verslag van vijf studies waarin de voordelen van 
psychologische en sociologische onderzoeksmethoden worden gecombineerd. Ik 
onderzoek de invloed van persoonlijkheidskenmerken en sociale omstandigheden op 
voorbeelden van geefgedrag in het ‘echte leven’, onder een grote steekproef van de 
Nederlandse bevolking. 
In hoofdstuk twee – Geven en vrijwilligerswerk in Nederland – presenteer ik de 
gegevens die gebruikt worden in de hoofdstukken drie tot en met zeven. Deze gegevens 
zijn afkomstig uit de Familie-enquête van de Nederlandse Bevolking 2000 (FNB2000, in 
het Engels Family Survey of the Dutch Population 2000, FSDP2000). Dit is een landelijke 
huishoudenenquête die door collega’s van het ICS Nijmegen (De Graaf, De Graaf, 
Kraaijkamp & Ultee, 2000) is gehouden onder een steekproef van 1587 Nederlanders. 
Hoofdstuk twee beschrijft de omvang van het geefgedrag: hoeveel geld de respondenten  
 
geven aan ‘goede doelen’, hoeveel er vrijwilligerswerk doen, bloed geven, en organen ter 
beschikking stellen. De cijfers uit de Familie-enquête worden vergeleken met cijfers uit 
andere bronnen, zoals administraties en het ‘Geven in Nederland’-onderzoek van de Vrije 
Universiteit (Schuyt, 2003). De beschreven vormen van geefgedrag zijn de afhankelijke 
variabelen in de hoofdstukken vier tot en met zeven. Appendix A geeft meer gedetailleerde 
informatie over de opzet van de enquête, de steekproeftrekking, en de vragenlijsten die 
gebruikt zijn om de onafhankelijke variabelen te meten – de sociale omstandigheden 
waarin mensen leven en zijn opgegroeid en hun persoonlijkheidskenmerken. Om de 
invloed van persoonlijkheidskenmerken te bestuderen heb ik een standaardvragenlijst 
gebruikt die bekendstaat als het ‘Vijf Factoren Model’. Bovendien heb ik meer specifieke 
vragen gesteld over sociale waardenoriëntaties en empathie dat bestaat uit cognitief 
inlevingsvermogen en emotioneel medeleven met anderen. 
In hoofdstuk drie – ‘Wie geeft wat en waarom? Een quasi-experimenteel onderzoek 
naar sociale dilemma’s – bestudeer ik hoe kenmerken van de situatie waarin mensen 
beslissen over het bijdragen aan collectieve goederen de bereidheid beïnvloeden om tijd en 
geld te geven. Dit hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op een vignettenexperiment dat in de FNB2000 
is opgenomen. In het experiment beoordeelden de respondenten acht hypothetische 
situaties waarin een bijdrage van tijd of geld werd gevraagd: zij gaven de kans aan dat ze 
in zo’n situatie geld of tijd zouden geven. In het experiment werden willekeurige 
combinaties van vier aspecten gemaakt: (1) de materiële kosten, (2) de sociale afstand tot 
degene die om een bijdrage vraagt, (3) de psychologische afstand tot degenen die 
uiteindelijk van de bijdrage profiteren, en (4) de effectiviteit van een bijdrage. De 
resultaten van het experiment laten zien dat de sociale afstand tot degene die het verzoek 
doet de belangrijkste factor is die de kans op een bijdrage beïnvloedt: mensen geven eerder 
geld of tijd naarmate het verzoek gedaan wordt door iemand die hen nader staat. Van de 
kenmerken van de respondenten die meegenomen werden bleek vooral een hoger 
opleidingsniveau de kans op een bijdrage te verhogen. Persoonlijkheidskenmerken bleken 
minder sterk samen te hangen met de kans op een bijdrage. Van de 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken bleek het emotionele aspect van empathie het sterkste samen 
te hangen met de kans op een bijdrage. 
In hoofdstuk vier – ‘Anonieme giften: persoonlijke beslissingen, sociale 
achtergronden’ – heb ik donaties aan onbekenden bestudeerd. Geldelijke giften aan goede 
doelen, donaties van bloed en organen komen ten goede aan onbekende anderen die niet 
in staat zijn om iets terug te geven. Volgens de zwakke situatie-hypothese zou de invloed 
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van persoonlijkheidskenmerken het grootste moeten zijn voor dit type geefgedrag. De 
resultaten van de statistische analyses laten echter zien dat anonieme giften het sterkste 
samenhangen met sociale omstandigheden. Een hoger opleidingsniveau verhoogt de kans 
op het geven van geld, bloed, en organen. Een hogere frequentie van kerkbezoek verhoogt 
giften aan goede doelen, maar verlaagt de kans op orgaandonatie. 
Persoonlijkheidskenmerken hadden grillige en relatief zwakke effecten. Opnieuw bleek het 
emotionele aspect van empathie het belangrijkst. Echter, de invloed daarvan bleef beperkt 
tot geldelijke giften. 
De hoofdstukken vijf, zes en zeven gaan over verschillende vormen van activiteit in 
vrijwillige verenigingen. De resultaten van deze hoofdstukken geven aanleiding tot 
gelijkaardige conclusies als in hoofdstuk vier over anonieme giften. Vrijwillige 
verenigingen worden sterker gesteund en bevolkt door mensen uit specifieke sociale 
omgevingen (mensen met een hoger opleidingsniveau, een sterkere religieuze 
betrokkenheid, en inwoners van kleinere plaatsen) en niet zozeer door mensen met 
specifieke persoonlijkheidskenmerken. In hoofdstuk vijf – ‘Deelname aan vrijwillige 
verenigingen: een kwestie van hulpbronnen, persoonlijkheid of allebei?’ – bestudeer ik 
lidmaatschap en vrijwilligerswerk in verenigingen. Omdat deze vormen van prosociaal 
gedrag gemakkelijker waarneembaar zijn en kunnen leiden tot gegeneraliseerde 
reciprociteit, werd verwacht dat de beschikbaarheid van hulpbronnen sterker met 
verenigingsactiviteit samen zou hangen dan met anonieme giften. Dit bleek echter niet het 
geval. Net als anonieme giften blijkt lidmaatschap en vrijwilligerswerk in verenigingen 
vooral samen te hangen met sociale omstandigheden, opnieuw met name het 
opleidingsniveau en de mate van religiositeit. De persoonlijkheidskenmerken van actieve 
burgers zijn minder duidelijk dan hun hulpbronnen. Persoonlijkheidskenmerken hebben 
vaak verschillende effecten op verschillende vormen van participatie. Leden van vrijwillige 
verenigingen zijn sterker emotioneel meelevend dan niet-leden, minder netjes, en iets meer 
open voor nieuwe ervaringen. Emotionele stabiliteit is vooral kenmerkend voor mensen 
die lid zijn van meerdere verenigingen tegelijkertijd en vrijwilligerswerk doen. Vrijwilligers 
zijn ook meer extravert en staan meer open voor nieuwe ervaringen. 
In hoofdstuk zes – ‘Verschuivende achtergronden van verenigingsparticipatie in 
Nederland’ – beantwoord ik (samen met co-auteur Nan Dirk de Graaf) hoe het kan dat 
deelname aan verenigingen in de afgelopen decennia niet is afgenomen, terwijl de 
kerkelijkheid wel sterk is teruggelopen. Kerkelijke betrokkenheid is in het verzuilde 
Nederland altijd de belangrijkste factor die deelname in verenigingen bepaalde. In de  
 
afgelopen veertig jaar zijn er vele seculiere verenigingen (natuur- en milieuorganisaties, 
sport clubs, muziek- en theaterverenigingen) opgekomen, die de afname in 
lidmaatschappen van verzuilde verenigingen (vakbonden, politieke partijen) 
gecompenseerd hebben. In dit hoofdstuk onderzoeken we hoe de aard van de 
verenigingsparticipatie in Nederland veranderd is door de kenmerken van leden van 
verzuilde en seculiere organisaties met elkaar te vergelijken. We bespreken drie elkaar 
aanvullende theorieën: (1) collectieve actie-theorie, (2) Inglehart’s theorie over 
postmaterialisme, (3) het ‘Vijf factoren model’ uit de persoonlijkheidspsychologie. 
Volgens de ‘logica van collectieve actie’ gaan mensen eerder over tot lidmaatschap als dat 
voor hen ook iets oplevert. De voorspelling op grond van deze theorie is dat seculiere 
verenigingen vaker gebruik maken van selectieve prikkels om leden te werven, vooral 
onder jongeren. Deze theorie gaat echter niet op voor alle seculiere verenigingen, zoals 
voor natuur- en milieuorganisaties. Deze verenigingen zijn aantrekkelijk voor mensen met 
postmaterialistische waardenoriëntaties. De opkomst van het postmaterialisme zou de 
afname in verzuilde participatie gecompenseerd kunnen hebben. Tenslotte bespreken we 
het argument dat seculiere verenigingen gegroeid zijn die aantrekkelijk zijn voor mensen 
die extravert zijn en open staan voor nieuwe ervaringen, en dat deze 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken sterker verspreid zijn geraakt onder de Nederlandse 
bevolking. De resultaten van de analyses geven steun aan deze laatste voorspelling, maar 
niet aan het argument dat seculiere participatie sterker gebaseerd is op 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken dan deelname aan verzuilde verenigingen. We vinden wel 
bevestiging voor de collectieve actie-theorie en de theorie over postmaterialisme. Sommige 
seculiere verenigingen zijn gegroeid omdat ze meer selectieve prikkels bieden aan hun 
leden. Andere seculiere verenigingen zijn ondanks een gebrek aan deze prikkels toch 
gegroeid omdat ze aantrekkelijk zijn voor postmaterialisten, en het aandeel 
postmaterialisten in Nederland de laatste decennia is gegroeid. Tenslotte bleek dat vooral 
de toename van het opleidingsniveau en in mindere mate ook de verspreiding van 
extraversie voor een stabiel aanbod van leden en vrijwilligers heeft gezorgd. 
In hoofdstuk zeven – ‘De intergenerationele overdracht van vrijwilligerswerk’ – 
bestudeer ik de invloed die ouders hebben op het vrijwilligerswerk van hun kinderen door 
hen het ‘goede voorbeeld’ te geven. Als ouders vrijwilligerswerk doen wanneer hun 
kinderen jong zijn, volgen die kinderen dat voorbeeld dan later als ze volwassen geworden 
zijn? En als dat zo is, hoe kan de invloed van ouders dan verklaard worden? Is het echt 
een gevolg van het goede voorbeeld, of is het een bijproduct van andere typen van 
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intergenerationele overdracht van ouders op kinderen, zoals de overdracht van 
religiositeit, hulpbronnen, of persoonlijkheidskenmerken? De resultaten van de statistische 
analyses leveren bewijs dat er een intergenerationele overdracht van vrijwilligerswerk is, 
maar laten ook zien dat deze overdracht vaak het bijproduct is van andere vormen van 
overdracht. De overdracht van vrijwilligerswerk voor religieuze organisaties blijkt een 
bijproduct te zijn van de overdracht van religiositeit, en de overdracht van verzuild 
vrijwilligerswerk blijkt een bijproduct van de overdracht van sociale status en religiositeit. 
Toch is de overdracht van vrijwilligerswerk van ouders op kinderen niet alleen maar een 
bijproduct van andere vormen van intergenerationele overdracht. Kinderen van ouders die 
vrijwilligerswerk deden voor religieuze of verzuilde verenigingen doen als volwassene later 
zelf ook vaker vrijwilligerswerk voor seculiere organisaties, ook als rekening gehouden 
wordt met de overdracht van religiositeit, opleidingsniveau, beroepsstatus, en 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken. De invloed van ouders bleek niet te verminderen als kinderen 
minder contact hebben met hun ouders. Dit resultaat laat zien dat de invloed van ouders 
waarschijnlijk niet door directe sociale druk verloopt. Het hoofdstuk laat ook zien dat de 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken van vrijwilligers in verschillende soorten verenigingen nogal 
verschillend zijn. Vergeleken met niet-vrijwilligers zijn vrijwilligers voor religieuze 
verenigingen meer extravert, minder open voor nieuwe ervaringen, minder in staat om 
zich te verplaatsen in anderen, maar meer medelevend; vrijwilligers voor verzuilde 
verenigingen zijn emotioneel stabieler, meer open voor nieuwe ervaringen en meer 
medelevend; en vrijwilligers voor seculiere verenigingen tenslotte zijn meer extravert en 
meer open voor nieuwe ervaringen. Deze patronen kwamen in hoofdstuk vijf niet boven 
water omdat daarin alle soorten vrijwilligers samengevoegd waren. 
Hoofdstuk acht – ‘Conclusie en discussie’ – vat de resultaten van de voorgaande 
empirische hoofdstukken samen en geeft antwoord op de probleemstellingen van dit 
proefschrift. De eerste probleemstelling was:  
P1.  In welke mate kan geefgedrag worden verklaard door prosociale motieven en 
andere persoonlijkheidskenmerken en door de sociale omstandigheden waarin mensen 
leven? 
Het antwoord op deze probleemstelling is dat geefgedrag voornamelijk een kwestie is van 
sociale omstandigheden, en niet zozeer van persoonlijkheidskenmerken. Gemiddeld wordt 
ongeveer 30% van de totale verklaarde variantie in de verschillende vormen van geefgedrag 
verklaard door persoonlijkheidskenmerken en sociale waardenoriëntaties. Het gaat dan met name 
om het emotionele aspect van empathie – medeleven. De hypothesen die voorspellen dat mensen  
 
die zichzelf omschrijven als vriendelijker, beter in staat om zich te verplaatsen in anderen en die 
prosociale waarden hebben vaker overgaan tot giften aan goede doelen, bloed donatie, 
orgaandonatie of vrijwilligerswerk blijken meestal niet uit te komen. De hypothesen over sociale 
omstandigheden daarentegen blijken meestal wel op te gaan. De meest karakteristieke 
eigenschappen van mensen die geld, tijd, bloed en organen geven zijn – in aflopende volgorde – 
hun  hoger opleidingsniveau, hun sterker religiositeit, het wonen in een kleinere gemeente, het 
hebben van een voltijds baan en een hoger inkomen. 
  De tweede probleemstelling van dit proefschrift was: 
P2.  In welke omstandigheden zijn persoonlijkheidskenmerken en sociale waardenoriëntaties 
sterker verbonden met geefgedrag? 
De lage kosten-hypothese en de zwakke situatie-hypothese blijken onhoudbaar te zijn als 
antwoord op deze probleemstelling. De invloed van persoonlijkheidskenmerken is niet zo 
heel groot, maar wordt niet minder als de kosten van prosociaal gedrag hoger worden of 
de sociale druk groter wordt. Het is moeilijk om deze weerlegging te negeren door te 
wijzen op tekortkomingen in de toetsing van de hypothesen, omdat die in meerdere 
hoofdstukken op meerdere manieren is uitgevoerd. Het lijkt erop dat beide hypothesen 
simpelweg ongeldig zijn als algemene regels voor de omstandigheden waarin 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken een grotere invloed hebben. Dit betekent overigens niet dat de 
invloed van persoonlijkheidskenmerken volledig losstaat van die van sociale 
omstandigheden. Op diverse plaatsen in het proefschrift zijn onverwachte bevindingen 
gedaan die een nieuw licht werpen op de manier waarop persoonlijkheidskenmerken en 
sociale omstandigheden met elkaar verweven zijn. In hoofdstuk vijf en zeven blijkt 
bijvoorbeeld dat de invloeden van het emotionele aspect van empathie en emotionele 
stabiliteit vaak verdwijnen als rekening gehouden wordt met respectievelijk kerkgang en 
het opleidingsniveau. Deze resultaten suggereren dat een kerkelijke omgeving 
aantrekkelijker is voor empathische mensen, en dat emotionele stabiliteit een pré is voor 
het behalen van een hogere opleiding. Ook de invloed van andere 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken verloopt gedeeltelijk via sociale omstandigheden. In 
toekomstig onderzoek moet daarom ten eerste sterker rekening gehouden worden met de 
mogelijkheid dat mensen met specifieke persoonlijkheidskenmerken voorkeuren hebben 
voor specifieke sociale situaties. Ten tweede moet in toekomstig onderzoek uitgezocht 
worden waarom geefgedrag zo sterk toeneemt met het behaalde opleidingsniveau. In dit 
proefschrift was geen ruimte om dit uit te zoeken, hoewel de Familie-enquête van de 
Nederlandse Bevolking daar wel mooi materiaal voor biedt. In de toekomst hoop ik 
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daarmee aan de slag te gaan. Een derde punt dat in toekomstig onderzoek meer aandacht 
verdient is het dynamische karakter van participatie in verenigingen. Het is waarschijnlijk 
dat de invloed van persoonlijkheidskenmerken en sociale omstandigheden verschilt in 
diverse stadia van deelname. Cross-sectionele enquêtes bieden echter te weinig 
mogelijkheden om dit te analyseren en om oorzaken en gevolgen van participatie netjes 
uit elkaar te houden. Longitudinale studies zoals het ‘Geven in Nederland Panel Survey’ 
zijn daarvoor beter geschikt. 
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